State v. CollinsState v. Collins
Case Information
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[Cite as
State v. Collins
,
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 23CA13 v. :
CLAYTON COLLINS, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. :
_________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Christopher Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant [1] .
Andrea K. Boyd, Special Prosecuting Attorney, Assistant Attorney
General, Ohio Attorney General’s Office, Columbus, Ohio, for
appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:7-25-24
ABELE, J.
This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas
Court judgment of conviction and sentence. Clayton Collins,
defendant below and appellant herein, assigns two errors for
review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“COLLINS’ PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND INTELLIGENTLY GIVEN.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED A CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE WITHOUT CONSIDERING ALL OF THER.C. 2929.14 FACTORS.” In January 2023, a Highland County Grand Jury returned an
indictment that charged appellant with (1) one count of rape of a
child in violation of
and (2) one count of gross sexual imposition in violation of
pleas. At a May 31, 2023 pretrial hearing, the trial court
notified the parties of the court’s practice that plea offers “be
placed in writing so that it’s clear what they are and then in the
event that there isn’t a plea reached that this matter proceeds to
tria l the Court has a written plea rejection form.” In addition,
the court added:
[M]y policy is that any resolution of the case involving a jury trial has to be done fourteen days prior to the hearing. So, that’s just a couple days prior to that and the reason for that is once we send out jury notices people start changing their routines and calling in and there’s a lot of people effected [sic.] and so I don’t engage, we don’t have jury’s that are sitting here everyday like they do in the city. So, we don’ t like to inconvenience people. So, there is no plea bargaining after fourteen days. {¶4} At the final pretrial hearing on June 26, 2023, the State informed the trial court that appellant rejected the S tate’s plea
offer. Consequently, the parties entered a written plea rejection.
In addition, the trial court reiterated:
[W]’ll send out jury notices the end of this week and the Court’s policy is there is no plea bargaining on trial date. There’s no plea bargaining fourteen days, uh within fourteen days. So, if there is going to be a resolution it needs to be done by the end of the week. Otherwise, we will go to trial, we don’t mess around talking and seeing if somebody wants to work something out the day of trial. We’ve got jurors here, they change their lives, everybody changes their schedule so. That’s the way it will go. Two days later, at the June 28, 2023 change-of-plea
hearing, appellant indicated that he consulted with his attorney,
expressed satisfaction with his representation, acknowledged he
understood the plea agreement, the allegations contained in the
indictment, the rights he waived with his plea, and the possible
penalties. The State reviewed the underlying facts of the
indictment and noted that this case involved two separate victims,
both appellant’s relatives, one less than ten years old and one
less than six years old. After appellant entered a guilty plea to both counts, the
trial court ordered appellant to (1) serve a mandatory life term
with possibility of parole after 15 years on Count 1- Rape, (2)
serve a 48-month prison term on Count 2- Gross Sexual Imposition,
(3) serve the prison terms consecutively to each other and to
another prison sentence appellant was serving on a different case,
(4) serve a mandatory 5-year postrelease control term, and (5)
register as a Tier III sex offender. This appeal followed.
I. In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that
he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.
Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court’s policy of
imposing a plea agreement deadline provided an advantage to the
State and caused him to enter an invalid plea. “Because a no -contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of
constitutional rights, a defendant's decision to enter a plea must
be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
Dangler
,
28-29 (1992). Thus, if a defendant did not enter a plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is
unconstitutional.
Id.
;
State v. Leib,
Dist.). In general, appellate courts apply a de novo standard of
review when evaluating a plea's compliance with
State v. Nero
,
evidence of a written waiver form signed by the accused constitutes
strong proof of a valid waiver.
State v. Clark
,
261 (1988).
{¶9}
In the case at bar, appellant does not challenge the
trial court's compliance with
due to the court’s policy to preclude pleas less than 14 days
before a trial, he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary plea. Concerning a judge's participation in the plea-bargaining
process, the Supreme Court of Ohio cautioned that “the judge's
position in the criminal justice system presents a great potential
for coerced guilty pleas and can easily compromise the impartial
pos ition a trial judge should assume.” State v. Byrd , 63 Ohio
St.2d 288, 292 (1980). Thus, although judicial participation is
strongly discouraged, it does not render a plea per se involuntary;
rather, the “ultimate inquiry is whether the judge's active con duct
could have led the defendant to believe he could not get a fair
trial, including a fair sentence after trial, and whether the
judicial participation undermined the voluntariness of the plea.”
