90 Iowa 594 | Iowa | 1894
I. In February, 1891, 'separate petitions in equity were filed in the Pottawattamie district “court by the attorney general, at tbe instance of the board of railroad commissioners of the state, and in their name, as such commissioners, against each of the defendants, which said petition, as finally amended averred, in substance: That plaintiffs were railroad commissioners of the state of Iowa. That defendant was and is a railway corporation and common carrier owning and operating a railroad in this state. That its line of railway in Iowa is intersected or joined by the lines of other railways; and it is necessary, proper and convenient, in facilitating transportation, for freight to be shipped over both lines, for which purpose a transfer of freight from one line to the other at the place of intersection is necessary. That in conformity with chapter 28, Acts Twenty-second General Assembly, the said board, during the year 1888, made for the railway companies of this state, including the defendants, a schedule of reasonable maximum rates of charges for transportation of freight and cars. That before fixing said rates under section 17, chapter 28, Acts Twenty-second General Assembly, said commissioners published notice, as required, and fixed a time and place, when and where they would proceed to fix and determine said rates; the place being the office of the commissioners, at the capitol, in Des Moines, and the time being the-day of June, 1888, and less than sixty days before said act took effect. That at said time and place the commissioners afforded all firms, persons, corporations, and common carriers an opportunity to be heard. That after making such maximum rates they caused notice to be given as required by law. That on October 9, 1890, said original schedule of rates was so revised and modified that there was in force in Iowa, as the maximum rates adopted, fixed, and established by said commissioners, the rates adopted in June, 1888, and on October 9,
II. It is contended that the state is not the proper party plaintiff; that the action should be prosecuted in “"the name of the commissioners. In answer to this
III. Some preliminary questions, which do not involve tbe validity of tbe law, are raised, which must be determined at tbe outset, and which, to our minds, are decisive of these cases:
" " First, it is conceded tbat no notice of an intention , to fix these rates was ever given by the railway commissioners to defendants. On tbe part of the state, it is” contended tbat tbe schedule of rates in controversy is but a revision of tbe schedule of reasonable maximum rates fixed and promulgated in 1888, so tbat no such notice was necessary. Tbe defendants contend that the schedule of 1890 is in no sense a revision of the schedule of 1888, but an independent and original schedule. If the latter claim is correct, it seems to be conceded, and is undoubtedly true, that the giving of notice of an intention to fix such rates, in advance of making them, was a requirement of the law absolutely necessary to be complied with, in order to confer jurisdiction on the board to fix the rates in controversy. It will be observed that one count of the petition is based on the thought that under the act of 1888, and the first section of the act of 1890, the commissioners had power to establish joint rates, and that the schedule in controversy was made without regard to, and not by virtue of, the subsequent provisions of the act of 1890. If a joint rate could be established under the' act of 1888, as seems to have been attempted, then the failure to give notice is justified by' the fact that that act only required such notice when tbe original schedule was made, not of a revision thereof; and if
Now, the rate fixed by the schedule in question was for a through shipment over two or more lines of road. That the form of the order provided that each road constituting the one line should only charge eighty per cent, of a certain other rate for the same kind of traffic did not make the rate any the less a joint rate, because the rate and schedule in question applied only to' through joint shipments; and a rate applicable only to a continuous shipment over two or more lines of road must, of necessity, be a joint rate, no matter what the form of phraseology of the order fixing it may be. Any other holding would result in authorizing the railroad commissioners to establish, promulgate, and have in effect, at the same time, and applicable to the same road, two different schedules of rates for the same identical service. Suppose two or more railroad companies mutually agreed that, for all through shipments over their respective lines, each company should have,
IY. Many other questions are elaborately discussed by counsel. As, however, for the reason heretofore given, the judgments below must be affirmed, and the same questions may not arise on another trial, we need not discuss them. Without determining whether there is a defect of parties defendant, it may be said that the question may not be free from doubt. Affirmed.