State v. ChambersState v. Chambers
{¶ 1} Appellant, Lewis T. Chambers, appeals from the September 7, 2001 judgment entry of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶ 2} On October 22, 1996, the Lake County prosecutor charged appellant by information with four counts: Count One was for kidnapping, a violation of R.C. 2905.01 and a second-degree felony; Counts Two, Three, and Four were for gross sexual imposition, violations of R.C. 2907.05 and felonies of the third degree. Appellant entered a written plea of guilty on all four counts on December 18, 1996. The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea in a December 23, 1996 judgment entry. On January 15, 1997, the trial court sentenced appellant to a term of five years on Count One and two years on Counts Two, Three, and Four, with the sentences to run concurrently.
{¶ 3} Appellant appeared before the trial court on August 30, 2001, for a sexual offender classification hearing. The trial court had previously ordered a psychiatric evaluation of appellant. Appellant was evaluated by Dr. John Fabian (“Dr. Fabian”), who found that appellant was not competent to understand the nature of a sexual offender classification hearing. Appellant was 83 years of age at the time of the evaluation.
{¶ 4} At the sexual offender classification hearing, the state stipulated that Dr. Fabian’s report was authentic but declined to stipulate as to the findings and conclusions of the report. The trial court, nevertheless, found that appellant was not competent. The trial court also found that appellant was not a sexual
{¶ 5} Appellant has filed a timely appeal of the September 7, 2001 judgment entry and makes the following assignment of error:
{¶ 6} “The trial court committed reversible error when it held a sexual predator classification hearing after [appellant] had been found incompetent.”
{¶ 7} Appellant argues that it was a violation of his due process rights to hold a sexual offender classification hearing after he had been determined to be incompetent to understand the proceedings. Appellant’s argument is premised on the view that sexual predator determinations are similar to probation revocation hearings and that the due process rights accorded to a defendant at a probation revocation hearing, including the right to be heard and confront witnesses, would be rendered void if the defendant were incompetent.
{¶ 8} The Tenth Appellate District addressed the issue of whether a defendant must be competent in order for a trial court to proceed with a sexual predator hearing in
State v. Kendrick
(Sept. 30, 1999), 10th Dist. No. 98AP-1305,
{¶ 9} We are in agreement with the
Kendrick
court that sexual predator hearings are essentially civil in nature.
State v. Tennyson
(Dec. 7, 2001), 11th Dist. No. 2000-L-115,
{¶ 10} In
Morrissey v. Brewer
(1972),
{¶ 11} Other jurisdictions are in accord with the Tenth Appellate District on the right of a defendant to a competency determination prior to a probation or parole revocation hearing. In
Commonwealth v. Megella
(1979),
{¶ 13} In spite of the essentially civil nature of a sexual offender classification hearing, the Ohio legislature has specified that the offender shall have certain rights at the hearing. R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) provides that “the offender * * * shall have an opportunity to testify, present evidence, call and examine witnesses and expert witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses and expert witnesses regarding the determination as to whether the offender * * * is a sexual predator.” These are the same rights that courts, in the context of parole and probation revocation hearings, have recognized cannot be effectively exercised if the defendant is incompetent. We are in accord with those jurisdictions that have held that a defendant’s right to testify, present evidence, and confront adverse witnesses is effectively rendered meaningless by the defendant’s incompetency. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s decision to proceed with appellant’s sexual predator hearing, after it found that appellant was incompetent, was a violation of the due process rights granted to appellant in R.C. 2950.09.
{¶ 14} However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a trial court need not hold a hearing to determine that an individual convicted of a sexually oriented offense is a sexually oriented offender.
State v. Hayden,
{¶ 15} This court is most aware of the concept that an intermediary appellate court is bound to apply the holdings and policies enunciated by its supreme court
{¶ 16} Perhaps even more puzzling is the evident resulting conundrum as to how an individual in the throes of Alzheimer’s disease would functionally be able to comply with the annual registration requirements for a period of ten years as set forth in R.C. 2950.07(B)(3). Again, ours “is not to reason why” some logic defies logic, but to dutifully accept the syllogism. We will await the intervention of the serendipity singers and an applicable Polish proverb.
{¶ 17} Applying the holding of Hayden to the facts of the instant case, we conclude that although the trial court erred in proceeding with a sexual predator hearing after finding appellant incompetent, it did not err in finding that appellant was a sexually oriented offender, since appellant’s guilty plea to the three counts of gross sexual imposition automatically conferred upon him the status of sexually oriented offender. Therefore, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entry of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. . Pursuant to R.C. 2950.07(B)(3), a sexually oriented offender's duty to register with the county sheriff continues for ten years.