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State v. Cazes
875 S.W.2d 253
Tenn.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 Plaintiff-Appellee, Tennessee, STATE CAZES, Defendant-

Victor James

Appellant. Tennessee,

Supreme Court

at Jackson.

Feb. 1994. April

Rehearing Denied

256 *4 Ball, Duncan, Dwight Memphis,

James V. defendant-appellant. for Burson, Atty. Report- Charles Gen. and W. er, Feirman, Gen., Merrilyn Atty. Asst. Nashville, Jr., Beasley, Asst. James C. Dist. Gen., Atty. Memphis, plaintiff-appellee. for OPINION ANDERSON, Judge. case, defendant, this Victor Cazes, first-degree was convicted of

James felony perpetration rape, first-degree burglary. aggravated rape, and sentencing hearing, jury In the found aggravating circum- (1) felony murder invalid circumstances: aggravating three ease is in this convicted of consideration previously the defendant was stance (2) felonies; doubt. beyond more violent a reasonable one or error harmless atrocious, heinous, therefore, murder was sen- We, the defendant’s affirm depravity torture or in that it involved cruel tence of death. (3) mind; murder was com- engaged in mitted while BACKGROUND FACTUAL felony. Ann. 39- committing a Tenn.Code (1982).1 (5), 203(i)(2), 2— guilt proof introduced The State’s mitigating circum- were no found that there Sunday that on phase of trial demonstrated outweigh sufficiently substantial stances Gladys body morning, April and sentenced circumstances alone, Skinner, who lived an older woman3 by electrocution. The to death Frayser area of in the found in her home twenty-five sentenced to defendant was also alive late had last been seen Memphis. She respectively, for the years years, six who a friend Saturday night Ben burglary. rape first-degree aggravated game. After from a card brought her home numerous appeal, the defendant raises On make sure checking house to Ms. Skinner’s alleged review which involve issues for our secure,” Harris left everything was “safe *5 guilt and occurring during both the errors 12:10 a.m. around trial. have careful- phases of telephone morning, because her as The next ly considered the defendant’s contentions called, Gladys occurring during guilt phase they Skin- busy each time errors was that none have merit. We to her daughter grandson and have decided went ner’s therefore, arrived, the defendant’s convictions. they affirm on her. When house to check a front window screen they noticed that occurring during alleged errors As to the broken, removed, the window was been only sentencing phase, we conclude that blinds, and on the window that blood was application aggra- one has merit —that locked. the house were the doors to forth in Tenn.Code vating circumstance set neighbor entered grandson The 2—203(i)(7), § the murder occurred Ann. 39— and found through the front window engaged in commit- house while the defendant was body lying some felony, Gladys That is so because it beneath ting a is invalid. Skinner’s floor, essentially duplicates of the of- the elements between on the bedroom bedcovers first-degree felony murder and does fense of next to the bed wall. The wall bed and the death-eligible population not narrow the several blood as were spattered was defendants, felony required as of an lay on the from the wall that broken pictures Tennes- aggravating circumstance under the the floor and Blood also stained floor. see and United States Constitutions.2 While the bedroom fitted sheet on the bed. ransacked, nothing of value was record, had been carefully reviewing the how- After ever, the house. missing from conclude that the submission we of, 2—203(i) or was accomplice the commission § Tenn.Code [now 1.Tenn.Code Ann. 39— commit, (1991)3 fleeing after penalty attempting or was death Ann. 39-13-204© —No commit, finding, attempting any upon committing first imposed a unanimous or shall be but indicated, arson, murder, robbery, burglary, rape, or degree of the existence of one as heretofore circumstances, statutory aggravating kidnapping, piracy, unlaw- larceny, more of aircraft or following: discharging limited to the throwing, placing which shall be of a de- ful device or bomb.... structive (2) previously convicted defendant was The felonies, present than the of one or more other Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 2. See State charge, the use or threat which involve (Tenn. 1992). person; violence to heinous, (5) atro- was The murder statements, prosecutor opening indicat- cious, torture or or cruel in that it involved old, sixty-eightyears but was mind; ed that Ms. Skinner depravity of her exact not otherwise reflect the record does committed while the The murder was age. committing, engaged or was defendant was Gladys body lying Gladys Skinner’s nude was face found on the backdoor. Skinner rou- down, tinely light night, her knees underneath her with her this and it left back “jacked up buttocks off the floor” and her was on when Ben Harris left her house legs spread apart. Scrape shortly midnight Sunday morning. marks were found after found, legs vagina. right body light on her inner off Her When her was socket, breast had been bitten and her left breast if it and the bulb was loose its scraped. vagina Dilation of the had been unscrewed. penetration rectum demonstrated at or after Michael Lucas testified that Victor Cazes death; however, sperm the time of no were hammers, chipping owned two three found. Numerous marks and bruises were Lucas described as blunt instruments made body, including found on her defensive end, entirely point of steel with a on one á hands, large wounds to her arms and and a end, chisel flat on the other coil-wired proof on her bruise back indicated anthropologist handle. A testified forensic by could have been caused a fist. pattern depressions that a located in the Shelby County medical examiner testi- portion involved of the victim’s skull were by fied that the victim’s death was caused ridges striking consistent with on the surface injuries by multiple skull that were inflicted particular chipping hammer welder’s instrument, with a blows head blunt by owned Cazes. The hammer had been chipping According like a welder’s hammer. crafted into metal knick-knack Cazes to the medical and a an- examiner forensic given after the crime and to a friend’s moth- skull, thropologist who examined the serologist also er. The forensic testified that ranged eight number blows had from a transfer blood stain on the victim’s “virtually fifteen and the skull had shat- been wet, bedsheet was caused contact with a proof tered” the force of the blows. Their bloody object which was consistent with injuries showed that one or more of these shape chipping size and of this same hammer *6 would have caused death within minutes to it that and another like Cazes had left hour, necessarily an but the victim would not home of his friend’s mother. immediately. have A lost consciousness fo- Souviron, Dr. Richard a forensic odontolo- serologist’s testimony rensic indicated that that, gist, upon compari- testified based his may the assault have continued for some Gladys of marks on son the bite Skinner’s serologist time. The testified that some molds and models of Cazes’ breast with may blows have been struck after the blood teeth, he had concluded to a reasonable de- begun clotting, from of some the wounds had gree certainty of teeth had dental Cazes’ and that it takes three to fifteen minutes for body made the bite marks on the victim’s body. blood to clot outside the of death. Another or about the time her murder, defendant, At the time of the Mincer, odontologist, Harry Dr. tes- forensic Cazes, welder, sporadically a worked Victor tified that the defendant Cazes could have handyman repair ga- as a at an automotive marks on the victim. made the bite Two Lucas, Gladys rage owned Michael Skin- engaged had in sexual inter- women who murder, step-grandchild. ner’s Before the course with Cazes testified that he had also Gladys Cazes had been to Skinner’s house them, body posi- bitten and that the victim’s car. two or three times work her On preferred during tion was one he sex. 23,1988, Saturday night, April attend- Cazes presented proof. The defendant no home, birthday a cookout at Lucas’s ed guilt phase, Based on this evidence was a blocks from house. He few Skinner’s defendant, Cazes, Victor found the gathering p.m. left the alone around 10 or guilty first-degree felony in the of evidence tied the defen- Circumstantial rape, guilty perpetration of a and also dant, Cazes, fin- to the offense. His Victor rape first-degree burglary. aggravated and ger palm prints and were found on the front trial, finger- sentencing phase In and frame. Two of his window screen upon presented light relied the evidence prints were lifted from bulb beside State during guilt phase and also introduced pry marks were the back door and fresh history chemi- long tioned the defendant’s previous convic- of the defendant’s records drug He multiple abuse. Tennessee, and dependency in Febru- cal Shelby County, tions might have degree that the defendant suggested murder first ary for “assault to also which, along with rape. aggravated problem control bodily injury” impulse and for indic- bedwetting, possibly history of introduced mitigation, the defendant In damage. neurological minimal ative of his incar- period from the medical records Shelby County to show in the Jail ceration jury found proof, Based on treatment on required had medical that he circumstances aggravating of three existence fights, and a result of occasions as several (1) doubt, which were: beyond a reasonable placed watch been on suicide that he had previously con- had been acquaintance An incarcerated. twice while (2) offenses; felony victed of violent heavy was a user that the defendant testified atrocious, heinous, murder was cocaine, he alcohol, marijuana and that and depravity involved torture or in that it cruel what he could not remember sometimes com- mind; murder was and intoxicated. while he was done engaged defendant was mitted while the §Ann. 39- felony. Tenn.Code committing of his brothers and two The defendant (7) (1982). addition, 203(i)(2),(5), In background. One testified about 2— children, mitigating un- circum- had been defendant found twelve sufficiently until he was his urination substantial able to control stances were twenty. that his father had He testified circumstances outweigh the young. result, him he was One broth- beaten when to death. sentenced as “hot-tem- er described the defendant “always fighting.”

