State v. ChamberlainState v. Chamberlain
The State challenges appellee‘s sentencing, arguing that the сourt should have classified and sentenced appellee as a prison releasee reoffender. We agree and reverse.
We dispose of the jurisdictional issues first. Citing to the State‘s stipulated agreement to the sentence imposed, appellee argues that by agreeing to the sentencing, the State did not properly object for purposes of the Criminal Appеal Reform Act, thus precluding this court from exercising jurisdiction. We cannot agree. Although the State did stipulate to the sentencing, that wаs only because the court had already ruled that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act did not apply. Consequently, when the Stаte stipulated to the sentence imposed, it did so subject to its objection to the court‘s ruling on the applicability of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, specifically objecting fоr purposes of appeal. We believe this was sufficient to preserve the issue for review.
Appellant has also raised the ultimate applicability of the Prison Releasee Reоffender Act to appellee given the timing of appellee‘s release from prison. However, the date of appellee‘s release from prison is not the determinative date for purposes of the Act. See Arnold v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1834, ___ So.2d ___, 1999 WL 565862 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug.4, 1999). Since appellee committed his new offenses on July 21, 1997, after the May 30, 1997 effective date of the Act, the Act may be applied to appellee.
Appellee‘s first substantive argument at trial сoncerning the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act was that thе Act violated the single subject rule. However, appellee abandoned that argument when he discovered that the judge had found the Act inapplicable to another defendant becаuse of the “occupied structure or dwelling” language in the Act. See
This court has since ruled in State v. White, 736 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does apply to a sentence for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. In other words, the dwelling need not bе occupied for the offense to qualify the offender for prison releasee reoffender status. Since appellеe‘s entry into an unoccupied dwelling did not save him from appliсation of the Act, we conclude that the trial court (without the benefit of our ruling in State v. White) erred in ruling that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Aсt did not apply to appellee.
Having concluded that thе court erred in refusing to classify appellee as a prison releasee reoffender, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
PATTERSON, C.J. and CASANUEVA, J., Concur.