STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Ricky J. CARUFEL, Respondent.
No. A07-1711.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
April 29, 2010.
783 N.W.2d 539
David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijo, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
OPINION
DIETZEN, Justice.
Ricky J. Carufel was found guilty of three counts of third-degree controlled substance crime in violation of
In December 2004 and January 2005, Winona police were working with confidential reliable informants (CRIs) to arrange for the purchase of controlled substances in the Winona area. On December 27, 2004, a police investigator, as part of a controlled buy, searched a CRI, and then provided the CRI with buy money and a small digital recorder. The investigator followed the CRI to Carufel‘s residence at 307 Adams Street in Winona. The digital recording device successfully recorded a controlled buy from Carufel at his residence.
Subsequently, the investigator arranged two additional controlled buys on December 29, 2004, and January 6, 2005, which were conducted in substantially the same manner, but with an additional CRI and with an additional police officer assisting. Both of the sales were conducted at Carufel‘s residence. The substances purchased during all three controlled buys later tested positive for cocaine.
Carufel was charged with offenses in three separate complaints filed in April 2005. Specifically, each complaint alleged one count of third-degree controlled substance crime in violation of
At trial, the State presented testimony describing the three controlled buys at the Carufel residence. The CRIs testified that Carufel sold them cocaine at his residence on the dates in question. Both the investigator and the police officer testified that Carufel‘s residence was within one block of Gabrych Park. The investigator drew a large diagram of the area surrounding Carufel‘s residence, which depicted a residential area divided into rectangular blocks bounded on all four sides by city streets. The diagram was admitted into evidence for illustrative purposes.
The superintendent of parks and forestry for the City of Winona testified that the city has designated Gabrych Park as a public park, and that the park is bounded on the north side by 6th Street, on the west side by Steuben Street, on the south side by 7th Street, and on the east side by Buchanan Street. Carufel‘s residence is located near the northeast corner of 6th Street and Adams Street, on the block immediately east of Gabrych Park. Carufel‘s block is bounded on the north side by 6th Street, on the west side by Buchanan Street, on the south side by 7th Street, and on the east side by Adams Street. The superintendent concluded that Carufel‘s residence is 330 feet from Gabrych Park and within one city block of the boundary of the park. On cross-examination, he agreed that “[t]o get from Gabrych Park to 307, you would go one block and turn right and go two houses.”
After the close of the State‘s case, Carufel moved to dismiss the second-degree controlled substance charges arguing that the State failed to prove that the sales had
During the jury deliberations, the jurors sent the court a note asking, “What is the legal definition of ‘one city block?‘” After consulting with the parties, the court informed the jury that Minnesota law contains no definition of “one city block” and that it was a question of fact for the jury to decide. The jury found Carufel guilty on all six counts. The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 48 months, 54 months, and 54 months on the second-degree controlled substance convictions. Pursuant to
The court of appeals affirmed the district court‘s decision to join the cases for trial, reversed Carufel‘s second-degree controlled substance convictions on the ground that the controlled buys did not occur within a park zone, and remanded for adjudication and sentencing on the third-degree controlled substance offenses. State v. Carufel, No. A07-1711, 2008 WL 5396714, at *4-*5 (Minn.App. Dec.30, 2008). We granted review solely on the issue of whether the controlled buys occurred within a park zone.
I.
The State claims the court of appeals misconstrued
Statutory construction presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Al-Naseer, 734 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn.2007); State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Minn.2003). The goal of all statutory construction is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Minnesota Statutes chapter 152 sets forth, among other things, different degrees of offenses for the sale of controlled
In 1989, the legislature added “school zone” and “park zone” to chapter 152 of the criminal code, Act of June 1, 1989, ch. 290, art. 3, §§ 4-5, 1989 Minn. Laws 1595, 1595-96 (codified at
At issue is whether the controlled buys took place in a “park zone” within the meaning of
“Park zone” means an area designated as a public park by the federal government, the state, a local unit of government, a park district board, or a park and recreation board in a city of the first class. “Park zone” includes the area within 300 feet or one city block, whichever distance is greater, of the park boundary.
