State v. ChelsonState v. Chelson
Expungement under the statute is discretionary, but with no objection on the merits by the prosecutor or chief of police of the municipality where the earlier offense was committed, that discretion might be exercised in favor of рetitioner. On the other hand, sentence was not suspended, so that the petition might be summarily dismissed on this basis. Although an inference may be drawn that the sentence for the exact jail time awaiting trial is the practical equivalent of a suspended sentence, a literal reading оf
More important, however, is the question of the availability of expungement where there is more than one conviction. Even assuming the sеntence, fine or nature of the offense do not bar relief, and the required ten years have elapsed since the conviction, the petition is only lawful
The legislative history of the statute furnishes additional evidence of the limited availability of the relief. The statement accompanying a bill which in 1936 amended the original 1931 statute was as follows:
“The purpose of this act is to assist only those persons who have one single conviction against them, and from thе time of the conviction and for a period of ten years therеafter have lived exemplary lives during that time and are able to show by their petition that they have made a complete moral сhange. It will rest with the judge hearing the matter to decide by the exercisе of his discretion whether the petitioning party would be entitled to this relief. This act reduces the period from twenty to ten years and provides notice to the chief of police of the municipality in additiоn to the prosecutor”
There is also evidence that the Executive Branch concurred in this interpretation of
“In addition, the language of the present act indicates that there is an intention to limit it to cases where the record shows but a single conviction.”
Recent legislation1 and legislative activity,2 together with other judicial decisions3 referring to
Petition dismissed.