State v. ClarkState v. Clark
Virginia K. Miller, Smith & Miller, 36 West Jefferson Street, #1, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Defendаnt-Appellant).
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.
O P I N I O N
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ralph E. Clark, appeals the Judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, denying his Motion to Withdraw Plea Pre-sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the court below.
{¶2} In May 2005, Clark was indicted for beating his wife to death with a rifle.
{¶4} Clark aрpealed his conviction and sentence to this court, which affirmed Clark‘s guilty plea but reversed the imposition of economic sanctions. See State v. Clark, 11th Dist. No. 2006-A-0004, 2007-Ohio-1780.
{¶5} Clark appealed this court‘s decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which remanded the case to our court for determination of whether Clark was prejudiced by the misinfоrmation provided to him regarding his sentence, i.e. whether he would not have entered his plea but for the trial judge‘s erroneous explanation of parolе/post-release control. See State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748.
{¶6} On remand, this court affirmed Clark‘s guilty plea but remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings with respeсt to the financial sanctions imposed. See State v. Clark, 11th Dist. No. 2006-A-0004, 2008-Ohio-6768, at ¶24.
{¶7} On June 17, 2009, Clark filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea Pre-sentence. As grounds for the Motion, Clark argued “he does not believe thаt the State of Ohio can prove his guilt at trial.” Clark also asserted that the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea pre-sentence be applied when ruling on his Motion.
{¶8} On July 2, 2009, Clark‘s resentencing hearing was held. At the hearing, Clark raised additional arguments as to why his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made. Clark claimed he was under the influence and control of a religious cult when he entered the plea. According to Clark, a day or two before the plea was entered, he was visited in the jаil by a Bishop Keyes, his cousin and church leader.
{¶9} Clark also claimed that his post-traumatic stress and being “somewhat illiterate” contributed to his inability to fully understand the terms of the plea agreement.
{¶10} On July 9, 2009, the trial court entered its Judgment Entry denying Clark‘s Motion. The court ruled that Clark‘s Motion would be treated as a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, inasmuch as his plea and conviction were neither reversed nor found void by this court or the Ohio Supreme Court. Addressing the merits of Clark‘s motion, the court held that the allegations do not rise to the level of a manifest injustice. The court noted that the only evidence presented was Clark‘s own “self-serving” allegations; the validity of Clark‘s plea has been affirmed on appeal; and many of the allegations made are barred by res judicata, inasmuch as they could have beеn raised in his direct appeal.
{¶11} On August 5, 2009, Clark filed his Notice of Appeal. On appeal, he raises the following assignment of error:
{¶12} “[1.] The court erred when it denied Clаrk‘s motion to withdraw his plea where the prosecuting attorney conducted plea negotiations with him through a third party - without his attorney‘s knowledge.”
{¶13} “A motion to withdraw а plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may sеt aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or
{¶14} “A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, at paragraph one of the syllabus. “A motion made pursuant to
{¶15} Clark argues the facts and circumstanсes of his case, i.e. the Prosecutor‘s conduct in “sending Clark‘s cousin, Bishop Keyes, to meet with him in jail to try to convince him to take the State‘s plea offer,” “аre so compelling that they rise to the level of manifest injustice.” We disagree.
{¶16} Clark‘s allegations are of doubtful credibility and the trial court acted within its discretiоn by rejecting them. The only evidence that the Prosecutor used Bishop Keyes to pressure Clark into accepting the plea offer is Clark‘s own statements. State v. Mull, 11th Dist. No. 2008-L-128, 2009-Ohio-3654, at ¶45 (“[g]еnerally, a self-serving affidavit or statement is insufficient to demonstrate manifest injustice“) (citation omitted). Clark did not raise the argument in his written Motion, but at the resentencing hеaring, thereby depriving the Prosecutor of the opportunity of preparing a response to the novel argument.
{¶17} Moreover, Clark raised the argument three and a half years after entering his plea. “[A]n undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea and the filing of a motion under
{¶18} We further note that, during the plea colloquy, Clark represented to the trial court that his decision to enter a guilty plea was an “informed decision,” madе in consultation with his attorney, he was not being forced or compelled to enter the plea, and he understood the terms of the plea. The evidence of the plea colloquy undermines Clark‘s current allegations of coercion by Bishop Keyes on behalf of the Prosecutor. State v. Kapper (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 36, 38 (“[d]efendant‘s own self-serving declarations or affidavits alleging a coerced guilty plea are insufficient to rebut the record on review which shows that his plea was voluntary“).
{¶19} Clark relies on the case of Disciplinary Counsel v. Sartini, 114 Ohio St.3d 205, 2007-Ohio-3601, as evidencе to support his allegations. In this case, Prosecutor Sartini was publicly reprimanded by the Ohio Supreme Court for conducting plea
{¶20} The sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶21} For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, denying Clark‘s Motion to Withdraw Plea Pre-sentence, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.,
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.,
concur.