State v. ColemanState v. Coleman
On January 26, 1987, defendant, Herbert Coleman, Jr., was charged by bill of information
FACTS
On December 13, 1986, defendant, along with Larry Steward and Joseph Provest, entered into the Louisiana State Employment Office, at 1028 Enterprise Boulevard, Lake Charles, Louisiana. Officers of the Lake Charles Police Department arrived at the crime scene at approximately 9:15 p.m. and found defendant with his right arm inside a broken window of the Louisiana State Employment Office.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information, contending that
Defendant was tried and found guilty by a unanimous jury of six persons. Defendant was then billed and found to be a second habitual offender, and sentenced to serve 10 years imprisonment.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
In defendant‘s first assignment of error, he contends
Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the constitutionality of a statute should be upheld whenever possible. State v. Brenner, 486 So.2d 101 (La.1986); State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953). Because a state statute is presumed constitutional, the party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality. State v. Griffin, 495 So.2d 1306 (La.1986). The attack will fail if there exists a reasonable relationship between the law and the promotion or protection of a public good, such as health, safety or welfare. Theriot v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 436 So.2d 515 (La.1983); Gilbert v. Catahoula Parish Police Jury, 407 So.2d 1228 (La.1981). The legislation must have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest in order to satisfy the substantive guarantee of due process in the federal and state constitutions. Theriot, supra, at 520; City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Harry‘s Hardware, Inc. v. Parsons, 410 So.2d 735 (La.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 881, 103 S.Ct. 178, 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982).
There can be no doubt that Louisiana has a legitimate interest in suppressing unauthorized entries into places of business. The defining and prescribing the means of suppression are the responsibility of the state legislature, and determinations of the legislature in this regard constitute an appropriate exercise of police power for the protection of the public. Brown v. State, through Department of Public Safety, Division of Louisiana State Police, 392 So. 2d 415 (La.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940, 101 S.Ct. 3085, 69 L.Ed.2d 955 (1981); Vaughan v. Dowling, 243 La. 390, 144 So.2d 371 (1962).
A statute may be attacked on grounds of vagueness. Jurisprudence has recognized that “penal statutes must describe the unlawful conduct with sufficient particularity and clarity such that ordinary men of reasonable intelligence are capable of discerning its meaning and conforming their conduct thereto.” State v. Defrances, 351 So.2d 133 (La.1977); State v. Lindsey, 310 So.2d 89 (La.1975). The requirement of lack of vagueness is derived from the due process clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions, and from
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
In defendant‘s second assignment of error, he contends that even if
Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “business” as:
“Employment, occupation, profession, or commercial activity engaged in for gain or livelihood. Activity or enterprise for gain, benefit, advantage or livelihood. Enterprise in which person is engaged shows willingness to invest time and capital on future outcome. That which habitually busies or occupies or engages the time, attention, labor and efforts of persons as a principal serious concern or interest or for livelihood or profit.” Black‘s Law Dictionary, 179 (5th ed. 1979).
Defendant argues that this definition, if applied to governmental offices, is being construed too broadly and violates
“The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.”
Applying this article to the case sub judice, we do not find a person of ordinary intelligence would consider a state employment office in any other capacity than a place of business. Further,
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE
In defendant‘s third assignment of error, he contends the sentencing court erred in imposing an excessive sentence.
Defendant was sentenced pursuant to the Habitual Offender Law in that he was found to be a second felony offender. At the sentencing hearing, the court found and defendant admitted that he had been convicted of simple burglary and criminal damage to property.
“A. Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as follows: (1) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.”
Since unauthorized entry of a place of business provides for a maximum term of imprisonment for 6 years, defendant‘s range of incarceration was a minimum of 2 years to a maximum of 12 years. Therefore, defendant‘s sentence of 10 years was within the statutory guidelines provided in
Even though within the statutory limit, a sentence may violate a defendant‘s constitutional right against excessive punishment. State v. Lofton, supra; State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979);
We do not feel defendant‘s sentence is excessive in that he is an habitual offender and has shown no desire to discontinue a life of crime. Defendant has already served a sentence for simple burglary and criminal damage to property. Approximately thirty days after being released from prison for these offenses, he was charged and subsequently convicted of the crime in the case sub judice. Accordingly, we find that the sentencing court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.