State v. CharbonneauState v. Charbonneau
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Hines
Lead Opinion
This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Charbonneau v. State, 275 Ga. App. 495 (621 SE2d 514) (2005), to consider two questions: (1) whether a criminal defendant, whose own testimony will constitute the sole evidence in support of an alibi defense, is nevertheless required to file a written notice in response to the State’s timely written demand for notice of intention to offer an alibi *47defense under
The relevant facts are outlined in the opinion by the Court of Appeals. Scott Charbonneau was arrested for the robbery of a sandwich shop in Fayetteville. During the investigation, he made a statement to a detective referencing an alibi. After investigating such claim, the detective concluded that it was not credible. Pursuant to
The Court of Appeals has misapplied Johnson v. State to the facts of this case.
In Johnson, unlike the present case, the defendant responded to the State’s written demand for notice of any alibi defense and indicated that he would be the only possible witness in support of that defense. Consequently, the salient issue was not whether the defendant was required to give notice in response to the State’s demand for notice of intention to offer an alibi defense under
To obviate the need for the statutorily-required notice contravenes the very purpose of Georgia’s Criminal Procedure Discovery Act (“Act”),
to establish a closely symmetrical scheme of discovery in criminal cases that maximizes the presentation of reliable evidence, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated on incomplete or misleading evidence, and fosters fairness and efficiency in criminal proceedings.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Dickerson, 273 Ga. 408, 410 (542 SE2d 487) (2001). Certainly, fairness or efficiency in the trial of a criminal case is not promoted by permitting a defendant to surprise the State at trial with a claim of alibi. The need for a defendant to provide notice under
*49Finally, contrary to Charbonneau’s contention, requiring a defendant to give the statutory notice does not impinge upon, much less eviscerate, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to testify effectively in his defense. As already noted, a defendant is obligated to provide only the information that
It should not be lost sight of that a defendant does not have to participate in the discovery procedures of
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, P. J., and Benham, J., who dissent.Notes
Upon written demand by the prosecuting attorney within ten days after arraignment, or at such time as the court permits, stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve within ten days of the demand of the prosecuting attorney or ten days prior to trial, whichever is later, or as otherwise ordered by the court, upon the prosecuting attorney a written notice of the defendant’s intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names, addresses, dates of birth, and telephone numbers of the witnesses, if known to the defendant, upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi unless previously supplied.
The defense of alibi involves the impossibility of the accused’s presence at the scene of the offense at the time of its commission. The range of the evidence in respect to time and place must he such as reasonably to exclude the possibility of presence.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Contrary to the holding of the majority, it was not the Court of Appeals which misapplied this Court’s decision in Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 468 (1) (a) (532 SE2d 377) (2000), but the majority which does so in this case. The salient issue on which Johnson was decided was not, as the majority asserts, whether the defendant had to disclose the substance of his alibi testimony prior to trial, but whether Johnson was required to give notice to the State of any alibi testimony he might give at trial on his own behalf. This Court unanimously ruled that he did not because the statute relied upon by the majority in this case was inapplicable to the alibi testimony of a defendant, overruled a prior decision by the Court of Appeals to the contrary (Todd v. State, 230 Ga. App. 849 (498 SE2d 142) (1998)), and reversed Johnson’s conviction. Today, however, the majority ignores that holding and, without overruling Johnson, declares a diametrically opposed rule.
The ruling of the majority, in addition to violating the principle of stare decisis, elevates form over function by requiring a defendant to give the State information it already has. It is evident from the statement of facts that Charbonneau told the investigating officer enough of the substance of his alibi defense to permit that officer to determine it lacked credibility.
In a case such as the present, where the only question is whether a defendant is required to give notice of an alibi defense of which the State is already aware and which it has already investigated, the *50“common sense” approach would not require the useless act of disclosure, would not limit the defendant in his own testimony from testifying he was where he told the investigator he was when the crime was convicted, and would not require the distortion of a prior decision of this Court. Because the majority opinion defies both common sense and unanimous precedent from this Court, I must dissent.