STATE OF KANSAS, Appellant, v. SETH COLLINS, Appellee.
No. 117,743
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
April 24, 2020
425 P.3d 630
- Probable cause is the standard used to decide whether a defendant is entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution under
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5231 , which is the statute broadly encompassing justifications for using force to defend people or property. The State bears the burden to establish probablecause that defendant‘s use of force was not statutorily justified when a defendant invokes the statute. - The term “probable cause” is described and applied in our caselaw somewhat differently depending on the context. For purposes of
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5231 , the State establishes the probable cause necessary to defeat a pretrial motion for immunity if the district court‘s factual findings are sufficient for a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the defendant‘s guilt despite the defendant‘s claim of justified use-of-force immunity. - To decide a defendant‘s motion for immunity from criminal prosecution under
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5231 , a district court must consider the totality of the circumstances, weigh the evidence before it without deference to the State, and determine whether the State carried its burden to establish probable cause that defendant‘s use of force was not statutorily justified. - A district court‘s probable cause fact finding under
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5231 must be premised on: (a) stipulations of the parties, evidence received at a hearing under the rules of evidence, or both; and (b) the reasonable inferences to be drawn from any stipulations or the evidence. - The process envisioned by
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5231 for determining whether the State met its burden of establishing probable cause will usually require a district court to hear and resolve conflicting evidence when making its factual findings. The district court‘s legal conclusions in deciding whether the State established probable cause must be supported by those factual findings. - Under
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5231 , the State can defeat a pretrial motion for immunity by establishing probable cause that the defendant‘s use of force was not justified in accordance withK.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5222 under either or both of two scenarios: (a) the defendant did not honestly believe the use of force was necessary under the circumstances, or (b) a reasonable person would not believe the use of force was necessary under the circumstances. - Under
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5231 , the State can defeat a pretrial motion for immunity by establishing probable cause that the defendant was engaged in a forcible felony or initially provoked the use of force under the conditions set out inK.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5226(b) or(c) .
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 56 Kan. App. 2d 140, 425 P.3d 630 (2018). Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JOHN J. KISNER JR., judge. Opinion filed April 24, 2020. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court and remanding the case is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded.
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellant.
Patrick H. Dunn, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BILES, J.: The lower courts disagree over the defendant‘s entitlement to statutory self-defense immunity after he drew a knife during an altercation with three unarmed women that ended with one dead and another seriously injured. The district court dismissed second-degree murder and reckless aggravated battery charges, ruling Seth Collins had reasonable grounds to believe he was in danger of great bodily harm. A Court of Appeals panel reversed and remanded the case for further district court proceedings. State v. Collins, 56 Kan. App. 2d 140, 149, 425 P.3d 630 (2018) (“[T]o overcome a defendant‘s immunity claim, the State does not need to prove that the defendant‘s use of force was not justified; it merely has to establish probable cause that the defendant‘s use of force was not justified.“). We agree with the panel.
We hold Collins is not entitled to immunity from prosecution under
Whether Collins’ conduct, as alleged by the State, was justified under the self-defense statutes must be decided at a trial under our statutory scheme.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Our focus is on two incidents on the same evening at an apartment complex involving Collins and his neighbors. In the first incident, Collins suffered multiple head and body injuries. In the second, Kayla Brown died from stab wounds inflicted by Collins with a foldable knife that had a 4.5-inch handle and “slightly less” than a 4-inch blade. Kayla‘s twin sister, Shayla Brown, suffered a serious stab wound to her bicep. At the time, Collins was 38 years old, 5‘11” tall, and weighed about 250 to 255 lbs. Shayla was 22 years old, 4‘11” tall and weighed about 113 lbs. Kayla was the same height as Shayla but weighed about 10 lbs. less. The State charged Collins with second-degree murder for killing Kayla and reckless aggravated battery for stabbing Shayla. See
Collins filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the State‘s charges claiming self-defense immunity. See
We recite the facts as found by the district court in its order granting Collins self-defense immunity because our standard of review preserves factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence. See State v. Hardy, 305 Kan. 1001, 1012, 390 P.3d 30 (2017). When necessary, we quote from the district court‘s order.
The two incidents
The first incident began on the night of April 30, 2016, when Collins drove back to his apartment with his two daughters. He tried to park near a vehicle occupied by Luz Toral. Shayla was outside the vehicle talking to Toral. Collins believed Shayla was obstructing the parking spot. He “made negative comments” towards the women and drove away.
After leaving his vehicle in guest parking, Collins and his daughters walked to his apartment building. Another verbal exchange ensued between Collins and Toral. Collins’ daughters kept walking toward his apartment. Shayla and Kayla got involved. Collins “clearly received and delivered numerous verbal insults” including some that were “racist, vulgar and inciting.” A physical altercation broke out that Collins “started . . . by pushing himself physically up to Ms. Toral in the parking lot.” Kayla, Shayla, “and possibly others joined in against” Collins. At that time, his daughters called 911. Trishall Dear, the twins’ mother, arrived in the parking lot and calmed the situation. Collins went into his apartment, having “sustained significant external injuries to his face, head and other portions of his body . . . .”
About 10 minutes later, the deadly second incident began when Collins returned to the parking lot to look for his glasses. Kayla, Shayla, and Dear were still outside. Collins, Shayla, and Kayla reengaged in a verbal quarrel with more insults. After Collins found his glasses, he had more words with the twins and walked back toward his apartment. As he passed Dear, who was standing near the door into the building, he “quietly stated something derogatory” to her.
The district court found there was no physical contact between Collins, Shayla,
“evidence that Mr. Collins . . . verbally provoked Kayla and Shayla . . . while in the parking lot during the second encounter when he looked for and located his glasses. Mr. Collins was still verbally ‘provoking’ when he made a negative comment to Ms. Dear as he went by her on the way back into the building. Yet, the totality of the evidence does not support a finding that physical force was provoked by Mr. Collins during the second encounter.”
Dear followed Collins into the building. Her daughters started after them. Collins walked up a nine-step staircase. As he approached the top, “all three ladies [were] very close (just a step or two) behind him and he look[ed] back at them.” The district court characterized this moment elsewhere in its order as the women “confront[ing him] from behind in a very aggressive way” and noted “it [was] apparent from the evidence [the twins] intended to physically punish him for the way he had treated them and their mother.”
Then, the court found:
“As Mr. Collins gets to the top of the first flight of stairs, he turns towards the three ladies immediately behind him and displays a knife. The testimony indicates that Collins initially held the knife in his right hand; with the blade open; with the blade pointing up; and he held it about shoulder to head-high next to him.
“While the precise details concerning these few key seconds vary significantly, the evidence indicates that within moments of Mr. Collins displaying the knife, Shayla Brown grabbed the back of his shirt collar and pulled him back towards her, her sister and her mother. In the next few moments, Mr. Collins, Shayla, Kayla, and Ms. Dear all fell back down the staircase.
. . . .
“No evidence was presented to clearly indicate who was stabbed first or the exact location of Kayla or Shayla at the time they were stabbed. The evidence is clear that Shayla Brown was stabbed on her left bicep and Kayla Brown sustained a fatal stab wound on the left side of her neck.
“Once at the bottom of the stairs Shayla held Mr. Collins down momentarily and Mr. Collins still had the knife. Once Ms. Dear saw how seriously wounded Kayla was . . . she went to aid Kayla. Shayla then released her hold on Mr. Collins to assist her mother and sister.
“Mr. Collins gets up, folds up his pocket knife and goes back up the stairs to his apartment.”
The district court did not clearly address how Kayla and Shayla were stabbed, but Collins testified he “start[ed] waving the knife” as they all tumbled down the stairs. He denied using “precision stabs or cuts” or “looking at exactly where the knife [was] going.”
After analyzing the applicable statutory provisions, the district court dismissed all criminal charges. It explained,
“The court has considered the totality of the circumstances and weighed much conflicting evidence. The evidence presented does not establish probable cause that Mr. Collins’ use of force was not justified under the statutes applicable to this case. Based upon these statutes and the recent case law cited herein, Mr. Collins is not subject to criminal prosecution for the tragic death of Kayla Brown or the injuries sustained by Shayla Brown.”
The State timely appealed, arguing it had established probable cause that Collins’ use of deadly force was not necessary to prevent great bodily harm to himself. See
The panel acknowledged the district court faced conflicting evidence but concluded the court applied the wrong legal standard. Collins, 56 Kan. App. 2d at 152. It reasoned that the district court erred by deciding what a jury was supposed to decide, i.e., “whether Collins was justified in his use of deadly force in self-defense.” Id. at 152. As the panel explained,
Collins petitioned this court for review. The State conditionally cross-petitioned for review on the panel‘s failure to decide whether the State met its probable cause burden to demonstrate Collins was the aggressor at the time of the fatal stabbing and initially provoked the use of force. We granted review on all issues.
Jurisdiction is proper. See
ANALYSIS
Under Kansas’ self-defense immunity statute,
“(a) A person who uses force which, subject to the provisions of
K.S.A. 21-5226 , and amendments thereto, is justified pursuant toK.S.A. 21-5222 ,21-5223 or21-5225 , and amendments thereto, is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force, unless the person against whom force was used is a law enforcement officer who was acting in the performance of such officer‘s official duties and the officer identified the officer‘s self in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer. As used in this subsection, ‘criminal prosecution’ includes arrest, detention in custody and charging or prosecution of the defendant.. . . .
