67 Mo. 380 | Mo. | 1878
—Defendant was indicted in the circuit court of Phelps county, at its February term, 1877, for forgery in the third degree, in forging a promissory note of' one Robert F. Springer, for the sum of $5,500. Defendant was duly arraigned at the February term, 1878, of said court, put upon his trial, which resulted in a verdict of guilty, and a judgment assessing his punishment at five years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary, from which he has appealed to this court. We give the following summary of the tendency of the evidence and the proceedings in the cause in the trial court, from which the principal grounds of error relied upon for a reversal of the judgment will appear.
The evidence on the part of the State tended to show that the note mentioned was a forgery; that Springer was-dead; that some time after his death the defendant presented said note to one of the executors of the estate, in Salem, who pronounced it a forgery, the defendant insisting that it was genuine; that the note was thereupon delivered to W. Q-. Pomeroy, Esq., to be by him kept till the matter was settled ; that Springer was a wealthy man and worth^over $30,000, $18,000 of which was in money, notes- and accounts; that the defendant repeatedly offered to sell said jfote. To this the defendant objected, which objectionsbein'g overruled, he excepted. When the State offered the note in evidence, the defendant objected, because the indictment did not sufficiently describe the same, which objections were by the court overruled.
During the trial the State was permitted to prove that the signature of Springer to two other papers, which were in no way connected with the cause being tried, were genuine ; and tne signatures thus proved were submitted to-two persons, experts in comparing handwritings, who were allowed to compare the same with the signature of Spring
The defendant testified, in Ins own behalf, that he had deposited the sum of five thousand five hundred dollars with Springer, to prevent his creditors from getting at the same; that he let Springer have three thousand dollars at one time, for which he took a due-bill, and twenty-five hundred dollars at another, whereupon Springer gave him the note mentioned; that it was genuine and signed by Springer. Defendant also offered evidence tending to show that such a due-bill as he described had been seen in his possession ; that Springer was at his house on the day named by him; that the defendant and Springer were seen in a small room together.
In rebuttal the State introduced several witnesses and propounded to each of them this question: “Do you know the defendant’s general character in the neighbor' hood where he lives, for truth and veracity, honesty, chastity and morality?” To which the defendant objected,^ because the defendant had not put his character in issue; because the testimony, if proper at all, ought to be confined to truth and veracity, and because the question as to each trait of*character should be asked separately; which objections being by the court overruled, the defendant excepted. Said witnesses then answered that they knew the general reputation of defendant in the town of Rolla, and that it was bad ; that defendant was well known there, but lived about five miles east thereof.
The writings offered in evidence in this ease, as standards of comparison, are not embraced in either of the above classes, but were irrelevant to the record and under the common law rule were inadmissible. For the rejection of such evidence, two reasons have been assigned,viz: “First, the danger of fraud in the selection of the writings offered as specimens for the occasion; and secondly, that if admitted, the genuineness of these specimens may be contested, and others successively introduced, to the infinite multiplication of collateral issues, and the subversion of justice. To which may be added the danger of surprise upon the other party, who may not know what documents are to be produced, and may not, therefore, be prepared to meet the inferences to be drawn from them. The same mischiefs would result, if the same writings Were introduced to the jury through the medium of experts.” 1 Green Ev., Sec. 580. It may, however, be observed that in England this rule has been overthrown by an act of parliament, passed in 1854, in relation to procedure in civil eases, and to be found in Yol. 94 of Statutes at Large of the United Kingdom, and Chap. 125, p. 800, 17-18, Yic., in which it is provided, “ That- comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses ; and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute.” It may also be observed that in 1865 another act was passed extending and making applicable the above rule in all criminal trials. (Vol. 43, London Law Journal, Chap. 18, p. 75.)
The act of Nevada provides that “ in the trial of all indictments, complaints and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes or offenses, the person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness, the credit to be given to his testimony being left solely to the jury, under the instructions of the court. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as compelling any such person to testify; and in all cases wherein the defendant to a criminal action declines to testify, the court shall specially instruct the jury that no inference of guilt is to be drawn against him for that cause.” In the case of The State v. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179, where the defendant testified as a witness, it was held that he was to be treated as an ordinary witness, subject to cross-examination, and even recall on the part of the State, for the purpose of asking.any question proper to be propounded on cross-examination.
The New York statute provides, that “in the trial of all indictments, * * ■ * and, in all proceed
In 41 Cal. 429, People v. McGungill, i't was held that the fact that defendant offered himself as a witness did not change as to ’him the rulers of practice with reference to the proper limits of a cross-examination: nor could the prosecutor legally claim that defendant should be made a witness against himself for the State. In Massachusetts, under a statute which allows a defendant in a criminal case, at his own request, and not otherwise, to testify in his own behalf, and provides, “that he shall be deemed a competent witness,” Bigelow, C. J., held that he was competent not for a special purpose, or to give evidence only which shall operate in his own favor, but competent to testify to any facts relevant and material to the issue. Like all other witnesses, he is to tell the truth and the whole truth concerning any matter to be inquired about. If he offers himself as a witness, he waives his constitutional ¡M'ivilege of refusing to furnish evidence against himself, and may be interrogated as a general witness in the cause. In Indiana, under a similar act, in case of Fletcher v. The State, 49 Ind. 124, it was held that it was proper for the State to attack the general character of defendant for truth, but not his general moral character. This was followed in the case of Mershon v. The State, 51 Ind. 14. In State v. Ober, 52 N. H. 459, when a defendant voluntarily becomes a witness, held “ that for the time being he occupies the position of a witness, with all its rights and subject to all its duties and obligations. If he gives evidence against himself it results from his voluntary act of becoming a witness, and not from compulsion.” A similar doctrine was announced in Town of Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 309. In the latter State the law allowing defendants in criminal causes to testify had a short lived existence, being repealed in about one year after its enactment.
In all the States, so far as we are informed, where
It is, however, insisted by learned counsel that our act is materially different from the acts of the various States which have been referred to. This, we think, is an error. It is true they are not couched in the same language, but the words employed convey the same idea. In all of them, as in ours, the defendant may, if he chooses, become a witness; he shall not be compelled or required to testify, and his declining to do so shall (neithei)be considered by^ court nor jury to his prejudice. It is earnestly argued that the following words in our act, “that the fact that ho is the person on trial may be shown to affect his credibility,” not being used in the acts of other States, makes the difference essential, and excludes every other method of attacking the credibility of such witness. We think this position is not tenable. These words were doubtless incorporated in .analogy to those used in Sec. 1, W. S., 1372, relating to witnesses, which provides that “ no person shall be disqualified as a witness in a civil suit or proceeding at law or equity, by reason of his.interest in the event of the same, as a piarty or otherwise, * * but such interest may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility.” This act, as well as the act of 1877, supra, is in derogation of the common law rule, and to lpold that the words that “ the interest of a party or witness (testifying under the law) might be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility, excluded every other method of assailing it, would, we think, be against sound reason and in
In the light, both of authority and reason, our opinion is that a defendant, who, at his own option, becomes a witness, under the act of 1877, occupies the position of any other witness; is liable' to be cross-examined as to any matter pertinent to the issue; may be contradicted and impeached as any other witness, and is to be subjected to the same tests. Under the rule adopted in this State and firit enunciated in the case of the State v. Shields, 13 Mo. 236, and followed in the cases of Day v. State, 13 Mo. 422; State v. Hamilton, 55 Mo. 520 ; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507, the question propounded as to the'general character of defendant was a proper one.
It may be observed that the second instruction given on behalf of the State is objectionable in' its phraseology, which can be corrected on another trial. It is more in the nature of a charge than an instruction and should be mod
Judgment reversed and cause l'eraanded,
Reversed.