pered” The defen- PART I. people fought he because other dant said that him on himself. would tease when he wet ERRORS GUILT PHASE —TRIAL grade, being arrested for the seventh after Sufficiency the Proof A. jail cell. truancy, defendant set fire to his psychiatric He underwent a examination argues the evi- first The defendant school, fights was sent to reform where jury’s support dence is insufficient After his release from reform continued. therefore, rape insufficient verdict of school, He has the defendant married twice. during the support of murder a verdict marriage. The one child from his second rape, because the victim was perpetration of *7 wage for a substantial defendant had worked penetration. at the time of dead Louisiana, in a de- as a welder brother “hard-working man.” The scribed him as a that a It is well-established began drinking after testified he verdict, by judge, defendant accred approved the trial using and admitted various his first divorce testimony the witnesses for of its the flying rages. drugs and into in favor of the all conflicts and resolves State state, pre theory and removes itself, testi- to the crime the defendant As v. sumption innocence. State of 1988, 23, Saturday night, April fied that on (Tenn.1992). the suffi Where S.W.2d way” on to [his] he was “full of it” and “well chal convicting is ciency of the evidence he left the cookout being drunk when appellate question for an lenged, the relevant leaving the home. After Michael Lucas’s whether, viewing after the evidence court is cookout, a of Jim Bean on he drank bottle State, any to the light most favorable in the totally “got drunk.” way to a where he bar fact could have found trier of rational nothing more stated that he remembered He beyond a reasonable doubt. guilty defendant night. about the Appellate Procedure Rule of Tennessee Nichols, psychologist, a clinical Wyatt Dr. 13(e); Virginia, Jackson compe- defendant was that while the testified (1979). L.Ed.2d 560 S.Ct. insane, legally not to stand trial and tent testified that examiner The medical signs psychological indicate there were vagina and anus indicated specifically men- dilation Dr. Nichols problems. death, penetration approach occurred at the time of tion or the defense to the bench death, routinely, within a of minutes of or short- repetitive questions matter or to ask ly Moreover, after death. jurors. prospective instructing calling defense counsel to refrain from a Brobeck, Court, in This State v. juror prospective by her en- first name was (Tenn.1988), 830-832 that a held defen- tirely proper. The record shows no bias was guilty aggravated rape dant is when the against or his counsel shown that, proof through shows use of force or judge. the trial weapon, pen- coercion with a unlawful sexual etration occurs at the time of death or short- Finally, support the record does not

ly Viewing in thereafter. the evidence judge the defendant’s claim that the trial did State, light most favorable to the we con- appreciate heightened process not due clude that a rational trier of fact could have applicable capital examples in cases. As rape beyond found the elements of the judicial insensitivity, points doubt. reasonable judge occasions when the trial admonished also find the evidence sufficient same, defense counsel that all trials were the perpetration establish murder in the otherwise, capital require that an rape. may entirely A conviction be based go attorney prepared to trial on the circumstantial evidence “where facts are ‘so date, appropriate “press busi clearly interwoven and connected that good granting ness” is cause for finger guilt pointed unerringly is ” setting continuance. In another the state defendant and the defendant alone.’ State capital ment that a trial is from a no different (Tenn.1993). Howell, surely misdemeanor trial is insensitive and Here, the facts established circumstantial inaccurate, heightened in view of the reliabili unerringly point finger guilt evidence ty required gravity and the of the ultimate at the defendant alone. penalty capital cases. Taken the con used, however, text these and other com Impartiality Judge B. of Trial judge ments the trial do not demonstrate The defendant next insists that the trial requirements a mindset so indifferent to the judge displayed hostility against and bias Eighth deny Amendment as him and his counsel as well as an indifference defendant a fair trial. heightened process standards of due applicable in a ease. C. Motion for Continuance It is well-established that a trial judge controlling has broad discretion charges The defendant that the trial trial, course and conduct of the and that by denying court erred his motions for a discretion, exercising that he or she must be request expert continuance and services. any might express thought careful not to history representation of defendant’s judge lead the to infer that the *8 Shelby County shows that Public Defend- against favor of or the defendant a crimi originally appointed repre- to er’s Office was 526, Caughron, nal trial. State v. 855 S.W.2d A sent him November 1989. trial date (Tenn.1993). 1990, February was first set for but at the example judge’s As an of the trial request, defendant’s the case was continued bias, alleged points during to occasions Cazes times and then reset and continued several judge voir dire when the trial refused to July thereafter. On after serious bench, approach allow his to re counsel developed the defendant conflicts between ques to ask a fused to allow defense counsel attorney, public and his defender the trial dire, previously voir and in tion asked on judge private attorneys. appointed two The counsel not to address a structed defense provided to public defender’s office its files prospective juror by her first name. attorneys, by agree- newly appointed and 10, September Initially, ment the trial was set for the record demonstrates that the prosecu- judge trial did not allow either the days judge the trial and

Twelve before trial sound discretion of only upon showing reversed a clear a for a will filed motion continuance and for inuring prejudice abuse and patho- of that discretion expenses fingerprint, advance to hire a to the accused as direct result court’s experts logical “attempt and dental to to 534; ruling. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d State expert proof, counter” to the State’s (Tenn.1982). Melson, 342, 359 employ expert investigate an to whether the Likewise, pro- the determination of whether publicity justified change pretrial a of venue. indigent capi- an expert vision of services to The trial court denied motion because necessary tal to ensure that the defendant length pending of time the had been case rights of the defendant are constitutional complied because the defendant had properly protected is entrusted discre- 13, 2(B)(10), § Supreme with Court Rule tion of the trial court. Tenn.Code Ann. requires specific information to (1990 40-14-207(b) Supp.1992). § & name, date, prospective expert’s examination place, cost. continuance, the As to the motion for a failed an defendant has to show abuse of however, judge, agreement The with the public The had discretion. defender’s office counsel continued trial another two handling the been case thirteen months when September weeks to 1990. On Wednes- present appointed. Many counsel was con- day, September the defendant filed a already granted tinuances had been at the parte hearing motion an ex to to set deter- request. defendant’s Out-of-state witnesses necessity investigative mine the or expert testify were to on behalf of the scheduled services under Ann. Tenn.Code 40-14- arrangements already State and been 207(b), a and for continuance to retain and made to accommodate these witnesses. We approved. any experts utilize The record trial acting that the court was conclude with- judge reflects that the trial informed defen- denying in its discretion in broad defen- objection dant’s counsel over his that the ex dant’s motion for continuance. parte hearing day, would be the next held Moreover, Thursday, trial court did not abuse its begin with the trial on set denying following Monday. request At discretion the defendant’s parte hearing, the ex Although expert compliance for services. request finger- defendant renewed for Supreme is not Court Rule 13 mandato- print, experts dental and pathology for ry specific when a defendant makes a show- requested the first psychiatric, time psycho- expert parte hearing the ex ser- logical neurological experts. Defense necessary protect indigent vices are explained delay counsel the re- rights, defendant’s constitutional there quest experts for new was a result of the showing no such made persons Louisiana, need to interview de- request for expert here. The defendant’s fendant’s unwillingness open up initial accompanied by little more than services counsel, busy and counsel’s schedule. undeveloped assertions services presented No ex parte evidence was attempt were to counter needed hearing to demonstrate the need these possibility proof, State’s experts, except counsel statement indi- juvenile defendant had been molested as cating possibility that the defendant had jail while in and needed further evaluation. jail truancy been molested while in State, See 443 So.2d Caldwell charges. trial court denied the motion Oklahoma, (1983); also Ake v. see grounds prior on the that numerous contin- L.Ed.2d 53 105 S.Ct. granted uances had been at the defendant’s *9 (When indigent an defendant demonstrates request, and because defendant had com- judge to the trial that his mental condition plied Supreme with Rule Court guilt in significant will be a issue either the 2(B)(10). trial, penalty phase the State provide that to grant We observe the decision must the defendant access to one deny competent psychiatrist).4 a motion for continuance rests within expert precluded without merit Likewise is the defendant's claim the denial services him 262 Sequestered

D. Individual Voir Dire only turned for “manifest error.” Patton v. Yount, 1025, 1031, 104 U.S. S.Ct. The defendant next faults the trial court (1984). 2889, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 There is no granting sequestered for not individual voir such error in this record. jury panel pretrial dire of public- on both ity penalty. and the death He also insists Moreover, we find no reversible er that the trial court’s to him failure allow to in sequester ror the trial court’s refusal to question prospective jurors about their atti- jurors questions penalty. about the death capital punishment impaired tudes towards The record defendant was shows right intelligently peremptory to exercise jurors individually to allowed voir dire as to challenges. penalty. their attitude about the death goal The ultimate of voir dire is to defendant has not established that the failure unbiased, jurors competent, insure that are sequester impartiality defeated the impartial, and the decision of how to jury, any juror exposed nor that jurors prospective conduct voir dire of rests potentially prejudicial information. State v. within the sound discretion of trial court. Smith, (Tenn.1993); Porter Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 247. field, 746 S.W.2d at 447. highly publi Where the crime is E. Admission Evidence cized, procedure grant the better is to individual, dire, sequestered voir complains The defendant next only “significant but it is where there is a in respects the trial court erred several possibility” juror exposed has been First, admitting certain evidence at trial. he potentially prejudicial material that individu testimony contends that Ben Harris’s al voir dire is mandated. 839 S.W.2d respect grandchildren’s photo to the victim’s 65; Porterfield, State v. 746 S.W.2d graphs personality, and the victim’s charac (Tenn.1988). Likewise, questions re ter, family was inadmissible as victim garding any publicity the content of to which impact proof. The defendant did not con jurors exposed may helpful have been temporaneously object testimony. to this assessing juror impartial. whether a How objection, testimony Had there been an ever, questions such constitutionally are not complained of still admissible because it required, trial court’s failure to ask guilt phase proceed occurred questions such is not reversible error unless evidence, ings, background was relevant thereby the defendant’s trial is rendered fun identity established the of the bedroom wall damentally Virginia, unfair. Mu’Min v. photographs later offered as evidence. Cf. 415, -, U.S. S.Ct. Miller, (Tenn. State v. (1991). L.Ed.2d 493 1989). find this issue without merit. is no indication this record There argues that the trial court abused its discretion The defendant next individual, denying sequestered post-mortem photographs voir dire of of the victim were prospective juror pretrial exposure publici improperly prejudi admitted because their ty. jurors examined, prospective ap substantially outweighed pro Of the cial effect their proximately twenty-five percent Specifically, had been ex bative value.

posed pretrial publicity points separate photographs showing to some about this case, jurors marks, including injuries, two of the who heard victim’s head breast bite her case, However, scene, body position and one alternate. those defensive wounds arms, jurors they vagina stated that could and ren on her and the dilation of the would impartial solely guided by that a der verdict based on the and anus. We are the rule presented regarding A evidence trial. trial court’s trial court’s decision the admissi findings juror bility impartiality may photographs be over- not be reversed on will defendant, presenting mitigating proof from in violation of knew better than the fied, who also testi- Eighth jail whether he had been molested while in Amendment. The defendant behalf, psychologist testify on his and no one and the effect it had on him. *10 weapon; type of of appeal showing of an abuse of ber blows and absent clear Souviron, Harris, testimony Dr. the foren- at 73. and of discretion. 839 S.W.2d the matching marks odontologist, sic the bite guilt phase, photo At the the pat- dental the with the defendant’s victim graphs to of the were relevant the issues argues the The defendant testi- terns. identity of perpetrator of the and the cause mony serologist anthropologist and of the death, necessary as well as to illustrate the of com- speculative, was and science testimony experts. many of of the State’s At paring patterns mark has not advanced bite sentencing, photographs the relevant to were certainty of characteristic the level is heinous, establish the atrocious or fingerprinting. of photo A cruel circumstance. testimony, admissibility expert its The graph showing how the victim’s skull was relevancy competency matters crushed, and are rest- massive force which illustrated the victim, the of the trial within sound discretion against properly used the was intro speculative is testimony often court. Such duced on that at as well. issue McNish, degree. properly in- some The was State v. 727 S.W.2d 494-95 (Tenn.1987). speculative expert the nature of Although structed on photographs the proof. certainty in The lack absolute the graphic respects, proba were some their witnesses, testimony of all three of outweighed tive these substantially value was not experts qualified whom in their indi- prejudicial Accordingly, effect. were the we objection by the properly vidual fields without defen- photographs conclude that the were dant, preclude testifying. their pursuant did not See admitted Rule of Tennessee Evi Banks, 839 S.W.2d at 69-70. dence 403 and v. State S.W.2d (Tenn.1978). 947, 949 II. PART argues,

The defendant next on the grounds, same that the trial court abused its SENTENCING admitting into discretion evidence vic tim’s A. Error cleaned and reconstructed skull. The Caldwell skull used testimony was to illustrate the argues The defendant that several anthropologist the forensic who had recon dire, prosecutor during remarks voir it, injuries explained structed as he and statement, opening closing argument and “signature” how he had for the found mur sentencing phase of the trial violated the weapon. cleaned, der reconstructed Mississippi, v. principles of Caldwell highly establishing skull relevant iden 320, 105 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. tity. The issue is without merit. See State (1985). reviewing alleged Caldwell (Tenn.1982). Morris, violation, must this Court first determine prosecutor’s whether the comments

Equally without merit is the defen they minimize the were such that would testimony dant’s contention that of his jury’s responsibility role sense previous partners two sexual his pro about determining appropriateness of death as pensity partner during to bite his sex was and, so, judge a sentence if whether the trial inadmissible. This evidence relevant to sufficiently impression corrected the left identity person who establish West, prosecutor. State S.W.2d raped victim, pro and murdered the and its (Tenn.1989). 387, 399 substantially bative value was not out Banks, weighed by prejudicial its effect. record and We have reviewed the 949; Tenn.R.Evid. 403 prosecu agree such defendant that Finally, objected your says tor’s law its not statements as “the admissibility expert testimony— anymore” “you’re making decision namely, testimony finding penalty. You’re forensic serolo the death automatic,” fact,” gist concerning pattern finding “the spat- of the blood verdict bedroom; proof says in the book what terings “the law the verdict shall be,” anthropologist concerning arguably state- forensic num- violate Caldwell. Such *11 jury’s merits tend to cuting attorney minimize the role and inquired about the defen- jurors allow the responsibility to feel that the dant’s Sunday reaction when he awoke on clothes, determining appropriateness ear, for find blood on his and tools. The West, death sentence rests defendant elsewhere. asserted his innocence and denied any S.W.2d at 399. clothing there had been blood on his morning During closing after the crime. First, however, stronger we note that the argument, prosecutor questioned the de- up part statements made a small of an exten- fendant’s statement that he would black-out sive voir dire days held over a number of when he became drunk and that he had done and, therefore, days were made several be- night so on the prosecu- of the murder. The Moreover, fore the deliberations. skeptically pointed tor also out that the de- Caldwell, unlike judge the court the trial any fendant did not volunteer information in this case improper did endorse the explain fingerprints about or how his came to remarks, which defense counsel here had be on lightbulb the window screen and pass objection. allowed to without In addi- crime scene. tion, portions other argu- the State’s final appeal The defendant contends in this correctly ment responsibility set forth the trial by overruling court erred his motion jury under Tennessee’s sentenc- for limited cross-examination. ing procedure, He asserts and the defendant’s final ar- that he Fifth privi retains his Amendment gument repeated and re-enforced the State’s lege by discussing not to incriminate himself argument. Finally, court, correct the trial the circumstances of the offense if he testi argument, correctly after instructed the only background fies about his and other immediately they began before deliberations mitigating circumstances unrelated to the of responsibility as to their determining Lehman, Relying fense itself. on Lesko v. appropriateness of the death sentence under (3d 1527, 1542 Cir.), 925 F.2d West, cert. denied 502 the law. See 767 S.W.2d at 399-400. -, U.S. 112 S.Ct. 116 L.Ed.2d 226 reasons, For foregoing we find the Cald- (1991), argues the defendant also beyond well error harmless a reasonable prosecutor’s during closing argu remarks doubt. Id. at 400.

ment violated his state and federal constitu Right B. of Limited Cross-Examination rights tional against self-incrimination under California, 380 U.S. 85 S.Ct. Griffin guilt hearing prior After the (1965), 14 L.Ed.2d 106 which held that penalty phase trial, of this bifurcated prosecutor the Fifth Amendment bars a from defense counsel moved that the State be commenting to the on the defendant’s prohibited cross-examining from the defen testify failure to at trial. during dant sentencing hearing with re gard erred, to the circumstances of the offense. agreeing While that the trial court The ruling insisted that such a argues any the State error was harmless proper would if he chose to take the only questioned because the defendant was purpose witness stand for the limited of testi on cross-examination about matters that he fying mitigating about factors unrelated to reasonably during raised direct. The State evidence of the crime for which he had been prosecutor’s further contends that re- argued convicted. The State that cross-ex mark was not error because the defendant permitted amination should be on all matters attempted explain regard- some facts sentencing, including relevant to ing murder, the circum night thereby waiving the' stances of the offense. The trial rights subject. court on the Griffin agreed with the State and denied the motion. The Fifth Amendment to the United defendant, against Constitution, of coun- applicable advice States which is sel, Amendment, sentencing hearing. testified at through Dur- states the Fourteenth 1, 6, direct examination Malloy Hogan, he said that he had see 84 S.Ct. (1964), night been drunk the provides of the murder and 12 L.Ed.2d 653 nothing Sunday person compelled remembered until he awoke ... “[n]o shall be cross-examination, morning. prose- any against On criminal case to be a witness *12 A fact.... witness to that Supreme the details States Court himself.” The United is on examination direct right who testifies the Fifth Amendment has held that questions on cross-exami- capital to a bound to answer against applies self-inerimination Smith, respect testimony that to the v. nation with sentencing proceeding. Estelle See 1866, 454, gave 68 L.Ed.2d 359 he on direct. 451 101 S.Ct. U.S.

(1981). 850, 855 Stapleton, 638 State v. added). (Tenn.Crim.App.1982) (Emphasis Estelle, the psychiatrist

In a testified for penalty phase, relating during the state a Stapleton emphasize that Harrison during a made statements against privilege can waive the defendant examination, despite the that psychiatric fact subjects regarding certain self-inerimination advised his the been defendant subjects on direct exami by discussing those rights Miranda before the examination. more cases have decided nation. Other testimony violated Court ruled takes broadly “that once a defendant privilege Fifth defendant’s Amendment Fifth Amend he waives his witness stand “ self-incrimination, stating that ‘the against himself to and makes liable privilege ment availability privilege does not turn ordinary as witness.” cross-examination upon type proceeding in which its (3d 327, Weber, 437 F.2d 334 United v. States invoked, upon protection is but the nature denied, 932, Cir.1970), 91 402 U.S. S.Ct. cert. exposure and the the statement admission (1971). 1524, People also L.Ed.2d 867 See 28 ” Id., 462, at 101 which it invites.’ 451 U.S. 726, 731, 83, Szabo, Ill.Dec. 113 Ill.2d 100 v. Gault, (quoting at 387 U.S. S.Ct. 1873 In re denied, 995, 1000 (1986),cert. 479 497 N.E.2d 1, 49, 1428, 1455, 87 18 L.Ed.2d 527 S.Ct. 1101, 1330, 94 L.Ed.2d 181 U.S. 107 S.Ct. (1967)). “[g]iven The Court concluded (1987)(testimony sentencing hearing at limit gravity of the decision to be made at the good since incar ed to defendant’s behavior penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the subject impeachment). to ceration was guaran- obligation observe to fimdamental 1542, Lesko, supra, F.2d at howev- Id., 462-63, 101 at tees.” 451 U.S. at S.Ct. er, Appeals held the Third Circuit Court 1873. testimony penalty phase a defendant’s expressly While this Court has never ad wholly are col- mitigating factors that about specific dressed self-inerimination issues charges against the individual lateral to the defendant, raised here the United operate complete as a waiver of does not Supreme States Court held Harrison privilege or defendant’s self-incrimination States, 222, 219, United S.Ct. Explaining ratio- rights under Griffin. (1968), L.Ed.2d that “[a] court conclud- position, nale for its the Lesko testify chooses his defendant who waives ed: privilege against compulsory self-incrimina Griffin, capital protection Without testimony respect tion he with penalty phase in the of his trial added.) (Emphasis gives_” See also prosecutorial comment about could avoid States, Caminetti v. United U.S. charges against his to address the failure (1917) (It 61 L.Ed. 442 S.Ct. price providing only him of not what permissible prosecutor court testimony may “life or about death” be may it draw an ad to advise the This mitigating circumstances. collateral from defendant’s silence verse inference high price require accused is too as to some when the defendant has testified fifth of his pay for the maintenance charged, concerning the but has facts crime privilege. amendment testify as to facts within his refused to other Lesko, F.2d Similarly, intermediate knowledge). our own Appeals has ruled that: Court of Criminal Significantly, recognized court Lesko the defendant’s assert- testimony interplay between A witness cannot discontinue subjected only right limited cross- ed to be already disclosed to transactions fact, sentencing hearing and though examination he witness. Once discloses Eighth right to Amendment incriminatory, testify respect the defendant’s he must present mitigation may any evidence in “[a] crime witness be cross-examined ...,” any for which defendant stands convicted. matter issue in the case relevant 611(b), previously held, cognizant As we have a sentencer in a we Tenn.R.Evid. are also precluded gravity capital case “must not from sentencing proceeding be considering any mitigating relevant evi and the constitutional mandate to ensure Thompson, mitigating pre- dence.” State all relevant circumstances *13 (Tenn.1989), denied, 1031, sentencing body. cert. 251 497 U.S. sented to a thus con- We 3288, (1990). that, only 111 in sphere 110 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 796 the limited of a clude Likewise, capital the Supreme penalty hearing, United States Court death a recognized testimony mitigating, Eighth regarding has Amendment defendant’s “requires wholly United are mer- the States Constitution factors that collateral to the mitigating charges against oper- to allow States consideration of its of him the does not capital McKoy in complete privilege evidence cases.” v. North ate as a waiver of the Carolina, 433, 442, 1227, against Accordingly, 494 110 a U.S. S.Ct. self-incrimination.5 1233, (emphasis right 108 L.Ed.2d 369 has a defendant limited cross-exami- California, original). Boyde See also testify 494 nation if he or she wishes to about 370, 1190, 377-78, 1196, only mitigating U.S. 110 S.Ct. 108 at collateral circumstances (1990). Moreover, phase 316 penalty L.Ed.2d as stated in the of a trial. We McKoy: however, reiterate, special that even in such situations, completely may a defendant decisions, be

Under our it is not relevant thoroughly all tes- cross-examined about the barrier whether to the sentencer’s con timony given fairly by defen- raised mitigating of all is in sideration evidence dant on direct examination. by statute, ...; terposed by the sentenc court, ...; by evidentiary rul case, Applying present that rule it is cause, ing, - ... Whatever the the con trial limit clear that the court’s failure to necessarily clusion would the same: did not cross-examination the defendant “Because the failure to con [sentencer’s] prejudicial result error. The defendant all mitigating sider evidence risks the testified on direct examination about imposition erroneous death sen the night the murder and he could said that tence, Ohio, in plain [v. violation of Lockett anything becoming remember after 586, 2954, 438 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 57 L.Ed.2d morning. drunk he awoke It until the next 973], duty it is our this remand case for was, therefore, prosecutor not error for the Oklahoma, resentencing.” Eddings v. 455 inquire specifically into the defendant’s 869, [104] at n. n. [102 U.S. S.Ct. memory day, physi- including of the next the (O’Connor, J., L.Ed.2d ... concur 1] 71 car, clothing, cal condition of his and tools ring).” when In he awoke. view the defendant’s McKoy Carolina, v. North supra, (quoting examination, in- testimony during direct the Maryland, Mills U.S. quiries propounded by prosecutor the were (1988)) 1860, 1865-66, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d proper. omitted). (citations analysis agree

We set further conclude that the com thé by closing recognizes prosecutor during forth in Lesko that the Fifth both ments made Eighth implica argument principles not violate set Amendment Amendment did permit Supreme raised a decision forth in The United tions whether States Griffin. only prohibit limited cross-examination of defendant Court held that does not has Griffin capital sentencing Although prosecutor commenting from defen hearing. at a we on a silence, general if re- recognize the Tennessee rule that dant’s such comment is a fair 104(d), Compare provides admissibility lege, Tenn. Tenn.R.Evid. or the of evidence. testifying upon 608(b)(3), 104(a); an “accused does not see also Tenn.R.Evid. R.Evid. preliminary subject matter become to cross-ex- privilege against waive self- accused does not as to case.” Pre- amination other issues in the testifying relat- incrimination when as to matters liminary questions qualification include the of a credibility. ing to witness, privi- person to be a existence case, sentencing occur after the trial and position taken either the but sponse to a date, not err a trial court does United effective or defense counsel. See as it 31-33, by instructing jury under the statute Robinson, States v. commit (1988). the offense was time 864, 868-70, existed S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Brimmer, Here, under the rationale ted. Here, prosecutor cast de- doubt April the offense occurred because testimony that he drunk or fendant’s was sentenced and the defendant time of offense blacked-out pre-1989 statute under instruction acts describing the calculated intentional issue merit. This is without appropriate. necessary to break into vic- were addition, prosecutor tim’s ar- home. Equally is the de without merit know, “you gued that didn’t complaint court erred trial fendant’s know, you explain anything, volunteer pre-1989 by instructing under *14 things of that fingerprints on the screen and regard aggravating cir statute with nature, thought I was somewhat amaz- especially that “the cumstance ing.” that such comments con- We conclude heinous, in it involved atrocious or cruel that ease, stitute, to response in this a fair the depravity of mind.” or Tenn.Code torture claim of and his claim defendant’s innocence 39-2-203(0(5) (1982). The § Ann. memory loss. provides that “the murder amended version heinous, atrocious, or in cruel Errors C. Instructional physical that it involved torture serious jury the challenges The defendant necessary produce to beyond that abuse given sentencing gen at on five 39-13-204(i)(5) instructions § Ann. death.” Tenn.Code only grounds. eral Because one the al (1991). holding in Again, under our recent leged grounds is in for relief contained the Brimmer, pursuant the instruction to statute trial, defendant’s motion for new the State in the the is effect at time offense occurred argues the that defendant has waived most merit in the entirely proper. also find no We We, however, challenges. these have elected argument aggravating that the defendant’s to on the consider five issues raised Ann. circumstance set forth Tenn.Code merits as set out below. 39-2-203(0(5) (1982), unconstitutionally § previously vague. This has and re Court First, argues that trial validity aggrava peatedly upheld of this charging jury in according court erred at ting in the face of similar circumstance the statute that existed at the time of the where, here, tacks, jury particularly grounds on the defendant is offense meaning properly has instructed on been jury charged according to have the entitled in in the statute accor of the terms used in to the statute which is effect at the time of Williams, 690 with State v. S.W.2d dance sentencing. offense The occurred Black, (Tenn.1985). 526-30 See State required in effect at that time the statute (Tenn.1991). S.W.2d any aggravating jury to find that circum- any outweighed by mitigat- stances were not assigns next as error The defendant ing impose in order death circumstances charging all statuto trial court’s action The occurred sentence. ry refusing to mitigating circumstances and statute, and the as amended now non-statutory mitigating circum charge requires find past in the been critical stances. We have proven by outweigh, circumstances State indiscriminately charging all practice doubt, mitigating beyond any a reasonable mitigating have statutory circumstances jury may impose circumstances before suggested trial courts instruct instead § Ann. 39- sentence of death. Tenn.Code juries only mitigating circumstances those 204(f) (1991). 13— Smith, proof. by the See S.W.2d raised — Buck, Brimmer, 15; recently held in State v. State (Tenn.1984). showing of S.W.2d - (Tenn.1994), In the absence that where of however, prejudice, any such error does is committed before the effective date fense generally require the error involved in this reversal because of the same 1989 amendment Smith, benefits the supra. defendant. No CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES prejudice has been in this shown case. caution, Out of an abundance the defen- dant next raises a number of issues that he The trial court did not commit error when says either pen- render the Tennessee death it charge nonstatutory refused to mitigating alty statute unconstitutional or result in the requested by circumstances as the defendant. arbitrary imposition capricious repeatedly We have held that: penalty. arguments death ofMost ad- by vanced repeated- the defendant have been only mandatory ... instructions with Court; ly rejected therefore, by this we find respect mitigating circumstances are unnecessary again it discuss in detail the statutory those circumstances which holdings. reasons for our For the resolution are raised the evidence shall be ex- rely upon those authority issues we pressly charged, and the must be told cited below. they weigh any shall and consider other facts or circumstances that are following arguments raised the de- they Smith, raised rejected evidence find to fendant supra: were circumstances, mitigating in making the (1) qualifiers “extreme” and “sub- circumstances, determination of which ag- stantially” statutory in the mitigat- as used gravating mitigating, outweigh the oth- set circumstances forth at Tenn.Code er. (1982), 2—203(j)(2) Ann. un- *15 39— constitutionally jury’s limit the consider- Smith, (quoting S.W.2d at from State evidence; mitigating ation of relevant Hartman, (Tenn.1985) 106, 118 v. 703 S.W.2d (2) “anti-sympathy” instruction vio- added)). (emphasis jury The instructions in Eighth lates a defendant’s Amendment this ease were in accord with the directives of rights; Smith and Hartman. (3) the of an absence instruction advis- ing jury purpose weigh- D. Prosecutorial Discretion in ing process is to determine whether death Seeking Penalty the Death appropriate punishment; is the (4) the statute is unconstitutional be- argues The pros defendant that the penalty cause the death has imposed been ecutor’s in selecting unlimited discretion can discriminatory in a manner based on didates for the penalty death results in arbi wealth, race, geography, gender; and trary capricious imposition and of the death (5) imposed the death is sentence in an penalty process and renders the entire un arbitrary capricious and manner because argument rejected constitutional. This is not as to the instructed effect of by Supreme the United Court in States verdict; non-unanimous Gregg Georgia, 96 S.Ct. (6) penalty imposed is in death (1976), in L.Ed.2d which arbitrary capricious and manner because opportunities the Court held that for discre is not allowed to address tionary occurring during process action eligibility, parole issues such as costs of ing case, including authority murder incarceration, deterrence, general and the prosecutor the state to select per those execution; method of and sons for capital whom he wishes to seek (7) penalty per the death is se cruel and punishment penalty do not the death render punishment unusual under all circum- theory unconstitutional op on the that the stances. portunities discretionary for action render imposition penalty following arguments by The raised arbitrary the death the de- rejected supra: fendant were apply freakish. We that rule in this case. State, Cooper (1) there is a reasonable likelihood the Of (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (discussing prosecuto- trial court’s understood the instruc- rial post-conviction discretion in to a unanimity relation requiring mitigating tions as defendant). challenge by circumstances; 39-13-204(i)(7) (1991), support imposi- (2) penalty of death appellate review penalty death conviction tion constitutionally inad- is eases Tennessee murder, felony although it can be used to equate. penalty for support imposition of the death by following arguments the de- raised determined that premeditated murder. We rejected Caughron, supra: were fendant felony murder the use of (1) arbitrary and penalty the death elements of the duplicated the circumstance right has the capricious the State because failed to felony murder crime and underlying closing argument penalty of final death-eligible murderers class of narrow the phase; and I, required Article Section man- procedures the lack uniform Eighth Tennessee Constitution sequestered dating voir dire individual Constitu- Amendment the United States during jury imposi- selection renders whether, now tion. must determine arbitrary penalty tion of the death case, the sentenc- on the facts this based capricious. felony jury’s consideration of the invalid is harm- aggravating circumstance Groseclose, Finally, in State v. S.W.2d beyond where a reasonable doubt less error (Tenn.1981), rejected we the ar- 147-48 remaining aggravating circum- there two are gument defining ex- an instruction stances, namely previous the defendant’s plaining constitutionally re- mitigation is offenses, felony of violent convictions quired. murder was heinous atro- unnecessary repeat find it Likewise we it or cruel in that involved torture or cious lists, analysis our issues depravity of mind. argument, regarding without a number connection, recently held we have challenges other constitutional Howell, 260-61, previously ad- been decided this Court precision guarantee [i]n order versely position.6 to his *16 sentencing individualized considerations argues The defendant next that the provide explana- a principled demand and penalty Tennessee death statute fails to suffi case, it tion in each for our conclusion ciently eligible narrow class of death conducting important, harmless er- when Eighth under Amendment to defendants review, completely the rec- ror examine I, Constitution, § and Article 16 of the U.S. po- presence of factors ord for the Constitution, per all the Tennessee because ultimately tentially the sentence influence felony eligible sons are convicted murder include, imposed. not limit- These but are penalty for the death on sole basis that to, strength of remain- ed the number and they underlying felony.7 committed the circumstances, aggravating ing valid sentencing, argument prosecutor’s Middlebrooks, In State v. 840 S.W.2d to establish the invalid evidence admitted (Tenn.1992), majority held of this Court nature, aggravator, quality that it is the Tennes- unconstitutional under mitigating strength of evidence. Constitution, I, use see Article Section circumstance, felony this case aggravating murder Our examination of record 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) analysis § demonstrates with that Ann. accordance Tenn.Code Melson, (holding that it allows the admission of S.W.2d at 366-368 stitutional because concerning mitigating findings sentencing). neither written hearsay evidence at circumstances, allowing the nor an instruction mercy jury impose a life on are sentence based argument the same with 7. The defendant raised Black, required); constitutionally 39~2-203(i)(6) § regard Ann. to Tenn.Code (holding that the statute does not violate (1991)], 39-13-204(6) mur- [now “[t]he rights by mandating of a defendant constitutional avoiding, purpose der committed for the was jury impose upon finding aggra- that a death that with, interfering preventing a lawful arrest or vating outweigh mitigating cir- circumstances prosecution or another." This of the defendant (hold- cumstances); Smith, 857 S.W.2d at 22-23 aggravating in this circumstance was raised sufficiently ing limit that the statute does exercise issue is without merit. case. The jury’s aggrava- once matters in discretion found, and tion are that the statute is not uncon- felony-murder error, case, submission the invalid the Middlebrooks in this was aggravating circumstance for consider- harmless. ation beyond was harmless error a reason- Finally, we address defendant’s

able doubt.8 capital contention this Court’s review of constitutionally inadequate cases is to afford fully supports record here the two meaningful proportionality review. The remaining aggravating circumstances. The defendant bases his the fact claim on proof State introduced without contradiction juries Tennessee are not prior felony the defendant’s violent convic- required findings to make concerning written tions aggravated rape and “assault to mur- mitigating says circumstances. He also der degree bodily first with injury.” Addi- comparative the information base for review tionally, strongly supports the evidence degree of all first murder convictions is inad jury’s finding that the murder was equate and incomplete he asserts that heinous, atrocious, or cruel in it involved methodology conducting this Court’s com mind, depravity torture or beyond a rea- parative review is flawed. sonable fully doubt. The and cor- emphasized prior have We on occasions rectly on aggravating instructed this circum- comparative proportionality that our review Williams, pursuant stance to State v. is not simply rendered ineffective (Tenn.1985). because we Furthermore, S.W.2d 517 no rigid objec have “not chosen to formulate a evidence, any additional nor evidence tive test” as the “standard of review for all already properly jury, was not before the cases.” n. quot S.W.2d at support introduced of the invalid felo- Florida, ny-murder aggravating circumstance. A Proffitt (1976). S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 913 sentencing jury may properly hear evidence not, however, do lightly duty take our regarding the circumstances of the offense. comparative conduct in each review ease to addition, prosecutor emphasize did not penalty imposed determine whether the is or felony-murder aggravating invalid cir- disproportionate is not penalty im argument primarily cumstance. The focused cases, posed considering in similar the nature proof weaknesses the defendant’s regular of the crime and the defendant. We mitigation, emphasis some on the defen- ly routinely reports review Rule sub prior dant’s convictions and the heinous na- by trial judges mitted at the conclusion of all crime, ture of the but with little mention of trials degree criminal for first murder. The felony circumstance. *17 points report dissent out that no Rule 12 proof mitigation background in included correct; in this available case. That is how childhood, evidence about the defendant’s ev- ever, report Rule 12 contains far less infor idence of drug the defendant’s and alcohol record, mation than the entire which we have problems blackouts, that caused him to suffer thoroughly According reviewed this case. inability evidence about the defendant’s to ly, we well compara are able to conduct the control urination possible and its connec- proportionality tive based on review neurological problem tion to a fights the and knowledge. Because we do not find it neces brought that were about as a result this every sary in compare writing, case to problem. detail, by detail all specific the cases or cir thorough Based on our the rec- review of cumstances which are pro considered our ord, conclude, doubt, beyond we review, follow, reasonable portionality it does as the that the sentence would have been the same suggest, defendant and the to dissent seem jury given weight the no the invalid to have perform we failed to an effective felony therefore, aggravating factor; murder comparative proportionality review as out jury's 8. felony Because we conclude that the consider- aggra- for consideration the murder felony aggravating ation of the invalid vating felony, circumstance when an additional beyond circumstance was harmless error rea- felony underlying felony-mur- the other than the doubt, expressly sonable we reserve for later conviction, supports aggravating der also the cir- State, wit, by decision the issue raised the to cumstance. whether it is error under to submit Middlebrooks

271 Hines, Barber, v. 758 crimes. State v. 663- for similar See lined State 753 S.W.2d Duncan, (Tenn.1988). (Tenn.1988); v. 839 State See also S.W.2d 515 House, reject (Tenn.1985); Accordingly, we v. S.W.2d at State 698 S.W.2d (Tenn.1987); appellate Camp- claim that this Court’s v. defendant’s State 743 S.W.2d constitutionally inadequate. (Tenn.1984); review v. bell, State 664 S.W.2d (Tenn.1983); Williams, State 657 S.W.2d opinion that the This Court is of the Black, supra. first-degree felony murder of the victim imposition the death this case warrants clearly

penalty. The record established both CONCLUSION aggravating remaining valid circum carefully defen- have considered the We records were introduced stances. Court alleged errors dant’s contentions as phase penalty to establish the defen during guilt occurring prior aggrava dant’s As convictions. convic- phases the defendant’s conclude (i)(5) heinous, ting circumstance atrocious — sentence should be affirmed. tion and death depravi or cruel in that it involved torture or Tenn. with the mandate of accordance Williams, ty of mind—this Court in State v. 39-13-206(c)(l)(D) § [for- Ann. Code (Tenn.1985), tor defined 39-2-205(c)(4) ], merly we Tenn.Code Ann. physical as or ture the infliction of severe im- of death was not find that sentence pain upon he she mental the victim while fashion, arbitrary that the evi- posed in an or conscious. also said remains alive jury’s overwhelmingly supports dence depravity may acts by be shown occur statutory aggravating finding of circum- A ring shortly at or after victim’s death. stances, supports and that the evidence majority consistently up this Court has any mitigat- jury’s finding absence of circumstance, aggravating so held that sufficiently substantial circumstances defined, against constitutional attack. See aggravating circumstance. outweigh the Smith, State Oscar Franklin Further, comparative proportionality our re- (1993). Here, de instructions in this case is view reveals that the sentence according fined circumstance disproportionate nor Williams, neither excessive contrary conclusion cases, dissent, considering penalty imposed in similar reached the evidence in this clearly crime and character of record both both the nature established torture depravity. Gladys repeatedly Skinner was the defendant. force, and with in the tremendous beaten therefore, We, affirm the conviction of Her chipping

head with a welder’s hammer. felony first-degree murder and sentence virtually skull force shattered from the will out as of death. The sentence be carried of the numerous blows. Evidence indicated day May, provided by on the 14th law may assault have continued some unless otherwise ordered this Court time, and that the victim would not necessari proper authority. Costs of this other ly immediately. have lost De consciousness defendant, against the appeal are assessed Gladys fensive wounds to Skinner’s arms *18 Cazes. Victor James fact, not, that she in lose hands indicate did immediately upon being as consciousness O’BRIEN, JJ., concur. DROWOTA saulted, struggling pro and that she was Accordingly, herself. the evidence tect REID, C.J., concurs and dissents. torture, as in Williams. showed defined DAUGHTREY, J., participating. not Moreover, raped at the fact that Skinner or near of death is further evidence the time REID, concurring dissenting. Judge, depravity have of the crime. We defendant, affirming I in the conviction of first concur the character of the considered However, ag- I hold degree minder. would prior including mitigating proof the (T.C.A. (i)(5) § gravating 39-2- pen circumstance violent acts. We are convinced (1982)) 203(i)(5) and find the arbitrary, invalid sentence alty imposed excessive was neither penalty imposed disproportionate. of death disproportionate For the reasons discussed in v. State to the sentences in similar cases. See T.C.A. Black, 166, (Tenn.1991) 39-13-206(c)(l)(D) 815 S.W.2d 195-97 (Supp.1993). Pursuant (Reid, C.J., dissenting), statute, aggravating circum- to the the defendant and his criminal (i)(5), stance “The murder was hei- compared acts must be with other similar nous, atrocious, or cruel that it involved offenders and acts committed in order to mind,” or depravity torture a is not valid determine if the defendant is those one aggravating persons circumstance this deserving case. This most sentence Harris, circumstance can be established death. See State v. 839 S.W.2d proof only by (Tenn.1992) (Reid, C.J., victim dissenting); was tortured State Howell, (Tenn.1993) the course of the murder or the murder v. 868 S.W.2d (Reid, “depravity C.J., demonstrated mind.” The evi- concurring). injuries dence physical shows the various though majority Even the fail- defends victim, upon imposed including the cause rigid objec- ure of Court “to formulate a death, but there is no evidence of torture. tive test” and insists that the Court does not majority opinion, The which dismisses the duty lightly compara- “take [its] to conduct a summarily, issue does not indicate whether “regu- tive review in each case ...” and does proof showed victim was tor- larly and routinely reports review Rule 12 depraved. tured or the defendant supra See judges,” submitted trial opinion does However, at 267-268. majority’s even the not reflect the basis which it concludes description of the upon evidence relied its is not disproportionate, sentence comparative proportionality review shows except repeat physical evidence. See clearly proves that the evidence neither tor- supra at majority 270-271. The not able “[ejvidence depravity. ture nor That 12 report insist the Rule was utilized may indicated the assault have contin- contrary this case require- because time, ued some that the victim would Court, Supreme ments of the Rules of it necessarily not have lost im- consciousness appear does in the record nor was it mediately”1 equally does not obviate the Supreme transmitted to the Clerk of the likely conclusion that death resulted from the Tenn.Sup.Ct.R. satisfy Court. See 12. To first blows struck. suffi- This evidence is not statutory requirement comparative support finding cient to torture de- review, proportionality this must Court do pravity. more than restate the facts of the case. See Also, for Middlebrooks, reasons discussed in State State 840 S.W.2d 354- Black, aggravating (i)(5), (Tenn.1992) (Reid, prior C.J., circumstance concurring and amendment, to the 1989 is unconstitutionally dissenting); State v. and,

vague, therefore, is invalid. Use of 84-85. “depravity” in defining instruction years old, victim was 68 the defendant aggravator, what can used as an without There is no evidence as more than the State v. Williams2 definition relationship between term, of that constitutes violation of the except victim that the defendant worked for requires state and federal constitutions and step-grandchild, the victim’s that the sentence be vacated. See State v. repaired the victim’s automobile her Black, 195-97, (Reid, C.J., 815 S.W.2d at times, night residence several and on the Tran, dissenting); State v. Van murder, the defendant had attended a (Tenn.1993) J., (Daughtrey, 485-90 dis house, party step-grandchild’s senting); Mississippi Shell v. was located a few blocks from the victim’s *19 (per S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1 residence. The evidence the murder is curiam, Marshall, J., concurring). entirely proves It circumstantial. the defen- compara- murder;

I also would hold that under the dant committed the it how shows proportionality committed; tive review mandated stat- the murder was but it does not ute, view, why. the sentence of is disproportionate my death show does not record added). (Tenn.1985). Supra (emphasis 1. at 270-271 2. 690 S.W.2d 529-30 support finding proof contain sufficient I sentence is warranted. death of death and

would reverse the sentence

impose imprisonment. of life sentence ON PETITION

ORDER

FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM. Cazes, appellant, Victor James has cause, rehearing petition in this

filed has and con- Court considered

cludes should be denied. so

It is ORDERED.

Ralph Hillis, HILLIS and June

Plaintiffs/Appellants, Jacqueline Powers,

Glenn POWERS and

Defendants/Appellees. Tennessee, Appeals

Court of Section,

Middle at Nashville.

Dec. 1993. Appeal

Permission to Denied

Supreme Court March

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Cazes
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: Feb 14, 1994
Citation: 875 S.W.2d 253
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
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