[¶ 1] Joshua Lavern Charbonneau appealed from a criminal judgment and sentence entered after a conditional plea of guilty to five drug-related felonies and one driving-related misdemeanor. He argues the district court erred in its interpretation and application of the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (“UCSA”), N.D.C.C. ch. 19-03.1. We affirm.
I.
[¶ 2] On September 17, 2007, in Rolette County, Charbonneau pleaded guilty and was convicted of three drug-related felonies under the UCSA. He committed two of these felonies on August 25, 2005 — one class A felony and one class B felony for delivery of a controlled substance. He committed the third felony, a class B felony for delivery of a controlled substance, on November 16, 2005.
[¶ 3] In June 2009, the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s office charged Char-bonneau, by complaint, with ten drug-related offenses and one driving — related
II.
[¶ 4] Charbonneau argues the district court erred in its interpretation and application of the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence provision of the UCSA. He contends each of his 2005 offenses should have counted as only one prior offense because he was convicted of the three 2005 offenses on the same date in 2007. Specifically, he contends a defendant who has committed prior offenses should receive an elevated sentence only if the defendant receives independent notice of the possibility of an elevated sentence for each separate prior offense, because only then will the defendant have an opportunity to reform each instance of criminal behavior. He urges us to require that the conviction for each prior offense occur on separate dates to be considered a prior offense under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23(l)(a)(2) and (5), which provides:
1. Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to willfully ... deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.... Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:
a. A controlled substance classified in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, or methamphetamine, is guilty of a class A felony and must be sentenced:
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(2) For a third or subsequent offense, to imprisonment for twenty years.
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5. A violation of this chapter or a law of another state or the federal government which is equivalent to an offense under this chapter committed while the offender was an adult and which resulted in a plea or finding of guilt must be considered a prior offense under subsections 1, 3, and 4. The prior offense must be alleged in the complaint, information, or indictment. The plea or finding of guilt for the prior offense must have occurred before the date of the commission of the offense or offenses charged in the complaint, information, or indictment.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 5] The State alleged Char-bonneau’s prior convictions from 2007 in the complaint, the first information, and the second amended information. See State v. Mora,
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is fully renewable on appeal. Ackre v. Chapman & Chapman, P.C.,2010 ND 167 , ¶ 10,788 N.W.2d 344 . Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature’s intent. Id. We first look to the language of the statute to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Ward v. Bullis,2008 ND 80 , ¶ 18,748 N.W.2d 397 . We give words their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless a word is specifically defined. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02; see also Ward, at ¶ 18. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, “the letter of [the statute] is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05.
State v. Hager,
[¶ 6] In State v. Jones,
[It 7] In 1999, the Legislature amended § 19-03.1-23(5), modifying the sequence of events required to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence: “The plea or finding of guilt for the prior offense must have occurred before the date of the commission of the offense or offenses charged in the complaint, information, or indictment.” The plain language of the amendment does not require sequential convictions for each prior offense to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence as argued by Charbonneau. See Jones,
[¶ 8] The district court appropriately rejected Charbonneau’s argument that each of his convictions for prior offenses needed to have occurred on separate dates to be considered prior offenses. On September 17, 2007, Charbonneau pleaded guilty and was convicted of three drug-related felonies. He committed two of these felonies on August 25, 2005. He committed the third felony on November 16, 2005. His 2007 conviction included at least two instances of prior criminal conduct — in August and November of 2005.
[¶ 9] On December 16, 2009, Charbon-neau entered a conditional plea of guilty and was convicted of five drug-related felonies. He committed these felonies on or about June 16, 2009. His criminal conduct in 2009 serves as a “third or subsequent offense” under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23(l)(a)(2) because he was convicted of the requisite prior offenses in 2007, a year and a half before he committed the present felonies. Accordingly, the district court did not err as a matter of law in its interpretation and application of N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23(l)(a)(2) and (5).
III.
[¶ 10] We affirm the criminal judgment and the district court’s imposition of the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence.