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State v. Chapman
464 S.E.2d 661
N.C.
1995
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*1 COURT THE SUPREME IN 330 [342 N.C. [330] (1995)] testifying against the exchange for they plea bargain received defendant. readily distinguishable from in this case is crime

The defendant’s were circumstances Young Young. In that robbery motivated and was during a occurred the murder 228, 354 Quesinberry, 319 N.C. v. to State pecuniary gain. Pursuant redundant, be held would now circumstances (1987), 446 these S.E.2d clearly discrete opposed to the only aggravator as leaving one however, distinctions, are The most obvious found here. aggravators Young prior histories. their criminal ages of the defendants felony conviction, and the defendant prior finding of a there was no twenty-four by contrast, here, years old. was nineteen prison already years in for second- served four years and had old Young stabbed robbery. Additionally, the defendant degree more than stabbed his victim defendant here twice, while the victim Young from as distinguish this case These features times. thirteen sen- we have held the death cases wherein from the six other well as Benson, 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 323 N.C. disproportionate: State v. tence v. 1, (1987); 653 State Stokes, 319 N.C. 352 S.E.2d v. (1988); State overruled on other (1986), 713 Rogers, N.C. 316 Vandiver, (1988); S.E.2d 373 grounds by State v. Bondurant, v. (1984); S.E.2d 163 State Hill, 311 N.C. Jackson, (1983); State S.E.2d defendant, particularly the fea- and this

Considering this crime sentence is not exces- above, that the death noted we conclude tures a fair trial received disproportionate. We hold that defendant sive prejudicial error. proceeding, free of sentencing ERROR. NO EDWARD CHAPMAN CAROLINA v. GLENN

STATE OF NORTH No. 569A94 (Filed 1995) 8 December first-degree (NCI4th)— murder— 343§ Law 1. Constitutional error pretrial absent — no conference — defendant first-degree mur- prosecution in a for two was no error There pre-trial conference was absent from ders where defendant CHAPMAN STATE v. *2 required capital cases Rule 24 the of of General Rules Superior right Practice for the and District Courts. A defendant’s present prior stages to be at all of his trial does not arise to the trial, conference, commencement of and the Rule 24 which takes place jury panel sworn, stage before the is selected and is not a of pretrial trial. the The conference is an administrative device clarify intended to charges against the the defendant and assist prosecutor in determining aggravating whether circum- justify seeking penalty. stances exist which the death Defendant pretrial impli- has not demonstrated that the Rule 24 conference rights presence cated his confrontation or that his at the confer- reasonably ence would have had a substantial relation his to opportunity to defend. 2d, 695, 696, 910,

Am Jur Criminal §§ Law 911. (NCI4th)— first-degree 2. Criminal Law 1334 § murder— aggravating pretrial circumstance —not mentioned conference prosecution first-degree

There was no error in a for two mur- prosecutor pretrial ders where the mentioned at the Rule con- aggravating previous ference the circumstance of conviction felony involving a violent and did not mention the of course con- circumstance, aggravating duct but that circumstance was sub- jury. requires mitted While Rule the trial court and the parties aggravating to consider the existence of evidence of cir- cumstances, prosecution nothing the rule intimates that the finality will aggravating must enumerate with pursue all circumstances it require prosecution at trial and a trial court cannot rely upon aggravating declare which circumstances it will at the punishment phase. 2d,

Am Jur Criminal Law 599. §§ Jury (NCI4th)— first-degree jury selec- § murder — questions concerning parole allowed tion — —not prosecution first-degree There was no error in a for two mur- permit ders where the trial court denied defendant’s motion to potential jurors conceptions parole regarding voir dire of their jury inquire parole eligibility. eligibility, here did not prosecutors jury, argue dangerousness did not future circum- arguing and defendant’s contention that previous felony involving violence and stances of a conviction THE SUPREME COURT IN dangerousness is arguing future amount to course conduct any reason for the has not advanced unpersuasive. precedents holding its Supreme to reverse Court questioned opinions prospective jurors about their should not be parole upon for conviction. concerning eligibility a defendant’s seq. Jury 2d, §§ Am Jur 205 et (NCI4th)— first-degree 4. Evidence and Witnesses read to murder —unavailable witness — statement prosecution first-degree in a mur- There no error inspector where a was allowed to read to state- ders fire *3 a who not be at the time of the vagrant ment from could located the living and who been in a vacant house where one of trial had The sufficient indicia of victims was found. statement contained reliability personal vagrant to in that had be admissible the event, knowledge of there is no evidence that he underlying the inspector anything the than the had truth, reason to tell fire other he

and there is no evidence that ever recanted this state- testimony erroneous, Even if this was ment. the admission of prejudice incriminating in his light defendant cannot show of stating others that he killed this victim. remarks several 2d, Am Jur Evidence 690-707. §§ (NCI4th)— first-degree join- Law 5. Criminal § murder — against charges der of two one defendant —no error joinder was of murder first-degree There no error the charges the facts incident to the two murders reveal where temporal operandi proximity common modus and a sufficient connection, a transactional the defendant did not cite establish any requirement not be a and the Court was aware of that there commonality witnesses, and, although argued defendant that Conley would not have been convicted of murder without he the spillover stronger evidence, sub- the Ramseur there was from the could stantial evidence which determine Conley. Viewing whole, as a the defendant killed record separate place offenses were not so in time and and so distinct joinder unjust prejudicial circumstance that and to defend- 15A-926(a). N.C.G.S. § ant. seq. 2d,

