After a jury found Laquaine Darryle Chapman competent to stand trial and another jury found Chapman guilty of two counts of aggravated child molestation and one count of child molestation, the trial court, acting sua sponte, declared a mistrial in the trial of Chapman’s guilt or innocence and ordered a new trial on the issue of his competency. On appeal, the State contends that the mistrial order is void because it was entered after the jury returned its verdict and that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial on the issue of Chapman’s competency. For reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court, in substance, granted a new trial as to the issue of Chapman’s guilt or innocence, and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so, thereby mooting the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial on the issue of Chapman’s competency to stand trial. Accordingly, we affirm.
The record shows that Chapman was indicted on two counts of aggravated child molestation and one count of child molestation. Chapman entered a special plea of incompetency to stand trial, and he demanded therein that the issue of his competency be resolved by a jury as set forth in OCGA § 17-7-130 (b) (2). After a jury found Chapman to be competent, another jury found him guilty on all counts in the criminal trial. At the conclusion of the criminal trial, the trial court stated, among other things, that “[j]ustice was not done in this courtroom this week,” and that the “process by which we reached the decision today ... is hanging in my craw.” Approximately two weeks later, the trial court, acting sua sponte, entered contemporaneous orders granting a new trial on the issue of Chapman’s competency to stand trial and declaring a mistrial on the criminal charges.
The State initially claims that the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial after the return of the jury’s verdict was without authority and void. We agree with the State that it was too late for the trial court to declare a mistrial after the verdict. See State v. Sumlin,
The State further contends that if we construe the trial court’s order as a grant of a new trial, the trial court’s order must nevertheless be vacated because the court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. Generally, “[t]he grant or denial of a motion for new trial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court [.]” Taylor v. State,
In its written order, the trial court found that Chapman was charged for conduct allegedly occurring in September and October 2011. In November 2011, the seven-year-old victim complained to her grandmother of a burning sensation during urination and, in connection with this complaint, she indicated that Chapman had sexually abused her.
In May 2012, the victim was again diagnosed with a urinary tract infection and given an antibiotic. She was then treated on May 22, 2012 by Dr. Duke, an OB/GYN physician, for an abscess on the child’s tube or ovary. Dr. Duke testified at Chapman’s trial. According to Dr. Duke, the cause of the victim’s abscess was pelvic inflammatory disease, and pelvic inflammatory disease is almost always caused by prior exposure to a sexually transmitted disease. Dr. Duke performed surgery on the victim and numerous color photographs taken during the surgery were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury.
The trial court noted that the victim’s grandmother testified that during a pelvic examination in November 2011 the victim’s hymen was intact while Dr. Duke testified that in May 2012 her pelvic examination of the victim showed that the victim’s hymen was not intact. The trial court also noted that Chapman was arrested in November 2011 and remained in custody through the date of trial, and that there was no evidence that Chapman had ever had a sexually transmitted disease. The trial court found Dr. Duke’s testimony to be “highly indicative that the victim was sexually abused by someone other than the defendant after his arrest.”
Although Chapman sought to exclude Dr. Duke’s testimony, the trial court allowed the physician’s testimony, predicated on the State’s representation that the victim would testify that she had never been sexually molested by anyone else. The victim testified at trial, but she was not asked, and she did not testify about, whether she had been sexually molested by anyone other than Chapman. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that it erred in admitting Dr. Duke’s testimony,
The State contends that the trial court’s findings are directly contrary to the evidence presented at trial. The State concedes that during her trial testimony the victim did not testify that she had not been molested by any person other than Chapman, but it asserts that the child gave such testimony in a recorded interview following her outcry, and that this interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. In that respect, the evidence shows that after the victim had spoken to acts of molestation committed upon her by Chapman, the interviewer asked the victim “has anyone else ever done anything like this to you before,” and the victim answered by shaking her head, “no.” But the concern of the trial court, as expressly stated in the order, was that Dr. Duke’s testimony indicated that the victim had been molested by someone other than Chapman after he had been confined in jail. The State does not show that the victim’s statement following her outcry in November 2011 shows anything about what happened to the victim between the time of Chapman’s arrest and her illness in May 2012.
The State further contends that Dr. Duke’s testimony was probative, and that the trial court erred in finding otherwise. See Neal v. State,
The “law favors the admission of relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value,” unless the potential for prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mims v. State,
The State also contends that the trial court erred in granting Chapman a new trial on the issue of his competency to stand trial. Pretermitting whether this order is appealable by the State, we conclude that the
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
In its order the trial court also references the fact that it granted Chapman a new trial on the issue of his competency to stand trial, although this, standing alone, would not be a proper reason to grant a new criminal trial on the question of guilt or innocence. Rather, Chapman would simply be entitled to a new trial on competency and if found competent, his convictions would stand. See Baker v. State,
The appellate record includes only portions of the trial transcript and exhibits, specifically the trial court’s statements following the return of the verdict, the testimony of Dr. Angela Duke, and a DVD of the forensic interview of the victim following her outcry. The State does not show that the trial court’s recitation of the evidence is incorrect. See generally Malcolm v. State,