Lead Opinion
¶1 This case addresses the proper assignment of the burden of proof at a pretrial competency hearing following treatment designed to restore competency. The trial court placed the burden on respondent Mr. Blayne Coley to prove his incompetence. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the burden rests with the State to prove restoration of competency and that the trial
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 While police were responding to a domestic incident at the residence of Mr. Coley and his girlfriend, Mr. Coley informed officers that his girlfriend’s 13-year-old son had molested him. Upon investigation, respondеnt Mr. Coley was charged with and ultimately convicted in Grant County Superior Court of two counts of rape of a child in the second degree in violation of RCW" 9A.44.076.
¶3 Prior to trial, counsel and the court raised concerns about Mr. Coley’s competency on multiple occasions. Defense counsel filed a motion requesting an evaluation of Mr. Coley’s mental condition in July 2008. After referring Mr. Coley to Eastern State Hospital for evaluation and treatment, the court on December 9, 2008, entered an order of competency based on the hospital’s uncontested report. The court moved forward with pretrial preparations until, during an April 20,2009, hearing regarding Mr. Coley’s request to proceed pro se, Judge Evan Sperline again became concerned with Mr. Coley’s competency. Judge Sperline referred Mr. Coley to Eastern State Hospital for another competency evaluation. After receiving a report from Dr. William Grant at Eastern State Hospital that Mr. Coley was incompetent, the court on July 16, 2009, ordered a 90-day stay of proceedings and referred Mr. Coley back to Eastern State Hospital for treatment designed to restore him to competency. The order staying the proceedings and ordering treatment included a finding that “the Defendant, cannot stand trial at this time because he is not competent.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 38 (90 Day Order for Stay of Proceedings for Cоmpetency Restoration Treatment); see RCW 10.77.084 (court shall order stay of proceedings pending treatment and restoration period).
¶4 Following the treatment period, Dr. Grant issued a report stating that Mr. Coley was competent to stand trial. Defense counsel submitted a report from Mr. Coley’s medical expert, Dr. Jorgenson, reflecting the evaluation. The court ordered a competency hearing.
¶5 At this hearing on June 11, 2010, the court placed the burden on Mr. Coley to prove his incompetence. After hearing testimony from both doctors and Mr. Coley himself, and considering the doctors’ reports and a recorded interview between Dr. Grant and Mr. Coley, Judge John Antosz determined that Mr. Coley was compеtent to stand trial. Judge Antosz engaged each of the three witnesses in his own line of questioning in addition to counsel’s typical examination. When he made his competency ruling at the end of the hearing, Judge Antosz cited the value of all of these sources of information and emphasized his own questioning and observation.
¶6 Concurrent with these pretrial competency inquiries, Mr. Coley made several attempts to exercise his right to self-representation. He first requested self-representation in February 2009, which the court granted after a thorough colloquy. The court appointed Mr. Coley’s attorney as standby counsel, and Mr. Coley represented himself as pro se counsel for a portion of the pretrial proceedings. In March 2009, however, Mr. Coley requested that his attorney be reinstated and the court granted that request. Then, in April 2009, Mr. Coley again asserted a right to represent himself. The court denied Mr. Coley’s request due to the concerns about his competency that became apparent during his conversation with the judge. CP at 31 (Def.’s Mot. for Pro Se Defense Without Counsel). As noted, the judge subsequently referred Mr. Coley to
¶7 At the competency hearing in June 2010, Mr. Coley again stated his desire to act pro se. The judge acknowledged Mr. Coley’s request but informed him that the court could not consider his request at that time and that if he still wanted to represent himself after an order of competenсy had been entered, he would need to file a new motion with the court.
¶8 On June 15, 2010, after the court had orally judged Mr. Coley competent but before the order of competency issued, the court discussed Mr. Coley’s stated desire to represent himself. The judge advised Mr. Coley against pursuing his right to self-representation, and the two seemed to reach a consensus that Mr. Coley would continue to be represented by his attorney, although the record is not entirely clear.
¶9 Mr. Coley did file a written motion on June 16, 2010 titled “Motion for Order to Speculate Right to Self Defense.” The judge told Mr. Coley that he did not understand the nature of the motion and cautioned that he could not hear any comments that were meant to be presented during the trial itself. Mr. Coley responded with an unrelated question about plea bargain procedures. The subject of self-representation did not arise again.
¶10 After a mistrial, the case was retried and a jury ultimately found Mr. Coley guilty of two counts of rape of a child in the second degree. On appeal, Mr. Coley argued that the trial court incorrectly placed the burden on him to prove his incompetence at the June 2010 competency hearing, and that this error constituted a denial of his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Additionally, Mr. Coley contended that the trial court’s failure to adequately consider his repeated motions to represent himself without an attorney violated his right to self-representation guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the trial court misallocated the burden of proof at the competency hearing and this was structural error. Because the Court of Appeals ordered reversal on this ground, it did not reach Mr. Coley’s argument regarding self-representation. The State petitioned for review.
ANALYSIS
1. The Burden of Proof at Competency Hearings
¶11 Reviewing courts in Washington customarily defer to the trial court’s judgment of a defendant’s mental competency. State v. Ortiz,
¶12 It is a fundamental principle of state and federal law that incompetent defendants may not stand trial. This right is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Medina v. California,
¶13 Chapter 10.77 RCW governs the procedures and standards trial courts use to judge the competency of defendants to stand trial. State v. Wicklund,
¶15 In this case, we must decide whether chapter 10.77 RCW places the burden of proof to prove incompetency on a criminal defendant who is claiming incompetency or on the State.
¶16 Mr. Coley agrees that he is presumed competent and that he bears the burden to prove his incompetency. See State v. Hurst,
¶17 Mr. Coley relies on RCW 10.77.084(1)(b), which instructs the trial court to determine whether competency has been “restored.” He urges that this shows a statutory difference between competency hearings and restoration hearings. Mr. Coley contends that RCW 10.77.084(1)(b)’s instruction to determine whether “competency has been ... restored” evinces legislative intent to place the burden on the party arguing for restoration, in this case the State.
¶18 When engaging in statutory interpretation, this court aims to give effect to legislative intent. State v. Jacobs,
¶19 The sharp distinction between a competency hearing and a competency restoration hearing, urged by Mr. Coley, is not supported by the statutes or case law. RCW 10.77.084(1)(b) does instruct the court to hold a hearing to determine whether competency has been “restored.” However, RCW 10.77.086 operates in tandem with and details procedures to be followed at the hearing where the defendant faces a felony charge. Under RCW 10.77.086(3), “[i]f the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant charged with a felony is incompetent,” the court may extend the treatment period and must set a date for another competency hearing “to dеtermine the defendant’s competency.”
¶20 Ultimately, if the defendant’s competency can be restored through treatment, then the trial will proceed. If, however, after the statutory treatment period a defendant is found incompetent, the trial court may extend the treatment period or order alternative treatment for an additional 90-day
¶21 Reading the statute as a whole, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to create different procedures for initial competency determinations and competency restoration hearings. Instead, the legislature created a comprehensive scheme for evaluating a defendant’s competency, with a closely regulated сycle of treatment and evaluation followed by a judicial determination of competency. The scheme is intended to ensure the defendant’s competency, whenever questioned, so he may be tried, but it recognizes the defendant’s interest in being free from involuntary mental health commitment and treatment. We disagree with Mr. Coley’s assertion that the statute distinguishes between a competency hearing and a competency restoration hearing. Indeed, the question is the same in each hearing: the defendant’s competency.
¶22 Contrary to Mr. Coley’s contention, we conclude that the burden of proof placement does not depend on a distinction between a competency hearing and a restoration hearing.
¶23 Although chapter 10.77 RCW does not explicitly assign the burden of proof to either party, we interpret the statutes to place the burden on the party challenging competency. As noted, RCW 10.77.084 operates in conjunction with RCW 10.77.086 in felony cases. See Hurst,
¶24 At different points in the proceedings the party challenging competency may be the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, or the prosecutor. Given the fluid character of the question of competency, it makes sense to place the burden on the party challenging competency to the extеnt it is necessary to assign a burden of proof.