Am Jur Actions 86 et §§ COURT IN THE SUPREME first-degree murder— (NCI4th)— Law 1337 § 6. Criminal involving previous conviction aggravating circumstances — violence sup- first-degree murders prosecution for two record in a felony previous convic- circumstance of a

ported aggravating person, N.C.G.S. use or threat of violence involving the tion con- that he had been in that defendant testified 15A-2000(e)(3), § robbery years, the State within the last ten law victed of common conviction, the victim testi- and illustrating records offered robbery. during violence defendant used fied that 2d, Law §§ Am Jur Criminal first-degree murder— (NCI4th)— Law 1347

7. Criminal of conduct aggravating circumstances —course sup- murders prosecution first-degree in a for two The record conduct, course of circumstance of ported young two victims were 15A-2000(e)(ll), where the N.C.G.S. § had smoked habits; knew both and drug with defendant women virtually disposed each; were with their bodies crack other; both victims within two blocks of each fashion and same heads; was seen injuries to their suffered blunt-force death; shortly her he with, before with, had sex one victim people having to three incriminating statements made foreboding attitude victim; defendant had other killed the *4 smoking when he was crack. women toward Law 2d, §§ Criminal Am Jur first-degree murder —sen- (NCI4th)— Law 1373 §

8. Criminal and no aggravating circumstances tencing finding of — passion or of mitigating evidence circumstances —not prejudice support the contention of nothing the record

There was that the find- first-degree murders of two a defendant convicted mitigat- and no submitted aggravating circumstances ing of both jury’s strong emotional was evidence ing circumstances prejudice defendant. feeling of toward passionate seq. et 2d, §§ Law 625 Am Jur Criminal first-degree murder— (NCI4th)— Law 1373 § 9. Criminal disproportionate death sentence —not was not dis- murders first-degree of death for two A sentence of circumstances aggravating where the proportionate felony previous course of conduct and a involving conviction vio- Supreme lence. In none of the seven cases which the N.C. disproportionate Court has found the death sentence has the murder; defendant been convicted of more than one the two among circumstances found here are the four which justify have been standing held sufficient to a death sentence alone; none of the cases in which death sentence was found disproportionate involved a second murder as the course of con- duct; the they victims here were vulnerable in that were women engaged high-risk lifestyle who regular drug use; of defend- appears remorse; ant to have no and there is no discernible rea- why son defendant killed these two women. Criminal 2d, seq.

Am Jur Law §§ 625 et Justice Webb dissenting.

Appeal right pursuant 7A-27(a) to N.C.G.S. judgments from imposing two sentences of death Ferrell, J., entered at the 31 Superior October 1994 Criminal Court, Session of County, Catawba upon finding guilty verdicts of first-degree mur- Supreme der. Heard in the Court 10 October 1995. Easley, Attorney

Michael F. General, by Grumpier, William B. Attorney General, Assistant the State. Portwood, Jr.,

W.Thomas and W. Robert Adams for defendant- appellant.

WHICHARD,Justice. first-degree was convicted of the murders of Tenene Conley Betty Yvette Jean Ramseur and sentenced to death for appeals each murder. He from his convictions and sentences. Wecon- clude that trial, prejudicial defendant received a fair free error, disproportionate. that the sentences of death are not The State’s Conley evidence tended to show that young, was a *5 daily black female who used crack paid cocaine and for her habit through prostitution. Conley’sbody, down, naked from the waist was in found Hickory the basement of a Avenue, S.E., vacant house at 649 First in August

on 15 sign entry 1992.There was no of a forced into Defendant, July the house. paint who had been hired in 1992 to COURT

IN THE SUPREME house, get how to of the had been inside and knew trim on the outside into the house. performed Clark, pathologist who

Dr. Thomas a forensic Conley strangulation. manual autopsy, concluded died as a result of Conley’s and opined Dr. that the abrasions found about head Clark by any type made contact with of blunt forehead could have been Conley object, He determined had sexual including the floor. had. death, analysis of her and DNA intercourse within twelve hours body sample sperm sample given her matched a taken from defendant. Conley persons together during and

