359 N.E.2d 1382 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1976
The instant question arises upon motions to dismiss for the lack of a final order. Appellant has filed briefs on the merits asserting one assignment of error: the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss pursuant to R. C.
The facts as stated in appellant's brief are accepted, as follows:
The Defendant-Appellant, Roy H. Proplski, was served with summons in Case Nos. 75-CRB-6581 and 75-CRB-6625, as above referenced, on September 23, 1975.
The Defendant-Appellant, Cinema X. Bookstore, was served with summons in Case No. 75-CRB-6582 on September 23, 1975, and was served with summons in Case No. 75-CRB-6970, on October 5, 1975.
The Defendant-Appellants were subsequently arraigned on October 15, 1975, in Dayton Municipal Court, not guilty pleas having been entered with regard to each charge.
On October 21, 1975, the trial court, by Order filed sua sponte, declared that cases numbered 75-CRB-6970, 75-CRB-6582, and 75-CRB-6581, had not been reached for trial due to press of other business, and continued trial on same until January 2, 1975.
A Pre-Trial Conference on the cases was subsequently held on November 4, 1975.
On November 13, 1975, the trial court by Order filed sua sponte, declared that Case Nos. 75-CRB-6582, 75-CRB-6970, and 75-CRB-6581, had not been reached for trial "due to the press of other business" and continued the trial scheduled for January 2, 1976, to January 29, 1976. A similar Entry was filed in Case No. 75-CRB-6625, scheduling trial for January 29, 1976.
On December 4, 1975, Defendant-Appellant filed their Jury Demands in each case.
On January 9, 1976, Defendant-Appellants filed their respective Motions to Dismiss in each case, pursuant to the provisions of Section
On January 12, 1976, the trial court by Order filed sua sponte, ordered that the trial scheduled for January 29, 1976, in the four (4) cases be rescheduled to February 2, 1976, "pursuant to Defendants' Jury Demand."
The trial court by its Decision and Entry filed January 15, 1976, overruled Defendant-Appellants' Motion to Dismiss. *166
Defendant-Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal from the trial court's Decision and Entry on January 28, 1976.
The specifics of each entry of continuance appear with the filings in the docket and journal entries.
Every legislative change in the criminal statutes is initially a source of litigation as old precedents are reconsidered. It was not unexpected that the adoption of a complete new criminal code, mixed with procedural and remedial changes, would not only be unsettling but disruptive. A wholesale change of a complete body of the law provokes an anxiety to make changes effective overnight as though the effective date is a time to accomplish all new objectives immediately. This is not necessarily true with regard to procedural and remedial questions. State v. Walker (1976),
These comments reflect the writer's experience on the appealability of an interlocutory order denying the dismissal of a criminal action under R. C.
The direct question in this case does not appear to have been resolved by the Supreme Court. However, its language in recent cases arising in special remedies points out that issues arising on speedy trial motions cannot be resolved through mandamus or habeas corpus because there is an adequate procedure by way of an appeal from a conviction. State, ex rel. Woodbury, v.Spitler (1974),
Appellant relies upon State v. Pudlock (1975),
Much of the confusion upon the question whether a denial of a motion to dismiss is appealable arises out of the strong language and action of the court in State v. Cross (1971),
The defendants in the instant cases have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to contest the trial courts denial of the motions to dismiss after there has been a final decision by the trial court.
Having reached this point, the long established law applicable to an appealable order requires that the instant motions to dismiss be sustained for lack of an appealable order and that the cases be remanded to the trial court for proceedings according to law. R. C.
Resorting to a comparable situation, the loss of a civil remedy by way of the statute of limitations is similar to the right of a defendant to a discharge under R. C.
Returning to R. C.
While it may be a mistake to look to cases involving mandamus or other high writs for the prospective solution to questions of appellate review, it would appear that if a right existed for an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to discharge a defendant, such an important right would have found its way into the decisions relating to this statute. The absence of such enlightenment and frequent resort to unusual writs suggests the total absence of any right to an interlocutory appeal under R. C.
The appealability of former R. C.
Again in State v. Miller (1953),
Accordingly, the decision of this court in State v. Hayes,
No. 4753, rendered on April 3, 1975, holding that the overruling of a motion to dismiss under R. C.
In State v. Ritchie, No. 4633, this court stated that "the procedural right to discharge or other statutory benefits cannot be enlarged by the court." The motion to certify was denied for lack of a substantial constitutional question. Again arguably, it may be said that R. C.
The motions to dismiss are sustained.
Judgment accordingly.
SHERER, P. J., and KERNS, J., concur. *170