“(c) A prosecutor may commence a criminal prosecution upon a determination of probable cause.”
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5231 .
The district court plays a critical role in the pretrial processing of immunity claims under the statutory scheme laid out by the Legislature. Hardy, 305 Kan. at 1010.
At this pretrial stage, the district court‘s function is to assess the State‘s probable cause. See
In State v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 905, 462 P.3d 149 (2020), slip op. at 15, we held the district court failed to properly carry out its role in this pretrial motion process when it made no factual findings before reaching its legal conclusion that self-defense immunity applied. In Collins’ case, we are not concerned with that type of failure. Instead, we must consider whether the district court applied its factual findings as the statutes require in the second step. And as the panel correctly observed, the State‘s burden at this juncture was simply to establish probable cause that Collins’ use of deadly force in self-defense was not justified. 56 Kan. App. 2d at 152.
The term “probable cause” admittedly has been described and applied differently in our caselaw depending on the context. See, e.g., State v. Hubbard, 309 Kan. 22, Syl. ¶ 4, 430 P.3d 956 (2018) (“Probable cause to support a search can be established if the totality of the circumstances indicates there is a fair probability the place to be searched contains contraband or evidence of a crime.“); Hamel v. Hamel, 296 Kan. 1060, Syl. ¶ 8, 299 P.3d 278 (2013) (“In determining whether a beneficiary has probable cause to challenge the provisions of a will or trust, the term ‘probable cause’ means the existence, at the time of the initiation of the proceeding, of evidence which would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude there is a substantial likelihood that the contest or attack will be successful.“); State v. Washington, 293 Kan. 732, 733-34, 268 P.3d 475 (2012) (noting probable cause to bind a defendant over for trial “‘signifies evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused‘s guilt‘“); In re Burch, 296 Kan. 215, Syl. ¶ 7, 291 P.3d 78 (2012) (“In order to establish probable cause to justify transitional release, a person committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act must present facts at the annual review hearing that are sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and action to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that the person‘s mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that he or she is safe to be placed in transitional release.“); State v. Abbott, 277 Kan. 161, 164, 83 P.3d 794 (2004) (describing probable cause to support a warrantless arrest as “‘the reasonable belief that a specific crime has been or is being committed and that the defendant committed the crime‘“).
In the self-defense immunity setting, probable cause means that the facts as found by the district court are sufficient for a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of defendant‘s guilt despite the claim of justified use-of-force immunity. See Hardy, 305 Kan. 1001, Syl. ¶ 1 (holding State must establish probable cause that use of force was not statutorily justified to overcome motion for immunity under
It is important to remember the probable cause burden required by
Standard of review
An appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review when considering a district court‘s probable cause determination on a pretrial immunity motion. The factual findings arising from disputed evidence are reviewed for substantial competent evidence, and the reviewing court will not reweigh that disputed evidence. The ultimate legal conclusions drawn from the facts are considered de novo. Hardy, 305 Kan. at 1012.
It should be conceded upfront that the statutory scheme supplying various justifications for using force, including deadly force, to defend people or property has proven complex, overlapping, and difficult to apply from case to case. This appeal illustrates some of that higher degree of difficulty. So we begin where we always should start, with the statutes.
Self-defense is governed by
“(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such use of force is necessary to defend such person or a third person against such other‘s imminent use of unlawful force.
“(b) A person is justified in the use of deadly force under circumstances described in subsection (a) if such person reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or a third person.
“(c) Nothing in this section shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to protect such person or a third person.”
In a case involving the use of deadly force in defense of a person, governed by subsection (b), there is a two-prong test. The first is subjective. It requires a showing that the defendant sincerely and honestly believed deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to the defendant or a third person. The second prong is objective. It requires a showing that a reasonable person in the defendant‘s circumstances would have perceived the use of deadly force as necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to the defendant or a third person. State v. Macomber, 309 Kan. 907, 916-17, 441 P.3d 479 (2019).
Another way the Legislature imposes limits on a defendant‘s ability to claim the justification described in
“(a) Is attempting to commit, committing or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony;
“(b) initially provokes the use of any force against such person or another, with intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or
“(c) otherwise initially provokes the use of any force against such person or another, unless:
(1) Such person has reasonable grounds to believe that such person is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of deadly force; or
(2) in good faith, such person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that such person desires to withdraw and terminate the use of such force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of such force.”
As can be seen, subsection (a) denies the self-defense justification to a person engaged in a forcible felony. And subsections (b) and (c) articulate additional, but separate, bases for denying the self-defense claim when a person “initially provokes the use of any force against such person or another.”
