196 P. 360 | Or. | 1921
The scene of the killing was inside of the national Cascade forest reserve and a short distance west of the summit of the Cascade Mountains, upon the flank of what is known as Scott Mountain, a somewhat prominent peak the dome of which is situated about two and one-half miles in a northwesterly direction
The state, which prosecuted vigorously on the theory that the killing was not only done by the defendant but was one of purpose and malice, to show motive, introduced evidence which in some degree indicated that defendant was dissatisfied with the reason given for his discharge and resented it as unfair to himself. But as the verdict of the jury negatived a malicious or willful killing, that branch of the case need not be pursued further than to say that, while some evidence of a possible motive might be deduced, it is far from convincing to the writer, and it is evident that the jury took a similar view.
The verdict of manslaughter reduced the discussion of the facts to two propositions: (1) Did the
“If any person shall, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act without due caution or circumspection, involuntarily kill another, such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter.”
These propositions involve a discussion of the circumstances attending the killing. On the morning of July 23, 1919, at the request of Smith Taylor, who was supervising the work, the defendant, who lived on what is called the Fraker place, four miles below McKenzie Bridge, started with his wagon and team to go to Pole Bridge to work. From McKenzie Bridge or near there he was accompanied by deceased, who also had a team attached to a road-grader. It was the understanding that there would be eight days’ work excluding Sunday and including the time occupied in going and returning. Defendant took with him a 30-30 caliber Winchester rifle, which was the only gun in the crowd at the start, but after a discussion between deceased and defendant as to the necessity of securing “camp meat” deceased borrowed a 30-30 Winchester and seven cartridges from the Swartz brothers, who reside on the road at a place called “Lost Creek Ranch.” In the company besides deceased and defendant were J. O. Lewis, Walter Boone, Doug Love, and Howard Wise, a sixteen year old nephew of deceased. There were on the wagon provisions for the party, and eight bales of hay deemed sufficient to feed the horses the nine days the party expected to be absent. After passing Lost Creek Ranch the party went on to a place called
When Taylor left Pole Bridge with defendant was the last time he was seen alive by his associates. What the parties did thereafter depends wholly upon the statements of the defendant and the circumstances hereinafter detailed.
The defendant returned to the camp at Pole Bridge the next morning, which was July 25th, made no inquiry about his companion, declined to .take coffee at a camp of engineers which was near his own camp where he prepared his breakfast, and went to work on the road, not coming in contact with any of his associates until after the lunch hour. When he met them at about 1 o’clock p. m. he did not say anything about deceased until Boone asked him where Taylor was, and he answered that he did not know, that they had separated in the morning and he had not seen him since, and gave no further account of the hunt or of the whereabouts of the deceased until that evening (July 25th), when in answer to ques
Boone testified that as soon as the working party got in, that evening, defendant went immediately to his team. His testimony indicates that defendant displayed little anxiety at the prolonged absence of deceased. Doug Love testified substantially to the same "state of facts. Howard Wise testified that after the working party came into camp that night defendant said that he did not know what had happened to Taylor, adding that he was too good a woodsman to be lost. He remarked that, “something has happened to him or he has been shot.” Wise fired three signal shots with defendant’s gun and later Doug Love fired one shot. It does not appear from the testimony of these witnesses that the shooting was suggested by defendant, and nothing beyond the expression above quoted indicates that at any time he showed any anxiety or emotion over the nonappearance of his hunting companion. So far as the state’s testimony indicates, he was perhaps the most indifferent member of the party as to Taylor’s whereabouts.
The next morning, July 26th, he went in company with J. 0. Lewis to search for Taylor but instead of looking for him in the vicinity where Taylor would most probably have hunted, as indicated by the di
We pause here to remark that an inspection of the map taken in connection with defendant’s account of the separation of himself and deceased and the obvious route of the latter from that point toward Pole Bridge indicate that no intelligent man would have expected to find Taylor or his body in any of the
We now return to subsequent occurrences, described in the state’s testimony. Later in the afternoon of the same day, July 26th, James Sheasley, a forest guard, came to Pole Bridge camp with a party of searchers, and after some conversation with defendant asked him to go along for the purpose of pointing out the place where he and deceased had camped and to assist in the search. Defendant demurred at first, saying that he was “awful tired and worn and hungry,” but finally consented to go on horseback up the road and Scott Mountain trail, previously followed by himself and Lewis, but was unable to or at least did not locate the camping place, took the party about a quarter of a mile past where the camping place subsequently proved to be, then turned back, and indicated a point which he thought was near where Taylor turned off to the left, and said he went in that direction, indicating the direction of Scott Lake, or rather a line between Scott Lake and Scott Mountain. The searching party took the direction suggested and searched through the woods to the head of Hand Lake, which is from one-half to three fourths of a mile north of Pole Bridge; but defendant did not accompany them, he had better return home as his horses were running short of feed. He was assured that it did not necessarily make much difference whether they had grain or hay, because there was plenty of grass around, but he persisted in his determination to go home and actually did so the next morning, July 27th.