Several saw defendant Danner, early August Jamar who sold crack morning hours of Conley house, together and well cocaine from his saw defendant Conley had come daylight. Danner testified that defendant and before cocaine; they purchasing without to his house in search of left Conley’s body was the house where cocaine and walked toward Cowans, who lived within a block of the house found. Howard defendant, Conley, and Conley’sbody found, testified that which August Danny to his home around 3:00 a.m. on Blackburn came group smoked trying to sell a lawn mower. The 1992. Defendant was defendant, Conley, and home. A few minutes after crack Cowans’ exit outside, a man and a woman Blackburn went Cowans observed Conley’s body the house in which Blackburn’s car and walk toward identify implied the man but it was could not was found. Cowans up lady’s car “give did not his old defendant, stating that Blackburn group fin- anybody.” testified that after the anything or Blackburn car for ten crack, defendant the use of his smoking ished he offered car, she refused, getting is out of the dollars; saying, “she got has to do.” do, she knows what she got knows what the hell she up street, followed Conley began walking got out of the car and closely by defendant. police September 1992, defendant on 18

In a statement made Conley’s cleaning the house which acknowledged painting and Sunny Valley, not body However, he stated he went to was found. Sunny leaving house, August 1992. He also denied Cowans’ on Conley left, and Blackburn Valley Conley, insisting that when he with “When I smoked statement also noted: together. were Defendant’s They always wanting are to be around women. rock I don’t want [sic] something bothering me s—.” *6 IN THE SUPREME COURT (1995)] N.C. 330

[342 white, dating Chris Walker for about Ramseur, who was had been defendant, years knew she died. Ramseur and Walker three before pro- formerly Ramseur was on together. smoked crack and the three by probation seen her officer on June bation and was last probation involving the use of controlled regarding a violation substances. Highland Avenue, morning

On the of 12 June a fire Hickory reported. Creasman, vagrant Alvin who had S.E., in was asleep house, inspector that he was living been in the told a fire upstairs by He a black male when he was awakened smoke. noticed daybreak. morning female at the house that and white Rasmussen, investigator, an determined that the fire Thomas SBI fire accidentally intentionally. by hands, had been caused human either badly body decomposed, naked was August On 1992Ramseur’s Hall, Highland the house at 407 Avenue. Dr. Brent found under performed autopsy, had pathologist who determined Ramseur pos- Although died sometime in June 1992. he could not rule out the sibility body par- strangled that Ramseur had been because her was tially skeletonized, opined Hall Ramseur had died as a result of a injury having blunt-trauma to the head consistent with been struck with a brick. people told at least three that he had killed Ramseur.

Defendant Cline, cousin, Defendant’s Nicole testified that in June 1992defendant just cracking girlfriend told her he had killed Chris Walker’s her pointed the head with a brick. He from Nicole’s residence to the body Highland dragged house at 407 Avenue and said he had Cline, brother, under the house. Brian Nicole’s testified that he over- Following but heard this conversation. this conversation before body discovered, driving Ramseur’s was Brian and defendant were pointed Highland down Avenue when defendant to the house at 407 people him, they and said that if continued to mess with would “end up like that that was the house.” Lavar Gilliman testified bitch under say during the summer of he overheard defendant that he someone, body Highland had killed the house on body Avenue, it going and that defendant was burn her so that could not be found. Conley gotten high testified that he knew and had with through

her on one occasion. He knew Ramseur Chris Walker. He Conley August going with on 13 1992but denied having admitted sex further with her to Cowans’ and Danner’s houses. Defendant denied STATE CHAPMAN telling woman, and Brian Nicole Cline that he had killed a and he having denied ever seen Lavar Gilliman before Gilliman testified. He *7 killing denied either woman. sentencing

At the State offered evidence that defendant had been previously robbery. convicted of common law The victim of this rob- bery during robbery. testified to defendant’s actions provided Gwyn

Defendant offered evidence that he Anderson helpful and their child and that he neigh- was toward his friends and always bors. His father testified that he counted on defendant to take help care of the house and to with the other children as defendant up. growing was Worthing, psychologist,

Dr. Mark testified defendant was of low average intelligence. diagnosed Defendant had been with alcohol and dependency. opined cocaine Dr. Worthing appreciate defendant could criminality very severely impaired. of his conduct unless he was Because committing murders, Worthing defendant denied Dr. specific questions

unable to ask drugs about what he had used at the time of the offenses and thus was unable to determine the extent of impairment defendant’s at that time. found two aggravating circumstances for both murders: previously felony

that defendant had been involving convicted of a person the use or threat of violence to the and that murder for part which defendant stood convicted was of a of conduct in course by engaged which defendant and which included the commission person per- against defendant of other crimes of violence another statutory nonstatutory Although mitigating sons. three and sixteen jury, juror circumstances were submitted to the no miti- gating circumstance. pretrial assigns Defendant first as error his absence from the con

[1 ] required capital ference cases Rule 24 of the General Rules of Superior Practice for the and District Courts. He contends that his present right absence from the Rule 24 conference violated his to be every stage at of his trial. I, The Confrontation Clause in Article Section 23 of the North “ ‘guarantees right present Carolina an Constitution accused the to be ” person every Daniels, 243, stage of his trial.’ State v. 337 N.C.

