2005 Ohio 2524 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
Lead Opinion
{¶ 2} The charges against Colbert stemmed from his involvement in the March 21, 2003 murder of Willie Smith ("Smith") at a home, located at 4012 Station Avenue, Ashtabula, Ohio. Smith, a drug dealer, was involved in a dispute with Colbert's co-defendants regarding the selling of drugs on Station Avenue. The previous evening, Colbert's co-defendants had assaulted Smith and Smith, in turn, had made threats against Colbert's co-defendants. At about 6:20 p.m. on March 21, 2003, Colbert and his co-defendants went to the house where Smith was staying and confronted Smith on the front porch of the house. During the confrontation, co-defendant Richard Thomas Corpening shot Smith six times. Thereafter, Colbert fled the scene before turning himself into the police.
{¶ 3} Colbert was indicted by the Ashtabula County Grand Jury on one count of Complicity to Aggravated Murder, with a gun specification, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} The trial court sentenced Colbert to the maximum prison term of ten years for Complicity to Voluntary Manslaughter and to a prison term of five years for Participating in a Criminal Gang, to be served concurrently. Colbert timely appeals and raises the following assignment of error: "The trial court erred and abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant when it sentenced him to the maximum sentence."
{¶ 5} An appellate court reviews a felony sentence under a clear and convincing evidence standard of review. R.C.
{¶ 6} Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 7} In addition to stating its reasons for imposing the maximum sentence under R.C.
{¶ 8} In the present case, the trial court found on the record [at the sentencing hearing] "[t]his is the worst form of a complicity to commit voluntary manslaughter offense." The courted based its decision on the fact that the crime was premeditated; the crime was part of an organized criminal activity; and the crime was committed in broad daylight. Colbert argues that his is not one of the worst forms of complicity to voluntary manslaughter because he was not the actual shooter and was not involved in the drug deal or the assault leading up to the shooting. We disagree.
{¶ 9} This court has previously considered and rejected this argument. We have held that "[t]he argument that appellant is less culpable because he was convicted as an accomplice ignores R.C.
{¶ 10} Even if the trial court did err in finding this one of the worst forms of complicity, the trial court additionally found that Colbert, age twenty at the time of Smith's murder, "possesses [sic] the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes." Cf. R.C.
{¶ 11} We hold that Colbert's record of juvenile adjudications, by itself, "clearly and convincingly" supports the finding that Colbert poses the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes and, therefore, the imposition of the maximum sentence.2 Cf. Chike, 2002-Ohio-6912, at ¶ 10 ("There is no requirement that more than one of the five factors be present in order for the trial court to determine that the offender poses the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes.").
{¶ 12} The First District Court of Appeals has recently held that the "fact" of previous juvenile-delinquency adjudications cannot be used to justify a finding regarding the likelihood of future crime under the "prior conviction" exception in Blakely v. Washington (2004), ___ U.S. ___. State v. Montgomery, 1st App. No. C-040190,
{¶ 13} We note that, for the purpose of determining an offender's likelihood of committing future crimes, a court must consider an offender's delinquency adjudications as well as his history of criminal convictions. R.C.
{¶ 14} Although juvenile proceedings have been characterized as "civil" rather than "criminal" proceedings, the Ohio Supreme Court has made clear that this distinction is of limited significance. "Whatever their label, juvenile delinquency laws feature inherently criminal aspects that we cannot ignore. * * * For this reason, numerous constitutional safeguards normally reserved for criminal prosecutions are equally applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings. * * * Just as we cannot ignore the criminal aspects inherent in juvenile proceedings for purposes of affording certain constitutional protections, we also cannot ignore the criminality inherent in juvenile conduct that violates criminal statutes. * * * Whether the state prosecutes a criminal action or a juvenile delinquency matter, its goal is the same: to vindicate a vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws." State v. Walls,
{¶ 15} Therefore, a trial judge may consider an offender's juvenile record for the purposes of sentencing.
{¶ 16} In Blakely, and earlier in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000),
{¶ 17} The Supreme Court has recently shed light upon the nature of the "prior conviction" exception in Shepard v. United States (2005),
{¶ 18} In light of the foregoing, we hold that delinquency adjudications bear "the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record" and, therefore, may be considered by a sentencing court under the "prior conviction" exception to the rule of Apprendi and Blakely.
{¶ 19} Colbert's sole assignment of error is without merit. The ten-year sentence imposed by the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Rice, J., concurs, O'Neill, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 20} The tragedy in this matter clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of Ohio's current sentencing guidelines. As a result of a drug deal gone bad, one young man lies dead and a twenty-year-old ends up with a maximum sentence for complicity to commit voluntary manslaughter. The trial court did "impose the greatest or longest sentence under the complicity to commit voluntary manslaughter for the reason that the Court finds thatthis offender has committed the worst form of the offense." (Emphasis added.) The court went on to find that "the defendant possesses the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes." Thus, the trial court made two critical findings to support the imposition of a maximum sentence. While I do not disagree with the sentence imposed, I find fault with the procedure employed to arrive at that result.