The State argues Collins’ conduct in the stairwell, especially in pulling a knife on the unarmed women, makes
Against this backdrop, the State‘s appeal presents alternative analytical paths because it contends it met its probable cause burden under either
We hold
The probable cause showing Collins was not justified drawing his knife
In analyzing the second incident just before the stabbings, we begin with Collins’ conduct as he reemerged to retrieve his glasses. The district court found Collins triggered a verbal exchange with the women as he went back to the parking lot and was “still verbally ‘provoking‘” the women “when he made a negative comment to Ms. Dear as he went by her on the way back into the building.” Immediately afterward, according to the district court‘s findings, the women “very aggressive[ly]” followed Collins up the staircase. This was the first use of force.
To explain this, “‘use of force‘” for the purposes of the self-defense statutes includes “[w]ords or actions that reasonably convey the threat of force . . . .”
The initial aggressor statute applies when a person “initially provokes the use of any force” against the person—not just physical force. (Emphasis added.)
Next, Collins responded with his own use of force—halting the retreat to his apartment at the top of the stairwell, turning to the women, and brandishing the knife. This must be analyzed first under the initial aggressor provisions of
Under subsection (b), use of force is not justified if the person initially provokes the use of force against that person or another, with intent to use the force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm on the assailant. The district court found Collins did not harbor that intent, and we do not find reason to disturb that factual finding.
But under subsection (c)‘s retreat safe harbor exceptions, a provocateur‘s use of force can be justified in only two circumstances. First, under subsection (c)(1), if they have reasonable grounds to believe they are in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and have exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than resorting to the use of deadly force. Second, under subsection (c)(2), if in good faith they withdraw from physical contact with the assailant and clearly indicate their desire to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes it.
An ordinarily prudent and cautious person could conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief—based upon the facts found by the district court—that Collins did not exhaust every reasonable means to escape. See
An ordinarily prudent and cautious person could also conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief Collins did not “in good faith, . . . [withdraw] from physical contact with the assailant and [indicate] clearly to the assailant that [he] desire[d] to withdraw and terminate the use of such force, but the assailant continue[d] or resume[d] the use of such force.”
The probable cause showing that Collins was not justified using his knife
We now turn to the deadly aftermath of Collins’ decision to pull out his knife. In the third discernable use of force during the second incident, the women responded by grabbing hold of him. And that instantly led to the fourth use of force with Collins swinging the knife and stabbing and cutting the twins as everyone tumbled down the stairs.
An ordinarily prudent and cautious person could conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that Collins’ lethal reply was not justified, regardless of whether the women were warranted in grabbing him. If they were, Collins’ conduct was not justified because self-defense immunity is only available when force is necessary to defend against the “imminent use of unlawful force.” (Emphasis added.)
A forcible felony “includes any treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery, aggravated sodomy and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any person.”
It follows from the facts as found by the district court that there is probable cause to believe Collins committed an aggravated assault when he turned and wielded the knife against the women. And this all flows from the earlier circumstances that show probable cause Collins provoked the women into following him up the stairwell through his verbal taunting. Under these facts, a jury could conclude the knife was a deadly weapon, and that Collins knowingly placed the women in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm when he wielded it. See State v. Schoenberger, 216 Kan. 464, 465, 468, 532 P.2d 1085 (1975) (evidence sufficient to prove aggravated assault when defendant armed with a large knife and swiped at victim with it during a “street fracas“).
Collins chose to draw his knife in the afterglow of a prior confrontation in which he was badly injured, after his continued verbal provocation of the women when he reemerged to the parking lot, and while the women were very close to him at the top of the stairs. These circumstances present an “atmosphere . . . heavily fraught with danger and . . . threatening enough to have induced apprehension on the part of [the victims] for [their] personal safety.” See State v. Warbritton, 215 Kan. 534, 537-38, 527 P.2d 1050 (1974) (holding evidence insufficient to support aggravated assault conviction when, despite circumstances sufficient to induce fear for personal safety, victim denied being in fear and said she was not scared). And Collins’ undeniable purpose in drawing the knife on the women when he did was either to use it on them or make them fear that he would.
Yet, the district court rejected
On the whole, the district court lost sight of its task at this pretrial stage. We hold the State supplied probable cause to believe Collins’ killing of Kayla and wounding of Shayla were not justifiable acts of self-defense under our statutory scheme. The State‘s prosecution of Collins should have been permitted to continue. The decision whether to hold Collins criminally liable for his conduct, and to what degree, should be made at trial.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court‘s judgment and remanding for trial is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded with directions.
NUSS, C.J., not participating.
JARED B. JOHNSON, District Judge, assigned.1