State v. Lawson
,
motion, the trial court set the case for a jury trial on May 5,
2022. On April 18, 2022 the court held a final pretrial hearing
and explained that, because the court needed to send jury notices
the next day, the court inquired whether Bodine understood the
State's plea offer. Id. at ¶ 10. The court further explained its
policy not to accept plea agreements to anything less than the
entire indictment after the court sends jury notices. Bodine
responded that, because the court planned to send jury notices the
next day, he did not have adequate time to fully consider his
options. When the court replied that the case had been pending for
multiple months, Bodine responded that he had recently given his
attorney documents relevant to his case and he did not believe he
had adequate time to consult with his attorney. The court then
stated, “[t]his is your option, Mr. Bodine, to go ahead with the
proposal and enter pleas of guilty to those two counts or take it
to a jury trial.” Bodine chose a jury trial. Id. at ¶ 11. Later
that day, however, the parties presented the court with a
negotiated plea agreement and the court conducted a thorough
which a judge's involvement impacted the voluntariness of a plea
include significant coercion from the trial court judges. For
example, in
State v. Byrd
,
Supreme Court of Ohio found a plea involuntary when the trial judge
met with Byrd without his lawyer present, urged him to enter a
guilty plea, informed him that the evidence at trial would
determine whether he “went to the electric chair,” and urged his
family members and a family friend to encourage him to enter a
guilty plea. Bodine at ¶ 22, citing Byrd. The Bodine court pointed to another Third District
involuntary plea case when the trial court told a defendant that if
he testified at trial, he is “setting himself up for additional
charges,” that the evidence against him is “overwhelming,” that “no
way” would the j ury not find him guilty, and that his decision to
reject any plea offer is “stupid.” Id. at ¶ 23, citing State v.
Howard
,
court also stated, “you should've been scared the night you did
thi s stupid thing,” indicating that the trial court had already
determined the defendant's guilt. Id. The Bodine court held that
the Howard statements emphasized the defendant's futility of
pursuing a trial and are “entirely different” than the facts in
Bodine. Id. at ¶ 23. Thus, the court concluded that, although at
times Bodine did express reservations about entering a plea, the
trial court’s statements at the plea hearing did not amount to
coercion that rendered Bodine’s plea involuntary. Id. at ¶ 25. In the case sub judice, appellant's signed written guilty
plea form is included in the record. During the plea colloquy, the
trial court reviewed the elements of the charge, the possible
sentence and asked appellant if he understood that his guilty plea
waived his right to a jury trial, right not to testify against
himself, right to confront witnesses, right to compulsory process,
and right to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Appellant responded that he did understand. Although appellant now contends that the trial court’s
admonition meant that he had only “a matter of hours” to enter his
plea, the record reveals that the trial court notified appellant of
the plea deadline at the May 31, 2023 pretrial hearing and again at
the June 26, 2023 pretrial hearing. When appellant entered his
plea on June 28, 2023, trial was set to begin on July 12. With a
trial date of July 12, 2023, appellant knew about the time limit
and that he had four weeks to enter his plea. Thus, appellant knew
about the plea deadline from May 31 until his June 28 plea. Moreover, as appellee points out, at the June 28, 2023
change of plea hearing the trial court asked appellant, “do you
feel you had enough time to fully consider this matter before
making this decision to sign this document?” Appellant replied,
“Yes, Your Honor.” When asked if he signed the agreement
voluntarily, appellant responded, “Absolutely.” Further, appellant
confirmed that he had spoken with his attorney about the plea, that
he understood the terms of the plea and understood the
constitutional rights he waived by entering the plea, that he was
satisfied with his counsel, and that no threats had been made. In addition to his argument that he had “only a matter of
hours” to enter his plea, appellant further characterizes the trial
court’s plea deadline policy as an “arbitrary deadline [that]
provided the state with the upper hand in plea negotiations.”
Other courts, however, also use plea agreement deadlines. See
State v. Cogar,
weeks before trial);
State v. Dahlberg,
Dist.)(plea deadline hearing); State v. Stephenson (Apr. 30, 1997),
9th Dist. No. 17752 (trial court had discretion to accept plea
after court's plea deadline had passed.) Further, as appellee
points out, federal courts employ plea deadlines. See U.S. v.
Santos,
knowledge that the Court consistently sets plea deadlines
approximately three to four weeks before the scheduled trial date).
Setting such deadlines is the standard practice in this district and is widely practiced in many districts across the country. United States v. Allen ,2002 WL 31890920 (6th Cir. Dec. 26, 2002) (unpublished); United States v. Robertson , 2002 WL 1773302 (10th Cir. Aug. 2, 2002) (unpublished); United States v. Vargas Lopez , 2000 WL 1728114 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2000) (unpublished). Courts may reject guilty pleas that are tendered after a deadline is set by the court. United States v. Moore ,916 F.2d 1131 , 1136 n. 11 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Gamboa , 166 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir.1998).
Santos , supra.
{¶18} As outlined above, in the case sub judice the trial court notified appellant of the plea agreement deadline well in advance.
There are valid reasons that courts use plea agreement deadlines,
especially in less populated counties that do not have readily
available pools of jurors at hand in the courthouse to serve, but
instead must order personnel to individually notify prospective
jurors that their services are necessary and make other necessary
preparations to accommodate prospective jurors. Here, at the plea
hearing appellant stated that he had not been threatened to enter
his plea, and, when asked if he signed the agreement voluntarily,
appellant replied, “Absolutely.” Consequently, after our review we conclude that appellant
did enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error.
II. In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that
the trial court erred when it did not consider all of the
each other and to a previously imposed sentence in Case No.