{¶ 21} The trial court may very well be right in all its findings. However, it is those very findings that the Supreme Court of the United States has specifically prohibited.
{¶ 22} In enacting Senate Bill 2, with an effective date of July 1, 1996, the Ohio General Assembly radically altered its approach to criminal sentencing. The new law essentially designated three classes of citizens who would have statutorily defined roles in determining the amount of time an individual would be incarcerated for a particular crime. The three classes defined were: (1) the Ohio General Assembly; (2) judges; and (3) jurors.
{¶ 23} Senate Bill 2 also provided three distinct areas of judicial limitations when it set about its task of providing "truth in sentencing." Those would be: (1) sentences imposed beyond the minimum; (2) sentences imposing the maximum; and (3) consecutive sentences. The objective was apparently to provide a degree of consistency and predictability in sentencing.
{¶ 24} It is clear that the legislature did not interfere with the role of juries to determine guilt. Thus, the first task in sentencing went to juries. In the second phase, the legislature reserved unto itself the role of establishing minimum sentences that would be imposed once the finding of guilt, either by trial or admission, was accomplished. And finally, the new law set forth the "findings" that were required before a judge would be permitted to depart from the minimum or impose consecutive sentences. Thus, everyone had a clearly defined role to play.
{¶ 25} The first major pronouncement by the Ohio Supreme Court concerned the "findings" necessary to support the imposition of a maximum sentence. In Edmondson, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a trial court must "make a finding that gives its reasons" on the record for the imposition of a maximum sentence.3
{¶ 26} Following that pronouncement, the Supreme Court of Ohio, inState v. Comer, required the sentencing courts to make their "findings" and give reasons supporting those findings on the record "at the sentencing hearing."4 Thus, it is clear that the courts, in applying Senate Bill 2, imposed duties upon judges to make specific findings to support their sentences whenever they went beyond the minimum; or imposed maximum sentences or consecutive sentences.
{¶ 27} In 2004, however, the United States Supreme Court issued its judgment in Blakely v. Washington and made it clear that judges making "findings" outside a jury's determinations in sentencing violated constitutional guarantees.5 Specifically, the court held:
{¶ 28} "Our precedents make clear, however, that the `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may imposesolely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict oradmitted by the defendant. * * * In other words, the relevant `statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts `which the law makes essential to the punishment,' * * * and the judge exceeds his proper authority."6
{¶ 29} Thus, it is clear that the statutory judicial "findings," which provide the framework for all sentencing in Ohio, are prohibited by the United States Supreme Court.
{¶ 30} Following the United States Supreme Court's release ofBlakely, this court determined that a trial court's reliance on a previous conviction as evidenced in the record would still be permissible for the purpose of imposing a sentence greater than the minimum.7 As stated by this court in State v. Taylor:
{¶ 31} "Under R.C.
{¶ 32} It is clear that, for Blakely purposes, a trial court is permitted to take judicial notice that a defendant has served a prior prison term, for that is not a "finding." It is a judicial acknowledgement of an indisputable fact. The trial court merely acknowledges the prior prison term and does not have to weigh conflicting evidence to make a factual finding. As such, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not compromised by the exercise.
{¶ 33} I believe that a distinction must be made between "findings," which courts make to justify maximum or consecutive sentences and "acknowledging" the existence of a prior sentence in a criminal matter, which would permit the court to exercise its discretion in departing from a minimum sentence. Clearly, Blakely no longer permits courts in Ohio to "find" that a defendant has committed the "worst form of the offense" or that his actions predict the "greatest likelihood of recidivism" without either an admission by the defendant or a finding by the trier of fact.
{¶ 34} As so eloquently stated by the United States Supreme Court inBlakely:
{¶ 35} "This case is not about whether determinate sentencing is constitutional, only about how it can be implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment."10
{¶ 36} The court went on to state that the Sixth Amendment was not a "limitation of judicial power, but a reservation of jury power."11 In what I believe to be the true thrust of this landmark case, the United States Supreme Court finally held that "[t]he framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to the `unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,' * * * rather than a lone employee of the state."12
{¶ 37} Recently, in State v. Montgomery, the First District Court of Appeals held that "[a] plain reading of this statute indicates that R.C.
{¶ 38} In addition to my firm belief that trial courts are no longer permitted to make findings such as those made herein, I do not agree with the majority's conclusions regarding juvenile adjudications. Rather, I agree with the First District's analysis of this issue as set forth inState v. Montgomery:
{¶ 39} "[T]he court based its R.C.
{¶ 40} In conclusion, I believe the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to more than the minimum sentence in this matter; and, as a matter of law, I would hold that trial courts are only permitted to depart from the minimum sentence based upon facts admitted by the defendant or found by the trier of fact. The only exception I believe permissible, consistent with Blakely, is the indisputable fact of a prior adult prison term, which would then permit judges to do their statutory job. And that job is, and always has been, to sentence criminals within the determinate bracket established by the Ohio General Assembly.