It is undisputed that Gabrych Park is designated as a public park, and therefore qualifies as a “park zone” under subdivision 12a. Further, the parties agree that Carufel‘s residence is more than 300 feet from the boundary of Gabrych Park. Thus, the question is whether Carufel‘s residence is within a “park zone” on the alternative ground that it is located in “the area within... one city block” of the boundary of Gabrych Park.
Initially, Carufel asserts that the term “one city block” is ambiguous because it is not defined in the statute. To support his assertion, Carufel relies on State v. Estrella, 700 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Minn.App.2005). In Estrella, the court of appeals rejected a claim that the term “one city block” applied to a parcel of undivided land that was at least 3075 feet by 2050 feet. Id. The court of appeals explained that “where no actual grid system is present, the term ‘one city block’ does not apply” and therefore the within-300-feet provision controls. Id. In dicta, the court of appeals stated that the statute was “ambiguous in its definition of how far from the actual park boundary a ‘park zone’ extends” because
The State contends that when the land adjacent to a park is divided into rectangular blocks, the phrase “the area within... one city block” in subdivision 12a is plain and unambiguous. Citing The American Heritage Dictionary 149 (New College Ed. 1980), the State notes that a “block” is commonly defined as a “rectangular section of a city or town bounded on each side by consecutive streets.” See also Black‘s Law Dictionary 194 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “block” to include “[a] municipal area enclosed by streets“). Carufel urges us to interpret the “one city block” language of subdivision 12a to mean “the section of 6th Street [that is] between Buchanan and Adams streets.” According to Carufel, the statement “I‘m one block from the park” means the length of one side of a block. Carufel argues that the “whichever distance is greater” language of
Subdivision 12a sets forth two methods for determining the area of a “park zone” in a particular case, and provides that the method using the greater distance from the park boundary to calculate the area shall be applicable. First, the “park zone” includes the area within 300 feet of the park boundary. Based upon this method, the park zone includes a perimeter area bounded by sides extending 300 feet from the park boundaries in all directions. Second, the “park zone” includes the area within one city block of the park boundary. Pursuant to the second method, the park zone includes the area bounded by the consecutive streets surrounding the city blocks directly adjacent to the public park.2 This is consistent with the commonly understood definition of block as a rectangular section of a city or town bounded on each side by consecutive streets.3
We reject Carufel‘s argument that a park zone is limited to the side of the block directly across the street from a park, and the two sides of the block that run perpendicular to a park. The flaw in Carufel‘s park zone argument is that Carufel ignores the “area within” language of
We observe that subdivision 12a does not explicitly limit or modify the phrase “the area within... one city block of the park boundary” in any way. Had the legislature intended to limit the meaning of “the area within... one city block of the park boundary” to mean something less than all the land within a block directly adjacent to the park, the legislature could have done so with words like “block front,” “block face,” or “block portion.” But the legislature did not do so, and the court cannot add words to a statute not supplied by the legislature.
We conclude that when the land surrounding a public park is an area divided into rectangular blocks bounded by city streets on all four sides, the phrase “the area within... one city block... of the park boundary” in
Carufel‘s house is located on the western side of Adams Street, the side of the street closest to Gabrych Park. Although Carufel‘s house faces Adams Street, it is located within the block directly adjacent to Gabrych Park. Consequently, we conclude that Carufel‘s house is located within a
II.
Carufel argues that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to support his second-degree controlled substance convictions because during cross-examination the park superintendent confirmed that “[t]o get from Gabrych Park to 307, you would go one block and turn right and go two houses.”
“Where there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our review on appeal is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.1989). “The weight and credibility of the testimony of individual witnesses is for the jury to determine.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn.1989).
Two police officers testified that Carufel‘s residence was within “one city block” of Gabrych Park. The investigator also drew a large diagram of the area surrounding Carufel‘s residence, reflecting a residential area divided into rectangular blocks bounded on all four sides by city streets around the location of Gabrych Park. The diagram was admitted into evidence for illustrative purposes. Additionally, the park superintendent testified that Carufel‘s residence was within one block of Gabrych Park. We conclude that viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, this testimony was sufficient to prove that Carufel‘s residence was within the park zone surrounding Gabrych Park.