21CR0107. When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts apply
the standard outlined in
that “[t]he appellate court’s standard for review is not whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion.” Instead, the statute
authorizes appellate courts to “increase, reduce, or othe rwise
modify a sentence” “if it clearly and convincingly finds either of
the following”:
(a) That the record does not support the sentenci ng court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or(C)(4) ofsection 2929.14 , or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
trial courts’ broad discretion in making sentencing decisions.’ ”
State v. Gwynne
,
23 (appellate court's review of whether sentence is clearly and
convincingly contrary to law under
to sentencing court). Thus,
appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify
consecutive sentences only if the record does not “clearly and
convincingly” support the trial court's
consecutive-sentence findings. The clear-and-convincing standard
for appellate review in
negative. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio- 3851, at ¶ 13. Moreover, “clear and
convincing evidence” is “that measure or degree of proof which is
more tha n a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the
extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’
in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier
of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.”
Cross v. Ledford
,
three of the syllabus. In general, a statutory presumption exists in favor of
concurrent sentences pursuant to
imprisonment. To justify the imposition of consecutive terms of
imprisonment, “a trial court must make the findings mandated by
findings into its sentencing entry, but the court has no obligation
to state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Blair , 2019-
Ohio-2768 ¶ 52 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Bonnell , 2014-Ohio-
3177, syllabus. This Court explained the findings required to
support the imposition of consecutive sentences:
“Under the tripartite procedure set forth inR.C. 2929.14(C)(4) , prior to imposing consecutive sentences a trial court must find that: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public; and (3) that one of three circumstances specified in the statute applies.”
State v. Cottrill
,
v. Baker
,
circumstances are:
“(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates
that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
public from future crime by the offender.”
Cottrill
at ¶ 14, quoting
The record must support any findings that the applicable statutory sentencing provisions require and made by the sentencing
court, such as those contained in
Gray
,
Ohio-81, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.). Further, in Drummond we observed that
the plain language of
court to defer to a trial court's consecutive-sentence findings,
and to uphold the trial court's findings unless those findings are
clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. Drummond at
¶ 12. In
State v. Bonnell
,
Ohio held, “In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a
trial court is required to make the findings mandated by
findings into its sentencin g entry[.]” Id. at ¶ 37. In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that the trial
court included the necessary findings under
support the imposition of consecutive sentences in its June 28,
2023 sentencing entry. Appellant, however, asserts that the trial
court failed to make the required necessity and proportionality
findings at the sentencing hearing. “If the trial court fails to
make the requisite findings at the sentencing hearing, the
imposition of consecutive sentences is contrary to law even if the
[Cite as
State v. Collins
,
sentencing entry includes the findings.” State v. Conn , 2023-Ohio-
2669, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.), citing
State v. Brickles
,
9, 11 (4th Dist.). However, as appellee points out, although the
record must contain a basis upon which a reviewing court can
determine that the trial court made the
findings, “a word -for-word recitation of the language of the
statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can
discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and
can determine that the record contains evidence to support the
findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Bonnell at ¶
29. In the case at bar, at sentencing the trial court stated
the following regarding its decision to impose consecutive
sentences:
The Court is not going to follow the recommendation of concurrent sentence because to do so would mean that the offense meant nothing. There’s two separate victims. If it had been the same victim it would be different. We have two separate victims, you have two courses of conduct that are independent and the harm to these victims in each case is such that one single prison term would not adequately reflect the seriousness of your conduct. And that has to be taken into consideration. And the fact that you did these, and you have a prior criminal record. Your criminal history demonstrates to the Court as well as the nature of these offenses that this is necessary to protect the public. So, the four years sentence will be ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence in Count One. Both sentences are ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence that you’re currently se rving from this court in * * * 21 CR 107.
[Cite as
State v. Collins
,
Thus, we believe that the court adequately stated on the record
that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
offender poses to the public. Bonnell at ¶ 36. Finally, appellant contends that the sentencing entry
failed to indicate the statute that established the consecutive
sentencing requirement. As appellee observes, however, the
sentencing entry contained checkboxes for the trial court to
determine which sections applied to the case at bar. The trial
court placed an “X” by the clause that stated, “Consecutive
sentences are required pursuant to Section ORC,” but did not
fill in the blank. The court also placed an “X” next to the
following clauses:
Pursuant toSection 2929.14(C)(4) that the consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that the consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and the court also finds any of the following:
___ The offender committed one or more of the multiple
offenses while the offender was awaiting rial or
sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to
section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code,
or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
_X_ At least two of the multiple offenses were commixed as
part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused
by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was
*17
[Cite as
State v. Collins
,
so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
_X_ The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. After our review, we conclude that the trial court did
not err when it imposed consecutive sentences. Further, we do not
have a firm belief or conviction that the record does not support
the trial court's finding that consecutive sentences are not
disprop ortionate to the seriousness of appellant’s conduct and to
the danger he poses to the public. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we overrule
appellant’s second assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
JU DGMENT AFFIRME D. JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellee shall recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to
allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or
the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule
II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the
date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment & Opinion Hess, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only
For the Court BY:_____________________________ Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
Notes
[1] Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court proceedings.