State v. ClayState v. Clay
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Stratton
Lead Opinion
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Thе appellant was convicted of having a weapon while under a disability under
II. Facts
{¶ 2} On March 5, 2006, at аpproximately 1:00 a.m. outside the Gin-Gin bar in Cleveland, appellant, Howard Clay, shot and wounded Christopher Graham. At the time of the shooting, Clay was under indictment for possession and trafficking of drugs. For the 2006 shooting, a grand jury indictеd Clay on charges of felonious assault under
{¶ 3} Clay waived his right to have his case decided by a jury and tried his case to a judge. Clay argued that thеre was insufficient evidence to convict him of having a weapon while under a disability because he was unaware that he was under indictment at the time of the shooting. The court disagreed, holding that
{¶ 4} The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, holding that
{¶ 5} We determined thаt a conflict existed. We also accepted Clay’s discretionary appeal1 and sua sponte consolidated the two appeals.
III. Analysis
{¶ 6} Clay was convicted of having a weapon while under a disability. Therefore, we first examine
{¶ 8} “ * * *
{¶ 9} “(3) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse or has been adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by an adult, would have been an offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 10} It can be seen from the above language that the General Assembly did not provide a specific mental state in
{¶ 11} “When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a рurpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of the offense. When the section neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability to commit the offense.”
{¶ 12} “Thus, recklessness is the catchall culpable mental state for criminal statutes that fail to mentiоn any degree of culpability, except for strict liability statutes, where the accused’s mental state is irrelevant.” State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 2004-Ohio-732, 803 N.E.2d 770, ¶ 21.
{¶ 13} Clay argues that the word “knowingly” within
{¶ 14} In examining the structure of
{¶ 15} Because
{¶ 16} In the past, legislative silence as to a culpable mental stаte was interpreted as imposing strict liability. State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co. (1964), 176 Ohio St. 482, 27 O.O.2d 443, 200 N.E.2d 590, paragraph two of the syllabus. But that changed in 1974, when the legislature repealed former
{¶ 17} The General Assembly knows how to define a strict-liability offense when it so desires, as evidenced in State v. Lozier, 101 Ohio St.3d 161, 2004-Ohio-732, 803 N.E.2d 770. In Lozier, we considered whether
{¶ 18} “An offense is ‘committed in the vicinity of a juvenile’ if the offender commits the offense within one hundred feet of a juvenile or within view of a juvenile, regardless of whether the offender knows the age of the juvenile, whether the offender knows the offense is being committеd within one hundred feet of or within view of the juvenile, or whether the juvenile actually views the commission of the offense.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} We stated that “
{¶20} Nevertheless, the state argues that
{¶ 21}
{¶ 22} “(A) No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or performance involved, shall do any of the follоwing:
{¶ 23} “ * * *
{¶ 24} “(6) Bring or cause to be brought into this state any obscene material that has a minor as one of its participants or portrayed observers.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 25} In Maxwell, we reasoned that the inclusion of a culpable mental state in
{¶ 26} While the statutory structure at issue in Maxwell is similar to the structure of the statute herein, Maxwell is distinguishable from the instant case. The crime in Maxwell, possession of obscene material involving a minor, is not protected by the Constitution. But possessing a weapon, when the weapon is a firearm, is a constitutionally protected right subject only to limited restrictions. Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (the Ohio Constitution confers the right to bear arms, but that right may be limited through use of the police power). And in the instant case, it is only the additional fact of being “under indictment” that made possessing the firearm a crime under
{¶ 27} Further, unlike in Maxwell, there are no “other indications outside” the language of
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 28} We find that
{¶ 29} Because the trial court never determined whether Clay acted recklessly with regard to being aware that he was “under indictment,” we remand the cause to the trial court to determine that issue. Accоrdingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer and Cupp, JJ., concur. Lanzinger, J., concurs separately. O’Connor, J., concurs in judgment only. O’Donnell, J., dissents.Notes
. Clay asserted two propositions of law in his discretionary appeal: (1) whether knowledge of the disabling condition (e.g., a pending indictment for a drug offense) is an essential element of having a weapon while under a disability and (2) whether, as a matter of due process, a criminal defendant may not be convicted of having a weapon while under a disability unless he or she has received notice of the disabling condition. We find that the questions presented in these propositions are resolved when we answer the certified question.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
{¶ 30} I believe that it is important to emphasize that a defendant’s awareness of the possibility of an existing indictment is a necessary element in proving recklessness pursuant to
{¶ 31} The definitions of the mental states of “knowingly” and “recklessly” are somewhat blurred. “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 32} With respect to the mental state of “knowingly,” “[a] person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledgе of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 33} By virtue of the mental state required, as applied to this case, the trial court may convict Clay under