36 Minn. 402 | Minn. | 1887
Section 15, chapter 188, Laws 1885, is as follows : “Every railroad company or corporation organized under the
The action is to recover this penalty for a refusal by defendant to permit one JBarry, on his application, to construct, maintain, and operate on its land a warehouse at Blooming Prairie, a regular way-station on one of its lines of road. The court below overruled a demurrer to the complaint, and the defendant appealed.
On the argument here it was' assumed on both sides that the intent of section 15 is to require of a railroad company to permit any person or corporation applying for such permission to construct, maintain, and operate on the lands of the railroad company an ele
Taking that to be the intent of the section, the question presented to us, to wit, the constitutionality of that requirement, is very simple. The lands acquired by a railroad company for the purposes of its enterprise are, so far as the right of property is concerned, private property. If purchased, the company pays for them; if taken in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, it pays the compensation to the owner. They are purchased or taken and held for a public purpose, — a public use. Otherwise they could not be taken under the right of eminent domain. They are charged with a public duty, which the company, in consideration of the rights and powers conferred on it by the state, assumes to perform, and which the state can compel it to perform. But such public use is specific, not general ; and, when required for any other public use, the land must be taken for the purpose in the same manner as the lands of any private owner are taken; i. e., through the right of eminent domain. The ownership being private, there being a private interest in them, they cannot in any manner, nor on any pretext, be taken for a private use without the consent of the owner. Nor can they be taken for a public use without making just compensation. Such compensation cannot be fixed by the state; but, to determine it, the state must provide an impartial tribunal before which both parties may meet and discuss their claims on equal terms. Langford v. County of Ramsey, 16 Minn. 333, (375.)
These are elementary propositions, not disputed on the part of the state. On its part it is conceded that, if the section authorizes a “taking” within the constitutional meaning of the term, the section cannot be sustained. And this is undeniable, for the act makes no provision for ascertaining or making “just compensation” as required by the constitution.
That what the section contemplates is a taking, if anything can be, hardly admits of argument. When it puts A., without the consent of the company, into possession of a portion of its land, with right, of exclusive control, use, and occupation, ousting the company-
It is, however, contended that the section aims merely at regulating the public use for which the land was originally taken. By that taking the company acquired and paid for the exclusive right to possess and employ the land in that public use. Such right cannot be taken from it except through exercise of the right of eminent domain or through forfeiture. The section does not assume to control or direct the company in its use of the land, but to exclude it from such use, and to confer the right to employ it in a similar use upon another. It must be apparent that the amount of land to be taken does not affect the principle. If the state can take any of the lands, it can take all; if it can put another person or corporation into possession of so much of the company’s land as is necessary to construct and maintain an elevator or warehouse, it can put another corporation into possession of so much of its, land as may be necessary to construct and maintain another railroad. Indeed, if it can, under pretext of regulating the use, oust the company from any part of its property, however unimportant, no reason can be given why it may not, as a regulation, oust it from its right of way, yards, depot-grounds, tracks, and stations, and put other parties in possession of them, for it holds and employs all these for public use.
So far as the section requires railroad companies to let other persons into possession of any portion of their land without the compensation required by the constitution, it is invalid.
Order reversed.
Mitchell, J,, not having heard the argument, took no part in the decision of this case.