State v. ClarkState v. Clark
{¶ 1} Appellant, Leroy J. Clark, appeals his convictions for domestic violence, theft, criminal damaging, and aggravated menacing. After careful review of the record and pertinent law, we affirm appellant‘s convictions.
{¶ 2} On May 19, 2010, appellant was indicted and charged with one count of robbery in violation of
{¶ 4} On April 30, 2010, appellant began drinking alcohol with his girlfriend, Latoya Scruggs. Scruggs testified that she and appellant began to argue as they drove to a local store in her vehicle. Scruggs stated that as the argument intensified, appellant threatened to crash the vehicle into a pole. She testified that appellant then became physical and, at one point, took her glasses off her face, crumpled them up, and threw them out the window. Scruggs stated that appellant then took his Black and Mild cigar and stuck it on her neck, burning her. Once the vehicle stopped, Scruggs attempted to jump out, but appellant prevented her from leaving the vehicle by grabbing her by her sweater. Scruggs testified that she eventually broke away from appellant and called the police from a nearby gas station. Scruggs stated that as appellant sped away from the gas station, he threw her cell phone down the sewer, stating, “this is what I think of your phone.”
{¶ 5} Officer Jamie Cruz of the Cleveland Police Department testified that he responded to Scruggs‘s 911 phone call and report of assault. Officer Cruz testified that upon arriving at the scene, he was met by Scruggs and observed a fresh burn mark on her neck. Officer Cruz testified that Scruggs alleged that appellant had assaulted her and prevented her from leaving her
{¶ 6} At trial, appellant testified on his own behalf and denied assaulting Scruggs. Appellant testified that in the midst of the argument with Scruggs, she became enraged and attacked him while he was in the driver‘s seat of the vehicle. Appellant stated that Scruggs cracked a part of his tooth during the attack. Appellant alleged that the cigar burned Scruggs‘s neck when she jumped on him and that he was also burned by the cigar as a result of her actions. Additionally, appellant denied having any involvement in the destruction of Scruggs‘s glasses and indicated that he owned the cell phone involved.
{¶ 7} At the conclusion of the case, appellant was found guilty of domestic violence, theft, criminal damaging, and aggravated menacing. The trial court found him not guilty of all other counts. At sentencing, appellant was sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} Appellant appeals, raising three assignments of error for review:
{¶ 9} “I. “The state failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain appellant‘s convictions.”
{¶ 10} “II. “Appellant‘s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
I
{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal. Appellant contends that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions. We disagree.
{¶ 13} At the conclusion of the state‘s case, appellant moved for acquittal pursuant to
{¶ 14} Appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of
{¶ 15} In this case, Scruggs testified that appellant was the father of her three-year-old child and was living with her in an apartment at the time of the incident. Over the course of the trial, the trial court heard evidence that on April 30, 2010, appellant took his cigar and stuck it on Scruggs‘s neck in the midst of an argument. This purposeful act by appellant left a noticeable burn mark on the side of Scruggs‘s neck. The existence of the burn mark was corroborated by the testimony of Officer Cruz, who testified that he observed a fresh burn mark on the side of Scruggs‘s neck upon arriving at the scene of the altercation. Further, the prosecution presented the trial court with a photograph of Scruggs taken after the altercation that clearly illustrated the extent of her burn and other injuries.
{¶ 17} With respect to appellant‘s convictions for theft,
{¶ 18} Despite appellant‘s contentions, we find that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that the cell phone belonged to Scruggs. The record reflects that Scruggs paid the bills for the cell phone and exercised control over the cell phone at all times. Further, Scruggs testified that when appellant dropped the cell phone into the sewer, he stated, “this is what I think of your phone.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the state‘s evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant
{¶ 20} With respect to appellant‘s conviction for criminal damaging or endangering,
{¶ 21} Appellant argues that the state failed to present any physical evidence of the alleged broken eye glasses that were the subject of his criminal damaging conviction. At trial, Scruggs testified that, during the parties’ argument, appellant “snatched her glasses off her face, crumpled them up, and threw them out the vehicle‘s window.” Scruggs testified that she requires eye glasses to see and that, as a result of appellant‘s conduct, she was forced to wear new glasses because the destroyed pair of eye glasses were never recovered.
