{¶ 3} On February 16, 2007, in case number 07-CR-0104, Chavers was indicted on one count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} On May 23, 2007, a sentencing hearing was held. This hearing combined case numbers 06-CR-0392 and 07-CR-0104. Chavers was sentenced to 18 months of community control. On May 29, 2007, Chavers filed a notice of appeal. We dismissed his appeal, finding that the trial court had not issued a final, appealable order. On August 28, 2007, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc order, satisfying the requirements of a final, appealable order. On August 31, 2007, Chavers filed his notice of appeal. He has raised four assignments of error for our review. We have combined some assignments of error for ease of review.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT LET THE PROBATION DEPT. GIVE CONDITION(S) THAT WAS NOT PART OF [CHAVERS'] CRIME OR RAISED IN ANY OF THE SENTENCING PHASE[.]"
{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, Chavers contends that the trial court erred when it let the probation department give conditions that were not part of his crime nor raised at the sentencing phase. We do not agree.
{¶ 6} We first note that Chavers argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, Chavers pled guilty to the charges below. "A guilty plea *3
waives a defendant's right to challenge sufficiency or manifest weight of the evidence." State v. Jamison, 2d Dist. No. 21165,
{¶ 7} It appears that Chavers is challenging the reasonableness of his community contrоl conditions. He argues that because he was convicted of drug related charges, the requirements that he obtain drug/alcohol counseling and submit to "periodic, random drug/alcohol testing" is unreasonable. Specifically, he states that "there is no relationship btween (sic) [his] conviction and the non-comsumption (siс) of alcohol, there is nothing at all in the record that alcohol was involved in the crime."
{¶ 8} A trial court has broad discretion in imposing conditions of community control. Lakewood v. Hartman (1999),
{¶ 9} The reasonableness of community control conditions must be evaluated using the three-prong test set forth in State v. Jones (1990),
"consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation." Id.
{¶ 10} In its sentencing еntry, the trial court noted that "[t]he court has considered the pre-sentence report, the victim impact statement and the oral statements made during the sentencing hearing[.]" While the record before us does contain a transcript of the sentencing *4 hearing, it does not contain the presentence report to which the sentencing entry refers. At the sentencing hearing, Chavers' counsel stated that he "does have a prior record[.]" Further, we note that in his reply brief to this Cоurt, Chavers conceded two prior DUI convictions. As the trial court stated that it considered a presentence report, there is some indication that thе trial court was informed of these prior convictions, as well as any other facts surrounding the instant case.
{¶ 11} We have stated that when a presentence invеstigation was completed there is a presumption that the trial court utilized it in imposing its sentence. State v. O'Neal (Sept. 29, 1999), 9th Dist. No. 19255, at *2, citing State v. Koons (1984),
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT LET THE PROBATION OFFICER SIGN [CHAVERS'] NAME TO A[N] OFFICIAL DOCUMENT INWHICH (SIC) WAS NOT [CHAVERS'] SIGNATURE BUT, THAT OF THE PROBATION OFFICER'S SIGNATURE."
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN THE PROBATION OFFICER CALLED [CHAVERS'] DOCTOR AND ORDERED HIM TO STOP GIVING ANY TYPE OF MEDICATION(S) THAT WAS PERSCRIBED (SIC) TO [CHAVERS]."
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT LET THE PROBATION OFFICER TESTIFY ABOUT THE 1ST AND 2ND URINE TESTS HAD IN THE PROBATION HEARING."*5
{¶ 12} In his second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Chavers contests various actions that оccurred during the terms of his community control.
{¶ 13} At the outset, we note that Chavers was sentenced on May 24, 2007. He filed his initial notice of appeal with this Court on May 29, 2007. In his notice, Chavers stated that he was appealing from the judgment of the trial court in case numbers 06-CR-0392 and 07-CR-0104. Similarly, in his August 31, 2007 notice of appeal, Chavers stated that he was аppealing from the judgment/conviction entered in case numbers 06-CR-0392 and 07-CR-0104.
{¶ 14} Throughout these three assignments of error, Chavers refers to community control violations that we deduce occurred after his sentence was imposed on May 24, 2007. Specifically, his second of assignment of error pertains to his "Departmental Rеprimand for the wanton of a first violation" of his probation. His fourth assignment of error requests this Court to review actions that occurred at the June 12, 2007 community contrоl violation hearing.1 According to App.R. 3(D), a notice of appeal "shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from[.]"
"An appellate court "is without jurisdiction to review a judgment or order that is not designated in the appellant's notice of appeal. This promotes the purрose of App.R. 3(D): to notify potential appellees of an appeal and advise them as to what orders the appellant is appeаling from." (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Dixon, 9th Dist. No. 21463,
, at ¶ 2004-Ohio-1593 7 .
{¶ 15} As Chavers has not appealed from any orders relating to the community control violations referenced in his sеcond, third, and fourth assignment of error, we find that we are *6 without jurisdiction to review these assigned errors. Accordingly, we decline to address Chavers' second, third, and fourth assignments of error.
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Commоn Pleas, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediаtely upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation оf the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
*7Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARR, P. J., SLABY, J., CONCUR.