256, 298, Payne, 138, (1994) (quoting 446 S.E.2d 307 320 N.C. - -, 139, 612, (1987)), denied, S.E.2d 612 U.S. 130 357 cert. present L. dur- right Ed. 2d 895 This to be extends to all times COURT THE SUPREME IN 338 materially affects or done which anything is said the trial when ing Brogden, him. v. against State charge defendant as may capital defendant not 158, (1991). A 541, S.E.2d 534, 257, 446 S.E.2d at Daniels, N.C. at presence. right to waive his of his trial present stages at all However, right to be a defendant’s Rannels, v. of trial. State prior to the commencement does not arise Cole, 331 (citing State v. (1993) (1992)). distinguished from State case must be Defendant contends his on other (1989), vacated S.E.2d 635 sentence Huff, 325 N.C. Huff, where the 1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d grounds, 497 U.S. presentation portion during a of the State’s was absent defendant’s request counsel and with the of defense evidence at the permitting trial court erred Court held that the agreement, this *8 However, we found capital trial. during absent his defendant to be beyond because the a reasonable doubt error was harmless that the 35-36, at 381 S.E.2d prejudiced his absence. Id. defendant was not attorney objected to his absence Here, defendant’s at 654-55. because to a new conference, contends he is entitled Rule 24 at the trial. trial, in midst of while the was absent the defendant Huff during the Here defendant was absent presenting evidence.

State was conference, takes the Rule 24 which pretrial Wehold that conference. jury sworn, stage is not a place panel is selected and before the (1990) Smith, 392 S.E.2d trial. See State stage is a of trial at selecting impaneling (process of Rannels, N.C. present); State v. right has a to be which defendant unrecorded, side-bar confer- 652-54, (private, 430 S.E.2d at 258-59 place jury pool before commencement of with members took ences Cole, 331 N.C. at trial; right presence); to defendant’s no conferences with (pretrial, at 717 off-the-record bench trial; petit jurors stage occur at a of defendant’s prospective did not present at Therefore, right defendant’s to be right presence). to no implicated. every not stage of his trial was defendant relief. Rule language of Rule 24 does not offer The require superior “the capital cases, the court shall provides that in pretrial appear at a conference prosecution and defense counsel” to the issues alia, simplification and formulation of discuss, inter to indigent an defend- timely appointment assistant counsel for Super, 24, 1995Ann. R. N.C. 18. R. Pract. and Dist. Ct. ant. Gen. pretrial clarify conference is an administrative device intended to charges against prosecutor the defendant and assist the in determin ing aggravating justify whether circumstances exist which seek penalty. Capital ing gain the death defendants do not stand to lose or any rights at the conference. Defendant has not demonstrated pretrial implicated the Rule 24 rights conference his confrontation presence reasonably that his at the conference would have had a sub opportunity Buchanan, stantial relation to his to defend. See State v. 202, 223-24, (1991) (burden on defendant presence); Buckner, to show usefulness of his see also State v. 198, -S.E.2d -(1995). assignment This of error is therefore overruled.

[2] By his next assignment error, defendant contends the trial submitting court erred in the course of aggravat conduct ing prosecutor circumstance because the did not mention that cir pretrial pretrial cumstance at the Rule 24 conference. At the confer ence, prosecutor aggravating indicated that an circumstance pursuant existed 15A-2000(e)(3), N.C.G.S. as defendant had been § previously felony, robbery. convicted of a violent common law responded, one,” stipulated Defense counsel “That is at least and later that at least one circumstance existed for both murders. argues prosecutor Defendant now “blindsided” him and lulled security by presence him failing into a false sense of to mention the aggravating circumstance, conduct, pursuant of another course of surprise, 15A-2000(e)(11). N.C.G.S. Because of his defendant con tends, sentencing he was unable to rebut this circumstance at his *9 proceeding. requires parties

While Rule 24 the trial court and the to consider circumstances, the existence of aggravating nothing evidence of in prosecution finality the rule intimates that the must enumerate with aggravating pursue Moreover, all circumstances it will at trial. “a constitutionally aggra defendant is not entitled to an enumeration of vating statutory against factors to be used him: notice as contained in 15A-2000(e) N.C.G.S. McLaughlin, § is sufficient.” State v. 323 N.C. 68, 84, 49, grounds, (1988), S.E.2d sentence vacated on other 1021, fact, L. 494 U.S. 108 Ed. 2d 601 In a trial court cannot require prosecution aggravating the to declare which circumstances rely upon punishment phase. Holden, it will at the 125, 153, denied, 1061, (1987), cert. 486 U.S. assignment L. Ed. 2d 935 This of error is therefore overruled. THE SUPREME COURT IN

STATE v. CHAPMAN [3] next contends that the trial court erred in denying his concep potential jurors regarding their permit voir dire of motion upon entry Because parole eligibility the of life sentence. tions of jury— to the prosecutor argued circumstances the felony previously involving convicted of a that defendant had been person and that the murder for or threat of violence to a use part was convicted was of a course of conduct which defendant jury aggra both engaged which defendant because the —and prosecutor placed circumstances, asserts that the vating dangerousness at issue. In Simmons v. South defendant’s future L. Carolina, - U.S. -,-, (1994), 129 Ed. 2d United Supreme States Court held that “where the defendant’s future dan prohibits issue, is at and state law the defendant’s release gerousness jury parole, process requires sentencing be informed on due parole Simmons, ineligible.” Relying that the defendant is on defend granted ant contends that the trial court should have his motion to potential jurors’ conceptions parole eligibility. discuss misplaced. Simmons, reliance on is In Defendant’s Simmons prosecutor argued potential dangerous for future after the Simmons’ requested imposing penalty, a reason for the death Simmons ness as jury imprisonment meaning the trial court to on the of life instruct possibility (no parole). under South Carolina law The trial court ultimately request, jury refused Simmons’ and the returned a verdict Price, (1994), of death. In State v. 448 S.E.2d 827 cert. denied, - U.S. -, (1995), L. Ed. 2d 224 Court noted that this ruled that South Carolina could ‘not create Court Simmons “[t]he by advancing generalized regarding arguments false dilemma while, time, dangerousness preventing defendant’s future at the same will learning from that the defendant never be released on ” parole.’ (quoting Simmons, - U.S. at Id. at 830-31 prosecutor L. —, 147).Although argued 129 Ed. 2d at Price jury, dangerousness defendant’s future this Court affirmed only sentence, concluding Price’s death that Simmons controlled possibility parole where life without was the alternative to a death 762-63, sentence. Id. at 448 S.E.2d at 831. As Price would have been parole imprisonment eligible had he been sentenced to life in North Carolina, 15A-1371(a1) (1988), N.C.G.S. no “false dilemma” had Price, addition, been created. See 337 N.C. at 448 S.E.2d at 831. inquired parole eligibility; in Price had not about defendant’s *10 inquiry, parole eligibility the Court noted that without such an is irrel- CHAPMAN STATE v. evant and should not making capital be considered in sentencing determination. Id. at 448 S.E.2d at 831. in Price, inquire

As parole here did not about defendant’s eligibility. actually Defendant’s persuasive case is less than that in prosecutors Price because the argue here did not dangerous- future jury; ness to the defendant’s arguing contention that the aggravating arguing circumstances amounted to dangerousness unper- future is Therefore, provides suasive. Simmons no relief for defendant. Further, recently this again previous Court followed its decisions prospective jurors held that questioned should be not about their opinions concerning a eligibility parole upon defendant’s convic tion. State Moore, 567, 591, 797, 811, cert. denied, —, - 130 L. Ed. 2d 174 Defendant has not U.S. any why advanced reason the Court precedent. should reverse this assignment This of error is overruled.

[4] Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in allowing Raymond Mitchell, inspector Hickory a fire with the Department, Fire hearsay to read into evidence the statement Alvin Creasman made to Mitchell on 12 Although June 1992. acknowledges pursuant State gave notice, 804(b)(5) to Rule of the North Carolina Evidence, Rules of hearsay its intention to use Creasman’s state ment, argues he that the statement was inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(5) because there was insufficient indicia of the statement’s reliability. The statement read to the is as follows:

There living was fire room. clothing There was the area living hallway room. I asleep upstairs. up. The smoke woke me I a black male and a white notice[d] day female morning stayed there this I night break. all here. I am a smoker.

Before Mitchell read jury, Creasman’s statement to the the trial court hearing admissibility conducted a on the of the statement. Following that hearing concluded, pursuant require- the trial court Triplett, ments this Court set forth in 1, 9, (1986), unsuccessfully that attempted the State had to locate Creasman, that trustworthy, the statement was that the statement probative was material and more on the issue than other evidence prosecution which the through means, could secure reasonable justice would be served admission of the statement. Mitchell *11 COURT IN THE SUPREME v. CHAPMAN

STATE (1995)] [342 jury, pursuant Rule subsequently read the statement 804(b)(5). which a trial court reiterated the factors Triplett,

