State v. ChuonState v. Chuon
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Schumacher
OPINION
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
This appeal is from a judgment of conviction for attempted first-degree murder.
FACTS
Chuon was charged with attempted first- and second-degree murder, drive-by shooting, and “crime committed for the benefit of a gang.” The charges arose from the shooting of Monivorn Kim at a gas station in St. Paul. Kim, a 16-year-old member of the Asian Boyz gang, was shot after Kim’s companion and fellow gang member had “challenged” a man they suspected of being a member of a rival gang, the Red Cambodian Bloods (RCB).
Kim testified that he and his friends were at the station pumping gas when they saw a man in a red flannel shirt talking on the phone. One of the group went over to him to ask if he was in a gang, which he denied. The man then got into a red or maroon Honda Accord and drove off. Shortly after, the car returned and Kim saw the man in the red flannel shirt sitting in the passenger seat pointing a gun at them. Kim and three other eyewitnesses identified Chuon as the man with the gun. The man fired a single shot, striking Kim in the shoulder.
The state presented the testimony of Officer Straka, a Minneapolis police officer who was assigned to the Gang Strike Force and was familiar with Asian gangs. Straka estimated there were about 50 members of the RCB in the Twin Cities and began naming them. When Straka named the first suspected member, defense counsel objected on grounds of relevance. The trial court overruled the objection. Straka then gave his expert opinion that one of the primary objectives of the RCB was the commission of violent crimes. In support of that opinion, Stra-ka cited arrests made and charges filed against RCB members for attempted murder, aggravated robbery, and carrying a gun without a permit. Straka then gave his expert opinion that the shooting of Kim was committed to benefit the RCB by upholding their honor against the “challenge” made at the gas station.
Chuon testified that he had quit the gang several years earlier. He denied shooting Kim. The jury, however, found Chuon guilty on all four counts, including crime committed for the benefit of a gang.
ISSUE
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of criminal activity by other gang members?
2. Is the evidence sufficient to support the conviction?
ANALYSIS
1. Chuon argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that other members of the RCB had been arrested for, or charged with, criminal acts. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Kelly, 435 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn.1989).
In order to prove that Chuon committed a crime for the benefit of a gang the state had to show that the crime benefited a gang, defined as a group that
(1) has, as one of its primary activities, the commission of one or more of the offenses listed in section 609.11, subdivision 9;
(2) has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol; and
(3) includes members who individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity.
In sum, the changes in the guidelines reinforce the unambiguous language of
Thus, we conclude that
Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
It is unnecessary in this case to consider whether there is a limit to the gang crime evidence admissible to prove a violation of
2. Chuon argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because it does not establish an intent to kill. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, assuming the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence, in order to determine whether
Chuon points to cases in which the number of shots, or blows, has been held to support an inference of intent to kill. See, e.g., State v. Bock, 490 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Minn.App.1992) (holding that two separate severe blows to head proved intent to kill), review denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1992). He concedes that a single shot may be sufficient to support the same inference. See State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn.1987) (firing of sawed-off shotgun at victim’s head from less than six feet sufficient evidence to prove intent to kill). But he argues that under the circumstances of this case, in which a single shot was fired from a moving car, for the sole purpose of retaliating for a challenge against a gang, there is insufficient evidence of intent. We do not agree that a single shot is insufficient in this case to prove an intent to kill.
Intent must generally be proved by inferences from the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances. State v. Whisonant, 331 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn.1983). Chuon fired at Kim, striking him in the shoulder blade, from a distance of about six to eight feet. The supreme court in Whisonant held the evidence of intent to kill was sufficient where the defendant fired a single bullet from a “pen gun” at a police officer 12 feet away, even though the officer was struck only by “particles from the discharge.” Id. Chuon’s single shot to the victim’s torso, an area of the body containing vital organs, is sufficient to support a finding of intent to kill. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
DECISION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state to introduce evidence of alleged crimes, committed by other gang members in order to prove one element of the offense of “crime committed for the benefit of a gang.” The evidence is sufficient to prove intent to kill.
Affirmed.