84 Wash. App. 85 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1996
Rory Chaten appeals his conviction for second degree assault. The information which charged him with that crime did not explicitly state the necessary element of intent. Chaten argues that this omission renders the charging document constitutionally insufficient. We apply the preverdict standard of review to Chaten’s challenge, but hold that the information was suf
Sufficiency of information
Chaten asserts that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss after the State restéd. He argues, as he did below, that the information was insufficient.
An information is constitutionally defective if it omits an essential element of the charged crime.
Chaten and the State do not agree on the standard of review to be applied in this case. Chaten made his challenge immediately upon the State resting, and thus asserts that the preverdict standard of strictly construing the information should apply, while the State argues for the more liberal postverdict standard.
In a postverdict challenge, the court will liberally construe the charging document to ascertain whether it can fairly be read to include all the essential elements. If the document meets this test, the defendant must show he was nevertheless prejudiced in order to obtain a reversal. A defendant faces a more difficult postverdict burden because without it the defendant would have no incentive to raise the issue sooner, when a challenge "might only result in an amendment or a dismissal potentially followed by a refiling of the charge.”
The State asserts that the postverdict standard for the challenge should be applied to a challenge made after the State has rested, because it is then unable to amend its information. This argument is not consistent with the rea
We apply the preverdict standard to Chaten’s challenge, but nevertheless hold that the information was sufficient. Our courts have determined, applying the more liberal postverdict analysis, that a charging document asserting an "assault” reasonably includes the element of intent.
The remainder of this opinion has no precedential value, and will not be published.
Webster and Becker, JJ., concur.
State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 97, 812 P.2d 86 (1991).
Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 103.
125 Wn.2d 782, 788, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995); State v. Tang, 77 Wn. App. 644, 647, 893 P.2d 646, review denied, 127 Wn.2d 1017 (1995).
See, e.g., State v. Davis, 119 Wn.2d 657, 663, 835 P.2d 1039 (1992); State v. Hopper, 118 Wn.2d 151, 158-59, 822 P.2d 775 (1992); State v. Dukowitz, 62 Wn. App. 418, 424, 814 P.2d 234 (1991), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1031 (1992).
Dukowitz, 62 Wn. App. at 424.
See Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d at 787 (noting that an information which merely names the offense charged is sufficient if the name apprises the defendant of all the essential elements).