In this Court hearsay sought statement determining whether a must consider trustworthy: (1) is whether 804(b)(5) under Rule be admitted underlying events, (2) the personal knowledge of the had declarant otherwise, whether speak (3) the truth or motivation to declarant’s practical statement, (4) the and declarant has ever recanted availability meaningful at trial for cross-examination. of the declarant factors, we conclude Applying these 10-11, 340 S.E.2d at 742. Id. reliability to sufficient indicia of statement contained that Creasman’s underlying personal knowledge had admissible. Creasman be white noticed the black male and the event, for he stated that he daybreak. There is no Highland at the Avenue house female anything Mitchell had reason to tell evidence that Creasman any evidence that about this matter. Nor is there other than the truth Finally, deter- the trial court Creasman ever recanted this statement. if found at the time of trial. Even that Creasman could not be mined testimony, defendant cannot admitting court erred in the trial by light incriminating his prejudiced its admission show he was stating assign- that he killed Ramseur. This remarks to several others therefore overruled. ment of error is

[5] In his next assignment error, defendant contends that joinder 15A-926(a) N.C.G.S. charges murder violated of the two by process guaranteed the Fifth and deprived him of the due by Amendments to the United States Constitution Fourteenth of the North Carolina Constitution. I, Article Sections 18 and 19 joinder, but the objected to the State’s written motion for Defendant parties. following arguments granted court the motion trial joinder improper charges were not because the argues transactionally related, of the witnesses testified con in that none Conley murders, and the murders cerning both the Ramseur and apart. fact, defendant con approximately two months occurred only charged that he is with tends, in the two cases is connection reasons, reject following we defendant’s crimes. For the both contentions. pertinent part, that 15A-926(a)provides, in

N.C.G.S. § “[t]wo may joined . the offenses . . . are be . . for trial when more offenses together or transactions connected based ... on a series of acts or plan.” it has been deter- parts single of a scheme or Once constituting COURT IN THE SUPREME connection, have trial courts mined that offenses have a transactional Huff, N.C. at 22- for trial. State v. discretion to consolidate them transactionally related is at 647. Whether offenses are fully appeal. Id. at 381 S.E.2d at question of law reviewable on *12 required finding of the transactional connection A mere must consider enough, judge however.... trial statute is not [T]he more than one hearing accused can receive a fair on whether the deprives trial; hinders or charge at the same if consolidation ability present defense, charges his should accused of his to not be consolidated. 122, 126, Silva,

State the two murders here reveal a common The facts incident to a operandi temporal proximity and a sufficient to establish modus young drug women with connection. Both victims were transactional habits; and had smoked crack with each. One defendant knew both the waist found, nude when and the other was nude from victim was injuries heads; to their down. Both victims suffered blunt-force Conley pathologist and the could not strangulation, died as a result of possibility strangled. Ramseur had also been rule out the other, their bodies killed within two months of each and women were part vacant houses within two blocks were found in the lowest Conley shortly with and had sex with each other. Defendant was seen peo- incriminating statements to three death, her and he made before made several state- ple having killed Ramseur. Defendant also women, misogynistic attitude toward ments in which he exhibited keep people f- including his statement to Brian Cline that “[i]f they up under the house.” end like that bitch that was with me [will] any requirement of, to, cited and we are unaware Defendant has not commonality where two murder cases be a of witnesses that there joined have been for trial. a result of hearing was denied a fair as argues that he evidence joinder. Specifically, strength he contends “spilled delibera- over” into the him in the Ramseur murder

against Conley have been con- murder and that he would not tions on the spillover Conley without that effect. victed of the murder evidence Contrary argument, there was substantial to defendant’s killed that defendant which the could determine adduced from Conley. injury Conley Ramseur, had sustained a blunt-force Like Conley twenty-four the forehead. had had sexual intercourse within death, testing DNA hours of her and of the semen found demon- Danner, Cowans, strated a match with defendant. Jamar Howard and Danny Conley early morning Blackburn all saw defendant with in the day body defendant, hours of the before her was discovered. After Conley, home, and Blackburn left Cowans’ Cowans had observed get man and a woman out of Blackburn’s car and walk toward the Conley’sbody house in which was found. Blackburn stated that after Conley group smoking crack, finished then got out up began walking of Blackburn’s car and the street. light evidence, of this we conclude that defendant has failed to allowing charges

show that the trial court abused its discretion in whole, to be consolidated trial. Viewing the record as a we hold separate place that the offenses were not so in time and and so dis- joinder unjust prejudicial tinct in circumstance that Bracey, 112, 118, defendant. See State v. *13 statutory

Having violation, found no we turn now to defendant’s contention that consolidation of these two murder charges for trial process violated his federal and state rights. constitutional due merely surrounding asserts that the dissimilar facts the murders guilt innocence, hindered a fair determination of his or which, asserts, deprived process he him of due in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 18 and 19 of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution. argument explanation As defendant makes no or of how consolida- tion of provisions, the offenses for trial violated of these we Huff, decline to 26, address his assertions. 325 N.C. at 381 S.E.2d at 649.

[6] Finally, defendant argues, pursuant to N.C.G.S.§ 15A-2000(d)(2), support that the aggravating record does not the circumstances found by jury; imposed the that the pas sentence was under the influence of sion, prejudice, arbitrary factor; some or other and that the death sen disproportionate penalty tence imposed is excessive or in sim cases, considering ilar the both crime and defendant. jury

The found two circumstances for each offense: previously felony defendant had been convicted of a involving person, the use or threat of violence to the N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(e)(3) § (Supp. 1994); and that the murder for which defendant stood con- part victed of a course of conduct in which engaged THE

IN SUPREME COURT 345

STATE v. CHAPMAN and which included the of commission other crimes violence person against persons, 15A-2000(e)(11). another or N.C.G.S. The jury’s supports finding (e)(3) record of the aggravating circum stance. Defendant testified he had common been convicted of law robbery within last years, ten and the State offered Catawba County robbery criminal illustrating records the conviction. The vic tim there testified that defendant used violence in the commission of robbery. Thus, there was substantial evidence that defendant had felony been convicted of a which involved the threat of use or vio person felony lence to the prior occurred to murders Goodman, 22, at issue in this 569, See 1, case. State v. S.E.2d [7] record also supports jury’s finding (e)(11) aggra vating circumstance. Some between connection the violent events is required support generally to this circumstance. Even events remote may each operandi from other in time be connected modus or 507-12, motivation. v. Cummings, See State (1992) (course properly 703-06 of conduct circumstance submit place twenty-six apart ted to where two murders took months operandi common present); but modus and motivation were Price, 56, 81-83, (course S.E.2d 98-99 of conduct cir properly cumstance submitted violence, where other crimes of days arson and hostage-taking, occurred five after murder at issue operandi present), and common modus and motivation were sen grounds, tence vacated on U.S. 2d 7 other L. Ed. permit order finding conduct, of a must course court “con surrounding sider circumstances the acts of violence and discern connection, scheme, pattern some some psychological common or Cummings, together.” thread that ties them 332 N.C. at S.E.2d *14 above,

As noted several similarities tie the instant murders together operandi. suggest and common motivation or modus drug habits; women young victims were with knew both disposed had with and smoked crack each. Their bodies were of in virtually the fashion and same within blocks of each other. Both injuries victims suffered blunt-force to their heads. Defendant was with, Conley shortly with, death; seen and had sex her before he people incriminating having made statements to three killed foreboding had a Ramseur. Defendant attitude toward women when smoking supported finding was These he crack. similarities of a purposes joinder, and, considering transactional connection 346 v. CHAPMAN

STATE they State, supported to also light most favorable evidence in the cir the course of conduct finding the submission 321, Gibbs, 1, 61, 436 S.E.2d 355-56 v. 335 N.C. cumstance. See State (1994). 129 2d 881 denied, - U.S. -, L. Ed. (1993), cert. [8] Further, nothing the record supports defendant’s contention mitigat no jury’s finding aggravating circumstances and both pas jury’s “strong is of the emotional ing circumstances evidence prejudice “clear aver feeling ... of toward the defendant” or sionate 700, 448 Reeves, 337 N.C. In State v. sion toward the defendant.” —, (1995), L. denied, - U.S. cert. 131 Ed. 2d 860 (1994), S.E.2d 802 “We hold that rejected argument, stating: cannot this Court similar had miti jury did find that the defendant’s evidence because the not passion, prejudice, or ...[,] acting under gating value arbitrary 737, Id. at 448 S.E.2d 820. Defendant’s other factor.” meritless. argument is

