State v. CLINT L.State v. CLINT L.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Abbott
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Abbott, J.:
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the aggravated escape from custody charges under
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The juvenile proceedings arose out of acts committed by the respondents which would have constituted felonies had the respondents been adults. When the respondents were recaptured after their escape from custody, they were charged with aggravated escape from custody pursuant to
At that time,
“Aggravated escape from custody is
“(a) Escaping while held in lawful custody upon a charge or conviction of felony. . . .”
The trial court found that the respondents could not be convicted of aggravated escape under this statute because they were not being held “upon a charge or conviction of [a] felony” at the time of their escape. Instead, they were being held upon a juvenile charge or adjudication at the time of their escape. The State takes issue with the trial court’s ruling.
Statutoiy interpretation is a question of law. This court’s review of a question of law is unlimited. State v. Donlay, 253 Kan. 132, Syl. ¶ 1, 853 P.2d 680 (1993). “When determining a question of law, this court is not bound by the decision of the district court.” Memorial Hospital Ass’n, Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 668, 722 P.2d 1093 (1986).
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly against the State. State v. JC Sports Bar, Inc., 253 Kan. 815, 818, 861 P.2d 1334 (1993). This court may not give a different meaning to a word in a criminal statute than the meaning that the word usually possesses. State v. Frazier, 248 Kan. 963, 971, 811 P.2d 1240 (1991).
In support of its argument, the State cites to
State v. Busse,
252 Kan. 695, 847 P.2d 1304 (1993). In
Busse,
the adult defendant was charged with aiding a felon in violation of
“(a) Aiding a felon is knowingly harboring, concealing or aiding any person who has committed a felony under the laws of this state or another state or the United States with intent that such person shall avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment for such felony.” (Emphasis added.)
The trial court dismissed the charge, finding that the defendant had not aided a person who had committed a felony but rather the *176 defendant had aided a juvenile offender. The State appealed, and this court reversed. In Busse, this court stated:
“We do not believe that the legislature intended to exclude adults aiding juveniles who commit felonious acts from the provisions ofK.S.A. 21-3812(a) [aiding a felon]. The very language inK.S.A. 21-3812(a) supports this result. The statute prohibits aiding any person who has committed a felony. The felonious conduct of the one aided, not the status of the one aided, triggers the applicability ofK.S.A. 21-3812(a) .
‘We acknowledge that the definition of ‘felony’ inK.S.A. 21-3105 does not expressly include juvenile offenses. The defendant relies on this definition to support his claim that if the legislature had intendedK.S.A. 21-3812(a) to prohibit aiding one who has committed a juvenile offense, it could have expressly so provided. We agree that the legislature could have been more explicit, but we disagree that in the absence of that specificity, the statute does not proscribe the defendant’s aid to the juvenile. . . .
“ . . . The juvenile offenders code . . . was enacted for the benefit of the juvenile. This case charges a separate crime committed by an adult. It would serve no useful purpose to allow the status granted to a juvenile to inure to the benefit of an adult wbo aided a juvenile who committed a felonious act.
“ . . . We hasten to add that interpretingK.S.A. 21-3812(a) to include aiding juvenile offenders in no way undermines the benefits and protection that the juvenile offenders code extends to the young offender.” 252 Kan. at 697-99. (Emphasis added.)
The State also points to the 1996 amendment to
“Aggravated escape from custody is:
“(a) Escaping while held in lawful custody upon a charge or conviction of a felony or upon a charge or adjudication as a juvenile offender as defined in K S.A. 38-1602, and amendments thereto, where the act, if committed by an adult, would constitute a felony . . . .”K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-3810(a) . (Emphasis added.)
The State acknowledges that, ordinarily, courts presume the legislature intended to change the effect óf a statute when the legislature changes the language of a statute.
Hughes v. Inland Container Corp.,
247 Kan. 407, 414, 799 P.2d 1011 (1990) (“When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment.”) However, according to the State, the legislature’s amendment of
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Thus, the State asserts that
Further, the legislature has previously demonstrated its awareness of the distinction between criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications. The legislature knew how to include escapes from custody for juvenile adjudications within
In
State v. Ward,
20 Kan. App. 2d at 243-44, the Court of Appeals found that the Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act,
Moreover, in 1996, the legislature amended
Thus, we conclude that if the legislature had intended to include juveniles who committed felonious acts within the scope of the aggravated escape statute, it clearly knew how to do so and could have done so. The adoption of the 1996 amendment to the aggravated escape statute demonstrates a legislative recognition that the aggravated escape statute, as it existed at the time of the escapes herein, did not apply to an escape by a juvenile who was in custody pursuant to a juvenile adjudication.
In summary, when the respondents escaped, they were being held in custody for juvenile adjudications or pending juvenile adjudications for felonious acts; they were not being held in custody for a charge or conviction of a felony. Thus,
Affirmed.