State v. ChaneyState v. Chaney
Willie James Chaney, Jr. and Chad Watson were arrested and incarcerated on December 17, 1979. On January 10, 1980— more than three weeks later—they appeared before a judge for the first time, and then for the purpose of a hearing on their applications for writs of habeas corpus. In their applications the prisoners alleged that they were unlawfully confined and they prayed for their release. The basis for their applications was
“A. The sheriff having custody of an arrested person shall bring him promptly, and in any case within seventy-two hours from the time of the arrest, before a judge for the purpose of appointment of counsel. Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in computing the seventy-two hour period referred to herein.
B. At this appearance, if a defendant has the right to have the court appoint counsel to defend him, the court shall assign counsel to the defendant. The court may also, in its discretion, determine or reviеw a prior determination of the amount of bail. C. If the arrested person is not brought before a judge in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph A of this Article, he shall be released forthwith.
D. The failure of the sheriff to comply with the requirements herein shall have no effect whatsoever upon the validity of the proceedings thereafter against the defendant.”
The triаl court denied their applications and this court granted writs to review that ruling.
There is no question that the letter of
The trial judge was certainly correct in commending the Twenty-first Judicial District Public Defenders’ Office for its efficiency and proficiency. We cannot agree, however, that mere fulfillment of the “spirit” of a statutory provision constitutes adequate compliance with the statute. In State v. Murray, 222 La. 950, 953, 64 So.2d 230, 231 (1953), we stated that where the “language used in the applicable provision... is express and unequivocal .. (it) is to be given effect as written.”1 The language of
We also cannot agree that the spirit of this provision was fulfilled when Chaney and Wаtson were interviewed, in jail, by an investigator-attorney.
It should also be noted that
“... Similar legislation, requiring that arrested persons be promptly taken before a committing authority, appears on the statute books of nearly all the statеs.
The purpose of this impressively pervasive requirement of criminal procedure is plain. A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The lawful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted
to a single functionary. The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for which is seрarately vested in the various participants upon whom the criminal law relies for its vindication. Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important safeguard—not only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselvеs to a progressive and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as the `third degree’ which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime. It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy view of law enforcement. It outlaws easy but selfdefeating ways in which brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection. A statute carrying such purposes is expressive of a general legislative policy to which courts should not be heedless when appropriate situations call for its application.”
In its compendium of state statutes providing for a prompt first appeаrance, the McNabb court included articles 79 and 80 of the 1932 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Those articles provided that any person arrested, whether with a warrant or without a warrant, should be brought before a judge “without unnecessary delay.” Article 82 further provided that the judge should remand the prisoner for trial or for preliminary examination if the accused was entitled to such аn examination,4 should set bail and should sign a commitment specifying the offense charged, if bail was unavailable or could not be met.
The same provisions appeared in the Revised Statutes of 1950 as
“... While the trial court‘s denial of the motion to have defеndant released may have been error, and may have prompted this Court to order him released had he sought supervisory writs to review the ruling at the time, we review this ruling after defendant has been convicted and sentenced. The issue at this point in the proceeding is now certainly moot.”
In interpreting the language of
The state argues that even if we should find that the release sanction of the statute is applicable here, and that it means exactly what it says, this issue is moot as to these defendants because they have already been “released” on bail.6 In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 65 (1975), the United States Supreme Court found that a prompt neutral determination of probable cause is required whenever restraint of an accused‘s liberty is threatened, and it noted that “[e]ven pretrial release may be accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty,” citing a federal statute which includes pretrial bail as an example of such burdensome conditions. Similarly, the Preliminary Statement to Title VIII, Bail, of the Code of Criminal Procedure acknowledges the fact that release on bail is a “conditional release.” We also note that in the study of Louisiana courts prepared by the Institute of Judicial Administration, that body recommended, with regard to the mandatory first appearance, thаt “[i]f charges have not been filed within the designated time, the defendant should be released from custody if he is detained or, if he has already been released, he should be relieved of his obligation on his bond if he so requests.” A Study of the Louisiana Court System at 110 (1972). There is no reason to believe that the redactors of
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court denying petitioners’ applications for writs of habeas corpus is reversed. Petitioners are ordered discharged from custody and from bail forthwith.
MARCUS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
WATSON, J., dissents.
MARCUS, Justice (concurring).
I agree with the majority that, because the language used in
Notes
The 1977 amendment not only shortened the period to three days but also deleted the provision for an extension and the “good cause” exception to mandatory release. See note 3, infra.
“A. The sheriff having custody of an arrested person shall bring him promptly, and in any case within one hundred forty-four hours from the time of the arrest, before a judge for the purpose of appointment of counsel. Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in computing the one hundred forty-four hour period referred to herein. The time limit prescribed herein may be extended by written order of a judge for an additional maximum period of one hundred and forty-four hours upon a showing of good cause. The order shall state the reason for the extension and shall be communicated to the arrested person.
B. At this appearance, if a defendant has the right to have the court appoint counsel to defend him, the court shall assign counsel to the defendant. The court may also, in its discretion, determine or review a prior dеtermination of the amount of bail.
C. If the arrested person is not brought before a judge in accordance with the provisions of Subsection A of this article, he shall be released forthwith, unless good cause is shown.
D. The failure of the sheriff to comply with the requirements herein shall have no effect whatsoever upon the validity of the proceedings thereafter against the defеndant.”
In a supplemental brief on the issue of the sanction for non-compliance, the state cites statutes and cases from several other jurisdictions, but these are without relevance because the statutes do not provide specific sanctions for failure to comply, as the Louisiana statute does. Among the jurisdictions to which the state‘s brief refers us, only Georgia provides that a person who is arrested without a warrant “shall be released” if he is not brought before an officer authorized to issue warrants within forty-eight hours; and the Georgia courts have interpreted this provision to mean release “from imprisonment or custody” until a warrant is obtained.