[9] Nor we find do defendant’s death sentence is disproportion Proportionality possibility is intended to “eliminate the ate. review imposed by aberrant that a of death was the action of an sentence 294, 547, denied, jury.” Lee, 244, 573, 335 cert. State v. N.C. 439 S.E.2d - U.S. -, (1994). guard L. also 130 Ed. 2d 162 It is intended imposition penalty.” capricious “against the or random death Barfield, 306, 354, 510, cert. (1979), State v. 298 N.C. 259 S.E.2d 544 denied, 907, compare 1137 case (1980). 448 U.S. 65 L. Ed. 2d We this pool, Williams, v. 308 N.C. to others in the which we defined State 79-80, 47, 335, 355, denied, 865, 464 U.S. 78 L. Ed. 2d 301 S.E.2d cert. 106-07, 542, Bacon, 66, v. (1983), 177 and State 337 N.C. 446 S.E.2d denied, - U.S. -, (1995), L. Ed. (1994), 563-64 cert. 130 2d 1083 roughly regard that “are similar with the crime the defendant.” Lawson, 632, 648, 493, cert. (1984), State v. 503 1120, denied, L. Ed. 2d 471 U.S. 86 267 Whether death “ultimately disproportionate upon ‘experienced penalty is rest[s] Green, v. N.C. judgments’ of the members of this Court.” State 14, denied, - U.S. -, 142, 198, 443 47, L. Ed. 2d 547 S.E.2d cert. capital punishment Since 1 June the effective date of our only statute, disproportionate has death this Court sentences Benson, (1988); seven v. 372 S.E.2d 517 cases: State N.C. Stokes, Rogers, (1987); 319 N.C. 352 S.E.2d 653 State v. grounds by State (1986), overruled on other Young, Vandiver, (1988); S.E.2d 373 v. State *15 STATE v. CHAPMAN 669, N.C. (1985); Hill, S.E.2d 181 State v. 465, 311 N.C. 319 S.E.2d (1984); Bondurant, 674, State v. 309 N.C. 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); Jackson, 26, State v. 309 N.C. 305 S.E.2d 703 In (1983). none of those cases was the defendant convicted of more than one murder. State v. Conaway, 487, 541, 824, 339 N.C. (1995). Indeed, 453 S.E.2d “ multiple fact that heavy defendant is a killer is ‘a factor against ” McHone, State v. 627, 648, 334 N.C. 296, 435 S.E.2d 308 (1993) [him].’ (quoting Robbins, State v. 465, 529, 319 N.C. 279, 316, 356 S.E.2d cert. — denied, 918, 484 U.S. L. (1987)), denied, 98 Ed. 2d 226 cert. U.S. -, L. 128 Ed. 2d argues that the most damn ing against evidence him in the Ramseur murder was Creasman’s hearsay testimony and that this Court should therefore not consider this to be a multiple case of homicide. The argu evidence belies this ment. In addition to testimony, Creasman’s which we have found possessed admissible because it guarantees substantial of trustwor thiness, people defendant told at least three that he killed Ramseur. circumstances the found this case were also found in Skipper, 1, State v. 337 N.C. 446 S.E.2d 252 (1994), cert.

denied, -, - U.S. 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995), where this Court affirmed the defendant’s death though sentence even statutory nonstatutory three and two mitigating circumstances. The Court noted that aggravators many these two are found in cases that result death sentences. Id. at 446 S.E.2d at 287. There are four statutory aggravating which, standing alone, circumstances this Court has held sentences; sufficient to sustain death these two are among Bacon, them. State v. n.8, 337 N.C. at 110 446 S.E.2d at 566n.8. None of the cases in which this Court has determined the death penalty disproportionate to be has included (e)(3) aggravator. Harris, 129, 161, 387 (1994), cert. denied, —, only 131 L. Ed. 2d 752 In two cases in -U.S. penalty which this Court disproportionate has found the death did the jury find (e)(11) aggravating Rogers, circumstance: State v. Bondurant, and State v. Rogers S.E.2d 170. In neither nor Bondurant did the course of con murder, summary, duct involve a second as it did here. defendant’s comparable case is not case which this Court has held the disproportionate. death sentence support

Several additional characteristics of this case the deter- imposition dispropor- mination that of the death sentence was not they vulnerable, tionate. The victims in this case were in that were lifestyle engaged high-risk regular drug women who in the use. Cf. *16 THE SUPREME COURT IN (female 710, 729, (1994) Moseley, N.C. State v. - denied, -, cert. U.S. vulnerable), alone and victim was appears no addition, to have (1995). Ed. defendant L. 2d 802 137, 443 Robinson, See State v. remorse for his conduct. denied, - U.S. -, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 cert. (1994), S.E.2d why killed Finally, no reason there is discernible pure product of women; appear to be “the these two the murders 826, 858 Jones, meanness.” cert, L. Ed. denied, - U.S. -, 2d 873 (1994), defendant, we as the Considering foregoing, as well crime dispropor- not or sentence was excessive conclude that death sentencing a defendant received fair trial and tionate. We hold that prejudicial proceeding, free of error.

NO ERROR. dissenting.

Justice Webb majority opinion. I from I believe it was error to con- dissent says: 15A-926(a) two for trial. N.C.G.S. solidate the cases joined may more be . . . for trial when the Two or offenses on a . . . based on the same act or transaction or offenses are constituting or together series of acts or transactions connected parts plan. single of a scheme or a acts or

I not believe the two crimes were based on series of do parts together constituting single a transactions connected or apart. plan. The murders occurred two months I can see scheme or scheming nothing in the record that indicates that defendant was person kill first was committed. The another time the murder operandi not fact that the two crimes had common modus does plan. continuing I more of a show scheme believe without persons of one two it was error to con- showing scheme murder solidate the cases for trial.

I trials on grant charges. vote to new

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Chapman
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: Dec 8, 1995
Citation: 464 S.E.2d 661
Docket Number: 569A94
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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