155 Minn. 117 | Minn. | 1923
Lead Opinion
Defendant was convicted of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor on March IS, 1922. Defendant operated a soft drink estab
Evidence was received of other sales of liquor by defendant and of liquor found in the Minnesota House on several occasions, one as late as July 8, 1922. Defendant claims the evidence as to July 8 was erroneously received, because too remote in time, and because of his evidence that he sold his business at the Minnesota House on March 31 and had no further connection with it.
The occurrence of July 8 was not too remote in time. The state’s evidence shows a sale on March 25; a raid on April 1 resulting in discovery of liquor on the premises; another raid on June 3 with the same result. The liquor found on July 8 consisted of eight five-gallon jugs containing moonshine whiskey, concealed in a pit under the floor of the dining room. The pit was covered by loose boards. The floor was covered with linoleum and there was a corner of the linoleum “lapped right over the hole” so that it would turn back to give access to the hole. The events were so connected in time as to tend to show a general system or plan to commit crimes similar to the one charged and to render the evidence admissible as corroborative evidence under the rule of State v. Monroe, 142 Minn. 394, 172 N. W. 313.
Defendant strenuously contends that he was not connected with the Minnesota House on July 8. There is evidence of one witness that defendant was at the Minnesota House and sold drinks on July 2 and again on July 8. Defendant undertakes to discredit this witness, but the weight of the testimony was for the jury. The evidence also tends to show that the hole in the floor with its linoleum covering, which were discovered on July 8, showed signs of use for a considerable length of time.
We conclude that it was not error to receive the evidence as to the occurrences of July 8. By parity of reasoning, the evidence as to the occurrences of April 1 and June 3 was properly received.
Exception is taken to the reception in evidence of a box containing some corks and empty bottles and a hydrometer, taken from
Order affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.)
J dissent.
I agree that tbe evidence sustains tbe verdict. It is sufficient in my judgment with the testimony as to tbe three raids of Pat Courtney’s place in tbe Minnesota House and tbe one of tbe defendant’s home eliminated. Without this testimony, however, tbe jury bad difficulty in agreeing that defendant was guilty o'f selling to tbe two detectives on March 18, 1922. After several hours’ deliberation it inquired whether it could consider tbe exhibits found on these raids “as evidence, either direct or circumstantial, in this case,” and, on being informed, soon agreed. Tbe evidence of tbe two detectives, although denied by the defendant, who was supported by a good alibi, wras in law ample, but the jurors were not satisfied with its sufficiency in fact.
I cannot agree that tbe results of tbe raids of Pat Courtney’s place on April 1, June 3 and July 8, and of tbe one on tbe defendant’s home a few days prior to tbe trial, which commenced on July 26, were proper to put before tbe jury, nor that evidence of sales on July 2 and July 8 was admissible.
With my understanding of tbe record I cannot see that tbe raids disclose a plan or system within the meaning of that expression in tbe law of evidence, or disclose facts, such as tbe presence of liquor, material against tbe defendant, who was not in possession, on tbe question of tbe sale for which be was indicted.
That unlawful sales were made to the same person, or even to other persons, about the same time may sometimes be given in evidence, and evidence of possession of liquors or appliances usual in liquor selling is often competent. State v. Mueller, 38 Minn., 38 N. W. 691; State v. Sederstrom, 99 Minn. 234, 109 N. W. 113; State v. Peterson, 98 Minn. 210, 108 N. W. 6; State v. Lindquist, 110 Minn. 12, 124 N. W. 215; State v. Stoffels, 89 Minn. 205, 94 N. W. 675; State v. Gesell, 137 Minn. 43, 162 N. W. 683; State v. Van Vleet, 139 Minn. 144, 165 N. W. 962. The character of the issue, or the course of the trial, may determine admissibility. Evidence of conduct, if otherwise competent, is not incompetent because it shows the commission of another crime. State v. Madigan, 57 Minn. 425, 59 N. W. 490; 1 Wigmore, Ev. § 215; 1 Jones, Ev. § 143. It is not competent just because it shows another crime of the same character.
There may be reasons for abandoning the general rule confining proof to the issue, and permitting evidence of other like offenses, showing a disposition or habit or practice or occasional or frequent indulgence on the part of the accused, and a resultant likelihood of his guilt, as on the whole the most conducive to the ascertainment of the truth. The brief of the attorney general, with characteristic frankness, as if anticipating the existence or propriety of such a rule, suggests that the accused was “a persistent violator of the laws of the state forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquor.” A disposition to be fair with the accused has induced courts to limit the investigation' to the specific offense for which the accused is on trial and which he is notified he must meet. A practical infirmity of such a rule is that it tends to satisfy judges and juries with a finding of guilt, though not sufficiently proved, if on another occasion the accused was guilty, or if on several other occasions there were charges and some considerable evidence of guilt. Wigmore, Ev. §§ 192-194; Jones, Ev. § 143, et seq; 2 Bishop, New Crim. Proc. § 1120, et seq. The resultant distraction of attention from the main issue and the time used in the investigation of collateral questions are not without importance. Two-thirds of the time of the trial was taken in an investigation of the raids on Pat Courtney’s place, what was found there, what was said and done there, all involving Courtney and his place and its hangers on, but not touching or expected to touch the defendant.