f 25 The dissent is concerned that if the burden is always placed on the party challenging competency, the trial judge’s finding of incompetency will not be respected because parties could continually challenge it and continually place the burden on the defendant to prove his incompetency. Dissent at 563. The dissent’s concern overlooks the competency scheme in chapter 10.77 RCW. First, the trial judge did not issue an “order finding the defendant incompetent,” as the dissent asserts. Dissent at 562-63. Following the requirements of the statute, the judge issued an
¶26 Although we have not explicitly held that the burden of proof lies with the party challenging competency, we have indirectly approved of this burden structure. In Hurst, for example, we sanctioned placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to commit an incompetent defendant under related chapter 10.77 RCW provisions. Hurst,
¶27 Further, we have determined that the burden rests with the party challenging competency in other competency contexts. Most similarly, we have held that a party challenging the competency of a witness to testify bears the burden of proof. RCW 5.60.050 prohibits incompetent witnesses from testifying but, like chapter 10.77 RCW, does not explicitly assign the burden of proof. We interpreted the statute to assign the burden to the party challenging competency. State v. Brousseau,
¶28 We hold that implicit in the statutes addressing competency to stand trial is placement of the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence on the party challenging competency.
Chapter 10.77 RCW’s burden of proof placement does not violate due process
¶29 Because the court complied with chapter 10.77 RCW by placing the burden on Mr. Coley, the only remaining question is whether this burden placement violates due process under the Washington and United States Constitutions. Mr. Coley argues that due process, as outlined by the United State Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,
¶30 We have adopted the Medina due process framework for analyzing competency under chapter 10.77 RCW. See, e.g., Hurst,
¶31 Mr. Coley makes no argument under Medina why due process was violated here. As Medina indicates, we must consider historical and contemporary practice as well as the “fundamental fairness” of the burden of proof question. Medina,
¶32 At competency hearings in this state, all that due process requires is compliance with the mandates of chapter 10.77 RCW. See Heddrick,
2. Right to Self-Representation
¶33 Mr. Coley argues that the trial court erred when it declined to address his request to proceed pro se pending a competency determination. Mr. Coley emphasizes his original unequivocal request to represent himself on April 20, 2009, and his reiterated request at the June 11, 2010, competency hearing. He claims that under State v. Madsen,
¶34 The Court of Appeals did not reach the self-representation issue since the court reversed on the burden of proof issue. Because we reverse the Court of Appeals, the self-representation issue must be addressed, and we do so here. See RAP 13.7(b). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider any of Mr. Coley’s requests for self-representation because none of his unanswered requests were both timely and unequivocal.
a. Standard of review
¶35 Decisions on the right to self-representation are reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Pers. Restraint of Rhome,
b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to rule on Mr. Coley’s requests for self-representation because Mr. Coley made no unequivocal requests after he was deemed competent to stand trial
¶36 Criminal defendants have the federal and state constitutional right to
¶37 There is no automatic right to represent oneself. Rather, “courts are required to indulge in ‘every reasonable presumption against a defendant’s waiver of his or her right to counsel.’ ” Madsen,
¶38 A defendant’s motion to act as pro se counsel may be granted only if the defendant is competent to stand trial and the motion is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Rhome,
¶39 Notwithstanding Mr. Coley’s argument to the contrary, our cases do not cast doubt оn the trial court’s deferral of the April 2009 request. In Madsen, we faulted the trial court for failing to address stated competency concerns and instead using those concerns as an excuse for deferring a ruling on the defendant’s request for self-representation. However, a trial court may cite competency concerns as a reason for deferring review of a motion for self-representation so long as that deferral is accompanied by the proper referral for treatment and evaluation. See Madsen,
¶40 Mr. Coley was not eligible to exercise his right to self-representation until his competency was affirmatively established. Hahn,
¶41 Moreover, as the State argues, the trial court did not leave outstanding any unequivocal and timely requests for self-representation. Once the trial court held Mr. Coley’s competency restored in June 2010, any subsequent unequivocal requests for self-representation would have been timely. See Hahn,
CONCLUSION
¶42 We conclude that the legislature intended the burden of proof under chapter 10.77 BCW to rest with the party challenging competency. This placement of the burden does not offend due process. The trial court properly placed the burden on the party challenging competency — here the defendant
¶43 We reverse the Court of Appeals and rеmand with instructions to reinstate the trial court findings of competency and guilt.
Notes
In this unique area, the statutes also assign a duty to the court to question competency, even if no party is challenging it. As noted above, the process of restoring competency is the same regardless of who raises the issue, including the court. When the court is questioning competency, it makes little sense to assign a burden of proof to any party.
