290 N.W. 434 | Minn. | 1940
Lead Opinion
The pertinent facts have been stipulated. Defendant operates a gasoline filling station in Minneapolis. He sold soft drinks at his station for the accommodation of the public. He did not have a license to do so. The beverages were kept in a cooler from which the purchaser served himself by selecting the desired bottle. The buyer uncapped it and consumed the contents directly from the bottle. No drinking glasses or other conveniences were provided. At the station, in addition to the soft drinks, over 40 *94 different articles for automobile and household use were merchandised, including ice for home consumption.
The relevant statutes must be quoted to present the issues properly. By 3 Mason Minn. St. 1938 Supp. § 5905, it is provided that a person operating a place of refreshment must procure a license from the division of hotel inspection at the cost of $3.50. By § 5903, a place of refreshment is defined as:
"Every building or structure, or any part thereof, used as, maintained as, or advertised as, or held out to be a place where confectionery, ice cream, sandwiches, or drinks of various kinds are made, sold or served at retail, shall, for the purpose of this act, be deemed to be a place of refreshment. Provided, however, that a general merchandise store or grocery store retailing or serving * * * soft drinks * * * of any kind, if such * * * soft drinks are sold and delivered to the public in an original container and the purchaser thereof consumes the contents directly from the original container, shall not be deemed a place of refreshment within the meaning of this act."
Defendant asserts that he does not conduct a place of refreshment within the meaning of the act.
In deciding the merits of defendant's contention, we are met at the outset with the question whether the equal protection clause of U.S. Const. Amend.
There is no doubt that the state, by virtue of its police power, can require those selling soft drinks to procure a license. The legislature has extensive powers which it can exercise in determining whether an evil exists and what regulatory laws are needed. While the legislature is not compelled to regulate all evils simply because it undertakes to legislate as to one, see Patsone v. Pennsylvania,
"The power of the state to classify for purposes of taxation is of wide range and flexibility, provided always, that the classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "
This statement expresses the fundamental principle that runs throughout the realm of constitutional law. Legislation, even in a field where the power is conceded, must conform to constitutional requirements. Otherwise substantive rights are shattered.
Recurring to the matter for decision, the statute provides for the regulation by license of a particular form of business activity. All those within the general class of that activity must be treated the same unless reasonable and substantial grounds for differentiation exist. See discussion, City of Danville v. Quaker Maid, Inc.
But a statute must not be construed as unconstitutional if it is open to a valid construction. Of course, neither the intention of the legislature nor the language of the law can be violated. Starting from the premise stated, we think that the present exempting provision is broad enough to include within the category of "general merchandise store" a filling station retailing more than 40 different articles and dealing in commodities for both automobile and home use. The mere fact that a gasoline station has been termed a "station" is immaterial. Its business, under the stipulation, while not comprehensive, is at least broad enough to bring it within the exclusion. The term "general merchandise *97 store" must be understood in a broad rather than a restricted sense so that constitutionality can be preserved. Consequently, the defendant did not have to have a license.
The judgment is reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
I consider that there is so much difference in so many respects, both intrinsic and extrinsic, between a filling station and a "general merchandise store," that the legislature may well put them in different categories for purposes such as those presently involved. To hold otherwise appears to me to be but the forging of a judicial shackle for legislative action, which by so much would be a transgression of judicial power. In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
I concur in the above dissent.