{¶ 22} Viewing Scruggs‘s testimony in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the record contains sufficient evidence that appellant damaged property owned by Scruggs.
{¶ 23} Finally, appellant‘s conviction for aggravated menacing is governed by
{¶ 24} Construing this testimony in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the state‘s evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant knowingly caused Scruggs to believe he would cause her serious physical harm. Appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶ 26} “The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. In Thompkins, the court distinguished between sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence, finding that these concepts differ both qualitatively and quantitatively. Id. at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. The court held that sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, but weight of the evidence addresses the evidence‘s effect of inducing belief. Id. at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541. In other words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive — the state‘s or the defendant‘s? We went on to hold that although there may be sufficient evidence to support a judgment, it could nevertheless be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. ‘When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the factfinder‘s resolution of the conflicting testimony.’ Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, citing Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652.” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶25.
{¶ 28} Consequently, although we act as a “thirteenth juror” when considering whether the manifest weight of the evidence requires reversal, we are charged with the task of giving great deference to the fact finder‘s determination of the witnesses’ credibility. State v. Covington, Franklin App. No. 02AP-245, 2002-Ohio-7037, ¶22. Upon review of the record, we find no reason to dispute the trial court‘s determination of witness credibility, and there is no evidence that the trier of fact “lost its way.” Appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 29} In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in limiting the admission of certain testimony, the cumulative effect of which was to deny him a fair trial in violation of his due process rights under the Ohio and United States Constitutions. We disagree.
{¶ 30} We initially address appellant‘s contention that his state and federal constitutional rights to confront the witnesses against him were violated when the trial court restricted his ability to explore motive and bias during the cross-examination of Scruggs.
{¶ 31} The constitutional right of cross-examination includes the right to impeach a witness‘s credibility. State v. Green, 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 1993-Ohio-26, 609 N.E.2d 1253; State v. Brewer (Aug. 24, 1994), Montgomery App. No. 13866;
{¶ 32} On the other hand, trial courts have wide latitude in imposing reasonable limits on the scope of cross-examination based upon concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, witness safety, or repetitive, marginally relevant interrogation. Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674. It is within the trial court‘s broad discretion to determine whether testimony is relevant and to balance its potential probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. In re Fugate (Sept. 22, 2000), Darke App. No. 1512. The determination as to whether otherwise relevant evidence must be excluded because of a threat of unfair prejudice outweighing its probative value is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Cleveland v. Petko (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 670, 676, 679 N.E.2d 1162. See, also, State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 158, 1998-Ohio-370, 694 N.E.2d 932. An abuse of discretion implies an arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial court. Id.
{¶ 33} In the present case, Scruggs was questioned on cross-examination about whether she had ever assaulted appellant, to which she replied “no.” When asked if the appellant had ever called the police on her she replied
{¶ 34}
{¶ 35} “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness‘s character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in
{¶ 36} One commentator has noted that, “[u]nder
{¶ 38} This case presents a classic “he said, she said” credibility contest between Scruggs (the victim) and appellant. Scruggs‘s testimony is the only evidence that identifies appellant as the perpetrator of these crimes and demonstrates the elements of the offenses with which appellant is charged. Thus, Scruggs‘s credibility was a crucial issue in establishing appellant‘s guilt. That said, however, we agree with the trial court that the issues about which appellant wished to question Scruggs had no relevance as to whether, on April 30, 2010, appellant assaulted Scruggs and unlawfully restrained her.
{¶ 39} Further, the Ohio Supreme Court has noted that the “rights to confront witnesses and to defend are not absolute and may bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal process.” Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297. This includes discretion on the part of the trial court in considering the admission
{¶ 40} Whatever marginal probative value these areas of inquiry might have had in impeaching Scruggs‘s truthfulness was far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that could result from inquiry into those areas.
{¶ 41} We next consider appellant‘s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the use of impeachment testimony during the direct examination of appellant‘s witnesses, Wayne Allen and Doris Bright. Specifically, appellant attempted to elicit testimony from Allen and Bright regarding their knowledge of Scruggs‘s violent tendencies toward appellant in the past.
{¶ 42} In support of his argument, appellant relies on
{¶ 43} However, the admissibility of testimony under
{¶ 44} Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding that the probative value of the proffered extrinsic evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Appellant‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR