STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. George J. CARUSO, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 26351.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Decided Sept. 12, 2012.
2012 S.D. 65
Considered on Briefs Sept. 4, 2012.
Alan P. Caplan, Henderson, NV, and Joseph E. Ellingson, Spearfish, SD, for defendant and appellant.
KONENKAMP, Justice.
[¶ 1.] George J. Caruso was convicted of simple assault and sentenced to 360 days in the Meade County Jail. He sought bail pending appeal, in accord with
Background
[¶ 2.] Caruso, a member of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, was convicted by a jury of simple assault. The conviction arose from an altercation between members of the Hells Angels and the Mongols Motorcycle Club during the 2011 Sturgis Motorcycle Rally. Caruso started the confrontation when, unprovoked, he threw a punch at a rival gang member who was passing by a motorcycle shop in Sturgis, South Dakota.1 Caruso‘s attack incited, in the trial court‘s words, a “sprawling melee” in the public streets and sidewalks. Despite immediate law enforcement action, two people were stabbed.
[¶ 3.] Caruso was arrested and eventually released from custody after posting a $1,000 cash bond. A jury found Caruso guilty of simple assault on January 26, 2012, and a presentence investigation was ordered. The trial court permitted Caruso to remain at liberty on his previously posted bond. On March 5, 2012, Caruso was
[¶ 4.] Caruso filed a motion to permit bond pending appeal. A hearing was held on April 18, 2012, before Circuit Court Judge Eckrich who also presided over the January 2011 jury trial. The court took the matter under advisement and issued a memorandum decision denying Caruso‘s motion on April 26, 2012.
[¶ 5.] In its decision, the court addressed each of the factors described in
Standard of Review
[¶ 6.] Under
Analysis and Decision
[¶ 7.] Caruso contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to release him pending appeal. Specifically, he argues the trial court abused its discretion because he meets all the factors set forth in
On motion of a defendant who has been convicted of an offense, the court in which the conviction was had may release the defendant prior to the entry of
judgment, pending the expiration of time for filing notice of appeal, and pending the outcome of the appeal. The court in determining the eligibility of the defendant for release shall consider the criteria as set forth in § 23A-43-4, the risk that the defendant will flee or pose a danger to any person or to the community, and in the case of an appeal, whether the appeal is frivolous or taken for purposes of delay. If the court in its discretion determines that the defendant is eligible for release, the court shall release the defendant in accordance with §§ 23A-43-2 and 23A-43-3.
[¶ 8.] While the decision to grant or deny bail pending appeal is within the discretion of the trial court, “when ‘a state makes provisions for bail pending appeal, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that it may not be denied arbitrarily or unreasonably.‘” Janklow, 2004 S.D. 36, ¶ 9, 678 N.W.2d at 192 (quoting Grooms v. Solem, 562 F.Supp. 512, 513 (D.S.D.1983) (citations omitted)). Thus, “the failure of the trial judge to indicate on the record, at the time of his ruling, the factors he considered and facts upon which he relied, constitutes a violation ... of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s due process clause.” Id. ¶ 11 (citing U.S. ex rel. Bad Heart Bull v. Parkinson, 381 F.Supp. 985, 987 (D.S.D.1974) (citations omitted)).
[¶ 9.] “The statutes and relevant case law do not require that findings be made on each factor, nor is there a requirement to balance the competing factors.” Id. ¶ 14. Rather, a trial court‘s decision must be supported by “findings of fact sufficient to pass the ‘constitutional muster’ alluded to in the Bad Heart Bull decisions.”2 Id. ¶ 10. On appeal, this Court must “determine from the record made whether ... denial of bail is constitutionally permissible.” Id.
[¶ 10.] Caruso was convicted by a jury of simple assault. Once convicted, “[Caruso was] no longer clothed with the presumption of innocence” nor did he have an absolute right to bail pending appeal. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D.1977)). Instead, as previously stated, the decision to grant bail pending appeal was within the trial court‘s discretion. In exercising its discretion, the trial court, in accordance with
[¶ 11.] Here, in addition to the testimony presented at the bond hearing, the trial court had the opportunity to review Caruso‘s criminal history, the presentence investigation, as well as the trial evidence. As this Court stated in State v. Burgers and Janklow, “[W]e may presume that the trial court judge was familiar with the file and the relevant facts.” Janklow, 2004 S.D. 36, ¶ 14, 678 N.W.2d at 193 (citing State v. Burgers, 1999 S.D. 140, ¶ 15, 602 N.W.2d 277, 281). And, “[h]aving presided over the trial, the trial court judge was in
[¶ 12.] The trial court discussed the statutory factors, made findings of fact regarding each factor, and provided reasons for denying the motion. In particular, the court found that Caruso, a resident of Massachusetts, was more of a flight risk following sentencing because he was convicted and sentenced to 360 days in jail. Thus, the court reasoned, Caruso was no longer holding out hope for a lighter sentence and would be less inclined to appear for sentencing. The trial court‘s findings of fact are supported by the record and accordingly are not clearly erroneous. That the circumstances remained the same since the court released Caruso on bail pending imposition of sentence did not compel the court to continue release. The sentencing was “enough to confer fresh discretion upon the trial court in considering bail pending appeal.” State v. Aikens, 135 N.H. 569, 607 A.2d 948, 949 (1992). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing bail pending the outcome of the appeal.
[¶ 13.] Affirmed.
[¶ 14.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, ZINTER, SEVERSON, and WILBUR, Justices, concur.