Moreover, remanding this matter for clarification does not make sense. The question of competency in this case arose during the first trial. After the judge found Mr. Coley competent, the case proceeded and ended in a mistrial. Thereafter, Mr. Coley was retried and convicted. There was no competency challenge by Mr. Coley, the prosecutor, or the judge in the second trial.
At oral argument, the prosecutor conceded that the State carries the burden to prove competency following restoration treatment. The prosecutor offered no authority for this concession, and we decline to accept it. State v. Drum,
Dissenting Opinion
¶44 (dissenting) — The defense argues that at a hearing to determine whether a defendant has been restored to competency, the State — the party challenging the previously entered order finding the defendant incompetent — has the burden of proving competence by a preponderance of the evidence. At oral argument, the State took the same position. It represented that it had canvassed the practice of prosecutors across Washington, weighed the competing interests at stake, and — considering that history and practice — it was taking the same position as the defense on this particular point. Specifically, the State argued that at a hearing to determine whether a defendant, who was declared incompetent by the most recent court order, hаs been restored to competency, the State — the party challenging the previously entered order finding the defendant incompetent — bears the burden of proving competency by a preponderance.
¶45 I agree with both parties on this point. I think the statutes at issue here are most properly interpreted as placing the burden of proof on the party challenging the status quo. At the start of the trial, the status quo is usually the default presumption that a defendant is competent. See In re Pers. Restraint of Rhome,
¶46 Treating the trial judge’s ruling like it does not exist does not make sense and could not have been what the legislature intended. If the trial judge’s finding of incompetency did not remain in force, then that finding would be deprived of all meaning — a party who disagreed with it could just keep coming in and challenging it, day after day, and keep placing the burden on the incompetent defendant to prove continuing incompetency. That seems time-consuming, counterproductive, аnd disrespectful to the trial judge, who must have given some serious thought to the matter before signing the order.
¶47 I think it is much more reasonable to interpret the statute to place the burden of proof on the party challenging the status quo. In this case, at the beginning of the trial, it was the defendant, Mr. Coley. On Mr. Coley’s motion, the judge referred him to Eastern State Hospital (Eastern) for a competency evaluation. Based on that initial uncontested evaluation, the judge entered an order that Mr. Coley was competent, thus maintaining the status quo. But the judge again became concerned about the defendant’s competency a few months later and ordered another evaluation at Eastern. Basеd on that second (also uncontested) evaluation, the judge ruled that the defendant lacked competency and signed an order requiring the State to transport the defendant to Eastern for treatment to restore competency. At that point, a new status quo was established by the judge’s decision that the defendant lacked present competency to proceed.
¶48 The State then took the steps that the trial court ordered. It sent Mr. Coley to Eastern and provided treatment, and then the State’s expert submitted reports and testified to the court. The State’s expert concluded
¶49 To be sure, the expert’s reports and testimony alone can carry the State’s burden of proving restoration to competency. And that may have happened in this case. It is true that the trial court made some statements at the restoration hearing to the effect that it was placing the burden of proving incompetency on the defendant. But the trial court also made some statements at the restoration hearing suggesting the opposite; it expressly considered the testimony of both the State’s expert and the defense’s expert, as well as the testimony of the defendant (who testified at the competency hearing), before concluding that it believed the State’s expert that the defendant’s competency had been restored. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (June 11, 2010) at 156-59.
¶50 I therefore disagree with the majority’s decision that the burden of proof always lies with the party challenging competency. A trial court’s actual finding of incompetency changes the status quo, and the burden of proof properly rests with the party challenging that status quo — here, the State, not the defendant. Since it is not clear whether the trial court in this case applied the correct burden of proof оr not, I would remand for clarification.
The majority implies that we cannot grant relief in this case because the competency issue is moot due to an initial mistrial. But the parties and the majority have not treated this case as moot or even raised the issue. And it would not make sense to do so. The trial judge declared a mistrial in October 2010 because a witness revealed inadmissible evidence to the jury, and a new trial was held in December 2010 before the same judge. That mistrial was unrelated to, and thus had no effect on, Mr. Coley’s claim that the trial court erred in allocating the burden of proof at the competency hearing held in June 2010.