State v. CollinsState v. Collins
The main issue presented is whether or not the signing оf a waiver of rights form and subsequent inculpatory statements by defendant were free and voluntary. Also, the defendant questions whether or not the sentence imposed is excessive.
On December 7, 1983, defendant, Jerry Collins, was charged by bill of information with attempted second degree murder and aggravated burglary, in violation of
1. The trial court еrred by ruling statements made by defendant and a “rights form” signed by him were admissible.
2. The trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence.
On October 9, 1983, around 4:30 a.m., William Floyd Singleton, the victim, awakened by the barking of his dog, saw the shadow of a man in his bedroom doorwаy. The victim hesitated, and then jumped out of bed to confront the supposed intruder. Before he reached the intruder, the intruder fired a shot, which struck a wall. The victim continued forward, plаcing his hands on the intruder. Another shot was fired and even though the victim was struck in the abdomen, he kept a firm grip on the intruder and a struggle ensued. Somehow, they ended on the floor in a second bedroom, where the victim‘s baby was sleeping.
Barbara G. Earle, who was living with the victim, was sleeping beside him when the incident began. She called the police and ran to the neighbors to get hеlp. Carol Veals was the first neighbor to arrive. She helped keep the barrel of the pistol held by the intruder from pointing toward anyone. Her son, Robert Lewis Bennett, arrived and took thе pistol away from the intruder. Robert then tried to remove a red bandana the defendant wore to shield his identity. Another fierce struggle ensued and a lamp in the room caught fire. Confusion brоke out, Carol tried to smother the fire and Robert struck the intruder on the head
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting into the record over objection a signed rights form and inculpatory statements. Defendant contends he never signed any waiver of rights form or made any statements. Further, he claims he was in no physical condition to intelligently and freely waive his right to remain silent.
Before the state may introduce a confession into evidence, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that statement was free and voluntary.
During the predicate, defendant did deny signing any rights form or making any confession, but a trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Norman, 448 So.2d 246 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), reversed in part on other grounds, 452 So.2d 1178 (1984). Further, in reviewing a trial court‘s ruling on the admissibility of a confession, its conclusions on credibility are entitled to respect due those made by one who saw the witnesses and heard them testify. State v. Woods, 435 So.2d 1137 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).
It is apparent the trial court found the testimony of Detective Orrell H. Ryan more credible than the defendant‘s testimony. Detective Ryan explained the Miranda rights, obtained defendant‘s signature on the waiver form and received the confession by defendant. Detective Ryan was awarе of the overwhelming evidence linking the defendant to these crimes, including an arrest at the scene and numerous positive identifications. We note the point urged by the state in brief; in light of the evidence it is highly unlikely Detective Ryan felt it necessary to fabricate a confession, forge the defendant‘s signature on the rights waiver form and then perjure himself in court. This court is convinced the signing took place and the statements were made by the defendant.
Our inquiry must now focus upon whether the defendant was fully capable of understanding his Miranda rights and also capablе of freely and voluntarily waiving them. The defendant had been struck repeatedly in the head with a metal baseball bat. However, treatment was administered for these injuries and the defendant was released into police custody. No medical expert has indicated a condition existed in defendant which would prevent him from exercising clear thought. In fact, the weight of the evidence is in favor of clear thought. Detective Ryan testified the defendant stated he understood each and every right read to him by the detective. Further, the defendant‘s waiver of rights occurred after treatment in the hospital and the subsequent release from the hospital. We can assume the injuries to defendant were not so great as to impair his thought рrocess. Otherwise, he would not have been released by the hospital personnel. Thus, we find this assignment of error is without merit. See, State v. Clark, 340 So.2d 208 (La.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 936, 97 S.Ct. 1563, 51 L.Ed.2d 782 (1977).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
Defendant argues the trial court imposed excessivе sentences.
The sentences imposed, to be served concurrently, represent the maximum allowed by law for attempted second degree murder and aggravated burglary. Defеndant claims those sentences are excessive because
Although a sentence is within statutory limits it may still be adjudged excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). Maximum sentences are appropriately imposed in cases involving the most egregious and blameworthy offenders within a class. State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983); State v. Robinson, 431 So.2d 104 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).
However, the trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentenсe imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Shields, 444 So.2d 287 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied, 446 So.2d 312 (La.1984).
In State v. Telsee, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court lists several factors found within the sentencing guidelines of
The record is replete with references by the trial court carefully weighing these considerations and several others. The trial cоurt perceived the defendant would commit another crime during a period of probation; defendant needed to be institutionalized; a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the crime; the evidence showed defendant caused the incident which narrowly missed ending the life of William Floyd Singleton; and defendant‘s criminal record, which shows a histоry of repeated involvement in violent crimes, indicates defendant would probably not respond to rehabilitative treatment.
The record disputes defendant‘s allegation the trial court‘s sole consideration in determining the sentences was defendant‘s arrest record. We find no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in sentencing.
We notе the State in this case failed “to charge the defendant with the use of a firearm” or to “move timely for enhancement of penalty.” Because of this the firearm enhancement statutes,
This assignment of error is without merit.
AFFIRMED.