The defendant, as before stated, left Pole Bridg’e on Sunday morning, July 27th, and arrived home that evening, taking with him Lewis, Boone and Howard Wise, the last named being a nephew of deceased who lived with deceased. By making a detour of about a mile he would have passed the home of deceased and have been able to communicate the facts to Mrs. Taylor; but, notwithstanding the lad expressed reluctance to break the sad news to the wife of deceased, defendant let the boy go alone to tell her of Taylor’s disappearance, and did not himself go by or have any communication with her. The next day, Monday, July 28th, he received notice that he was wanted at the telephone by Smith Taylor, who had meanwhile gone to Pole Bridge, and went to the residence of deceased to answer the telephone. His wife was visiting at the home of deceased at the time. He was introduced to the mother of deceased, but never mentioned the occurrences connected with the disappearance of Taylor, nor did he inquire after the wife of deceased or ask to see her. He received a message from Smith Taylor requesting him to return to Pole Bridge and saying that there were some
Efforts to track the killer of the deer from the place where the head and entrails were found having proved unavailing, the combing party resumed operations by making a new swath, alongside the territory originally covered. The defendant on the morning of July 28th expressed a desire to take the party to -the place where he and deceased had camped, but was told by Smith Taylor and Sheasley that it would be better for him to join the searching party which designed to pursue the combing method already begun. He consented, and accompanied them and the combing was resumed, the party as it afterwards proved having passed within eight hundred feet of the body of deceased. On its last trip during this search the defendant frequently insisted on discontinuing the combing process and going to the place where he and deceased had camped, and finally at his continued suggestions the combing process was discontinued and some of the party went with him to search for that place, which he found. The place where he fired two shots at the porcupine was also found. The party then returned to Pole Bridge, and on "Wednes
Before recounting the circumstances which took place after the finding of the body and which we think indicate that deceased was killed by a shot discharged from defendant’s rilie, we will discuss the circumstances above detailed, and particularly the conduct of defendant, to ascertain whether they indicate a sense of guilt or a knowledge on his part that an act of his caused the death of Taylor..
His conduct was unnatural and out of the normal in not inquiring upon meeting with his fellow-workmen whether or not deceased had returned to camp. Almost the first question a normal- man would have asked would have been, “Has Taylor come in yet?” As the hours wore on and deceased was still absent it would have been natural for him to ex
We will now consider the circumstances attending the finding of the body and subsequent thereto. The body was discovered lying on a bench of land south of which at a distance of approximately seventy-three feet at the nearest point is an abrupt bluff or “rim-rock” as it is called in the testimony, which is probably eight feet in height and of which the general direction is approximately from northwest to southeast. At a point almost directly south of the body this rim-rock makes a curve to the north and runs for twenty-five or thirty feet on a tangent almost directly east. Here it again curves to the north for about the same distance, then again makes a curve and runs approximately south of east for perhaps twenty feet or mpre. At this point there is situated on the summit of the rim-rock a boulder
The body was lying about northwest of this tree, perhaps six feet distant, with the feet nearest the tree and almost under the branches. The head was toward the northeast. The foot were almost in a line drawn from the boulder before mentioned through the branches of the tree and from six to ten
The evidence indicates that deceased was an experienced hunter and that his customary method of preparing the carcass of a deer was to cut off the head and hind feet, open the upper part of the body and take out the entrails, skin the forelegs to the knee, and cut apertures in the gambrels so as to admit the remaining loose forelegs to be passed through these, making a pack which he carried upon his back with his arms through the loop made by the process above described and which produces practically the same effect as the pack-straps upon a soldier’s knapsack. The load is carried with the hams hanging down, which with a man of Taylor’s height would bring the neck of the deer up to about the back of his head. A large buck thus prepared, and without doubt the same deer of which the head and entrails were found about eighteen hundred feet southwesterly from the body was upon his shoulders in the form of a pack when his body was found. He was traveling evidently in an easterly direction, probably
It will be remembered that defendant and deceased were both carrying guns of the same make and caliber, 30-30 Winchester rifles, and that they were both using the same kind of ammunition, 30-30 cartridges with steel jacketed soft-nosed lead bullets, the cartridges perhaps most commonly used by hunters, and ordinarily it would have been impossible to identify by the cartridge the gun from which it was fired. In the case at bar that difficulty was surmounted by certain physical facts which cannot be disputed. At the boulder heretofore mentioned the witness found at the base of it an empty 30-30 shell, and another
