34 Kan. 302 | Kan. | 1885
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On November'4,1884, that being the day of the general election, a special election was held in Harper county, for the relocation of the county seat of that county, and whether such special election is valid, or not, is the only question presented to this court for consideration. It is admitted that such special election was not held under the acts of the legislature relating to the location and removal of county seats. (Comp. Laws of 1879, ch. 26; Laws of 1881, ch. 89.) And it is further admitted that unless it is valid under the act of 1861 relating to the organization of new counties, (Gen. Stat. of 1868, ch. 24,) as amended by the act of 1876, (Laws of 1876, ch. 63,) it is not valid at all, and was held without any authority whatever. It appears from the alternative writ, this being an action of mandamus, that Harper county was organized de facto on August 20, 1873. Of course a temporary county seat was located by the governor at the time of the organization of the county; for such is the law. (Gen. Stat. of 1868, ch. 24, §1.) And afterward, as alleged in the alternative writ, the county seat of said county was permanently located by a vote of the people of Harper county at a place called Bluff City, in said county. It would seem that this should end the case; for if one election was held under the act of 1861, (Gen. Stat. of 1868, ch. 24, §§ 5, 6; Laws of 1872, ch. 106; Comp. Laws of 1879, ch. 24, ¶¶1363, 1364,) to permanently
It is claimed, however, that the organization of Harper county in 1873 was fraudulent; but even if it was, it was still a defacto organization, and the legislature of 1874 ratified and confirmed such organization. (Laws of 1874, ch. 77, §28; The State, ex rel., v. Stevens, 21 Kas. 210.) It further appears that on November 5, 1878, that being the day of the general election, the people of Harper county again held an election for the location, or relocation, of their county seat. Whether this election was held under the general statutes for the relocation of county seats, or under the statutes relating to the organization of new counties, or under some other statute, is not shown. It is however alleged in the alternative writ that this election was only a' “pretended and unlawful election.” At this election, however, the town of Anthony received a majority of the votes cast, and was declared to be the county seat. Afterward, and on March. 8, 1879, the legislature, by an act passed at that time, duly ratified, confirmed and made valid the last-mentioned election, and made Anthony the county seat for the time being. (Laws of 1879, ch. 110.) Wewouldthink that this act is valid, for the legislature has the power, with the consent of a majority of the electors of a county, to change and relocate the county seat. (Const., art. 9, §1.) For the purposes of this case, however, we would think that it makes no difference whether the act is valid, or not. If the county seat had not been permanently located prior to the passage of that act, then we would think that the act would clearly be valid; but even if the county seat had been so located, still we would think that the act would be valid. This act in terms made Anthony only temporarily the county seat; but it was temporary only in the sense and upon the contingency that the electors of Harper county should at the next general election, to be held in 1879, relocate their county seat at some other point.
We have already sustained a motion to quash the alternative writ in this case, and as the parties acting for the plaintiff do not desire to take any further steps in the case, the action will be dismissed.