We shall next discuss the question as to whether the killing was under such circumstances as to justify a verdict of manslaughter. As before remarked, there was some evidence of resentment by defendant against deceased, but it was not very strong, and what ill feeling defendant had entertained had apparently died away. If defendant harbored it, he did not exhibit it on the trip, and the relations of the parties seemed so kindly that it hardly appears probable that defendant intentionally committed the homicide. Indeed, if such had been his intention and he had been lying in wait to commit murder, it seems very improbable that he would have taken a chance shot through the branches of a bushy tree to effect that object. However, the verdict of the jury has acquitted defendant of the charge of intentional homicide, and unless the evidence tends to indicate a careless or negligent shooting, the verdict must be set aside. The facts above recounted indicate at least that defendant fired through the branches of a bushy hemlock tree at an object which he could not see or at least could not see clearly. To do this under any circumstances would seem at first blush to be negligent. There is little proof of the assertion by defendant’s counsel
“If you find beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Martin A. Clark, in July, 1919, in Lane County, Oregon, fired his rifle at a deer or other object and in firing at a deer or other object, if he did so fire, he failed to use due caution or circumspection, and involuntarily killed Charles Taylor, then the defendant would be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.”
The court continued as follows:
“I instruct you that homicide is manslaughter even though committed in doing an act lawful in itself, if the defendant was guilty of gross negligence and such was the cause of the death, but the negligence must have been gross under the circumstances. A person cannot be guilty of manslaughter under the statute to which I have called your attention, unless that person is guilty of gross negligence; a mere mistake, however, where there is not gross negligence is not manslaughter.”
We will now consider the objections to the ruling of the court on other questions presented in the record. The assignments of error from I to IX, inclusive, relate to the submission of the question of murder in the second degree to the jury, and hence have already been disposed of.
“If you should find from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the shot that killed Charles L. Taylor was fired by the defendant, Martin A. Clark, but it might be reasonably inferred that no injury could result from such act of the defendant, then in that case the killing would not be manslaughter, but the act would be excusable.”
This instruction, while not given in the language of the request, was substantially covered by the following charge:
“If he is guilty of manslaughter as I have defined manslaughter to you, that is, doing a lawful act without due caution, or circumspection, then he would be guilty of manslaughter. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he killed Taylor at all and if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he committed manslaughter as I have defined manslaughter to you, then it would be your duty to return in to court a verdict of not guilty.”
The instruction requested was faulty in form and should not have been given. The act referred to is that of firing the shot that killed Taylor. If defendant when he fired the shot, acting as a prudent and reasonable man, thought at the time that no injury could result, he was not guilty, and this the court substantially told the jury in the instruction quoted and in the following:
“If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant in Lane County, Oregon, did the act charged, or a reasonable doubt as to whether the act, if committed at all, was committed between July 1, 1919, and October 15, 1919, the date of the filing of the indictment, or a reasonable doubt as to whether the act, if done at all, was done without due caution or circumspection, or a reasonable doubt
The instruction requested is loosely drawn, not confined concretely to an inference drawn by defendant or which “might be” reasonably drawn by him, whereas the instructions given are in the concrete and, taken as a whole, clearly state the law so that the jury must have fully understood that, if a reasonably prudent man would have fired the shot under the same circumstances, it could not convict the defendant.
“It may be impossible in this case for the jury to determine, from the circumstances, by what means the deceased met his death, and, in that event, it would be the duty of the jury to acquit the defendant. ’ ’
It would have been highly objectionable for the court to go into the business of prophesying what might happen in the jury-room. In the general charge the jury was fully instructed that it must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased came to his death by a gunshot wound inflicted by defendant either maliciously or by an act done without due caution or circumspection, and this in one form or another was reiterated. If the charge requested meant more than this, it was more than defendant was entitled ,to. If it meant the same thing or less, it was unnecessary. The following instruction given by the court in itself contains
“Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient for a conviction, in this case, must be of a conclusive nature; that is to say, its tendency must be not only to convince the minds of the jury of the defendant’s guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, but to exclude the supposition that the deceased Charles L. Taylor lost his life, in some other manner than at the hands of. the defendant, and each fact necessary to the conclusion sought to be established must be proved by competent evidence, to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt. And if you have a reasonable doubt, or if you are unable to determine from the evidence the circumstances or by what means the deceased met his death, in that event it would be your duty to find the defendant not guilty.”
“Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient for a conviction in this case, must be of a conclusive nature, that is to say, the tendency must be not only to convince the minds of the jury of the defendant’s guilt, but to exclude the supposition that the deceased, Charles L. Taylor, may have lost his life in some other manner than at the hands of the defendant, and each fact necessary to the conclusion sought to be established must be proved by competent evidence to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
This is fully covered by the instruction above quoted and by the general charge.
“A. He said that was the gun. * * He said this is the gun he had with him on the trip up with the road crew at Polo Bridge. He also said that it was- the gun he had hunting with him on the trip.
“Q. Is there any identification' mark on the breech-block?
“A. There is a mark on this block, yes, sir. There is a little scratch or mark made by E. P. Martin, the photographer,, on the back of the block.
“Q. State whether or not that mark is anywhere where it would come in contact with the cartridge when the gun is loaded.
“A. The mark is on the exact opposite end of the block from where'the shell rests.”
It is difficult to determine to what part of the testimony the objection refers. It was clearly proper to allow the witness to testify that defendant stated that the gun exhibited was the same one which he had with him on the hunting trip. When the circumstances are recalled, it is apparent that the other questions asked were proper. A photographer had placed a mark of identification on the breech-block. The state was contending that there were certain marks on the head of the block that reproduced themselves on the cartridges when fired. It was therefore important to. distinguish the mark made by the photographer' from those claimed by the state to have been on the gnn originally, in order to avoid the possibility that the jury would confuse them. The testimony could have worked no possible injury to defendant’s case in any event.
“By Counsel for Defendant: You understand, Mr. Stickels, that this photographic proposition is just simply a shadow; it is all controlled by light and shade?
“A. Yes, that is true.
“Q. You understand that by just light and shade you can magnify and enlarge a defect or an apparent defect?
“A. I understand that all right.
“Q. That is a fact,' isn’t it?
“A. Yes, sir.
“By Counsel for the State: We object to that. We did not ask a thing on earth about that. ,
“By Counsel for Defendant: He has testified in regard to how these photographs were taken.
“By the Court: He is not an expert on photography. The objection is sustained.”
This indicates that every question was asked and answered without objection except the last, “That is a fact, isn’t it?” How far the court’s ruling went is problematical, as the testimony was not stricken out. In any event, the objection'was well taken, both for the reason that the witness was not an expert, and that the fact sought to be elicited was one well known generally and upon which the jury was presumably as well informed as the witness.
Another objection was to a question asked the same witness as to how long defendant was kept in jail without being permitted to see counsel. The objection was properly taken at that stage of the case. Later the witness was cross-examined thoroughly as to the interest he had taken in the case, from which it appeared that he had been very- zealous in following up supposed clues indicating or supposed to indicate defendant’s connection with the shooting, and had been in consultation with the state prosecutor during the trial.
“It is no objection to the admissibility of a photograph that it is enlarged, showing the subject or object magnified, where this does not have a tendency to mislead. Photographs of instruments already in evidence which are so enlarged as to make the proportions plainer and to illustrate the testimony of witnesses may go to the jury in the same way as would a magnifying-glass or microscope”; 22 C. J., § 1121f, citing many authorities.
For the. same reason, enlarged photographs of other shells fired from the gun of deceased were admissible in connection with the shells themselves for the purpose of showing that shells fired from Taylor’s gun did not have upon them that peculiar mark imprinted upon those fired from defendant’s gun, thus negativing the theory that Taylor might have been killed accidentally by a shot from his own gun. The fact that the photographs were made without notice to defendant did not affect their admissibility:
This case is not like that of State v. Hembree, 54 Or. 463 (103 Pac. 1008), relied upon by counsel for defendant. In that instance the defendant was accused of killing his wife and daughter. There, the state to prove a motive for the killing assumed that defendant had been having illicit relations with his daughter and had committed the crime charged in order to prevent the results from being known. To sustain this, the prosecution introduced the keeper of the hotel where the daughter had been staying, who testified that the defendant visited his daughter’s room in the evening (which was certainly not in itself a circumstance indicating guilt) 5 that after a
The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.