The court of appeals incorrectly focused on the park superintendent‘s cross-examination to determine the drug sales did not occur within “one city block” of Gabrych Park. In doing so, the court of appeals stated that “one city block” was not—“one city block plus a right turn and two houses or one city block plus a left turn and three houses.” Carufel, 2008 WL 5396714, at *3. But when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, the jury could reasonably construe the park superintendent‘s cross-examination testimony as meaning “you would go one block and turn right [on the same block] and go two houses,” which was still in the “park zone” because it was inside the “area within... one city block” of the park boundary. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Carufel‘s second-degree controlled substance convictions.
Reversed.
PAGE, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the result only.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice (concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the majority but disagree with how the majority interprets and applies
I reach this result because the key concept in the statute is one of distance, not area. While the statute does include the concept of area, it is from a linear measurement of distance—“one city block“—that the area included in a park zone is
The majority would have us divide the land surrounding a public park into rectangular blocks bounded by city streets on all four sides and concludes that the “park zone includes the entire area of a block that is directly adjacent to the park.” By adopting this definition of “city block” the majority conflates the different means by which distance and area are measured1 and as a result unduly complicates the straightforward concept of distance as articulated in the statute. Distance is a linear measurement—the extent of the space between two objects or points—and is typically expressed in terms such as: 10 feet wide; 5 feet, 10 inches tall; 100 yards long; or “300 feet.” Area is a different type of measurement. It is a measure of the surface area of something and this measurement of area is expressed in terms distinctly different from those used for distance, i.e. square foot, square yard, square kilometer, square mile, or square block. Because distance and area are two distinct concepts of measurement, they should not be conflated. While measurements of distance can be used to determine area, distance should not be equated or confused with a measurement of area. It is at this point that the majority and I part company.
While the term “city block,” as indicated above, can be used to determine an area such as a square block—or as the majority states, “a rectangular section of a city or town bounded on each side by consecutive streets“—the term “city block” is not used in the statute to mean area. In contrast to the majority, I conclude that the legislature intended the term “city block” to mean a measure of distance that equals a linear segment of a street bounded by consecutive cross streets. Supporting my conclusion is the observation that if the legislature wanted the statute to define area as being bounded on each side by consecutive cross streets, it could have used terms such as the area enclosed within the boundary of adjacent streets, city streets, or even a square block or rectangular block. But the legislature did not do so; rather, it gave us a measurement of distance which we are to use to determine the area in a park zone.
It is a general rule of land title descriptions and boundaries that a municipality takes only an easement in a public right of way and that a conveyance carries title to the center of the right of way subject to the public easement. While this is a rule of construction that may be rebutted by an express provision showing the right of way was not intended to be conveyed, I conclude that it is appropriate to apply this general rule when interpreting the meaning of
Whether acquired by deed, dedication, condemnation, or prescription, the general rule is that in acquiring public rights of way, a municipality takes an easement only.... It is the general rule to construe such conveyances to carry the title to the center of the right of way, subject to the public easement, provided the grantor at the time owned to the center, and no words of specific description show a contrary intent.
Our case law likewise recognizes that “any abutting landowner owns to the middle of the platted street or alley and that the soil and its appurtenances, within the limits of such street or alley, belong to the owner in fee, subject only to the right of the public to use or remove the same for the purpose of improvement.” Kochevar v. City of Gilbert, 273 Minn. 274, 276, 141 N.W.2d 24, 26 (1966); see also Harrington v. Saint Paul & Sioux City R.R. Co., 17 Minn. 215 (1871) (“We see no reason why the trustee‘s deed to plaintiff did not pass to her the legal title to the fee of the land to the center of the street adjoining her lots, as in the ordinary case of conveyance of lands adjoining a highway.“).
The definition I propose provides a precise, unambiguous answer to the question of what is meant by the linear measurement of a “city block” in the statute. Moreover, this definition eliminates the possibility of any gaps within the area comprising the park zone and provides a context to answer questions we may face when applying the statute in the future. The attached diagram illustrates the precision that follows from the use of the term “city block” as I have defined it.
While my interpretation and application of
I find the majority‘s statement that a park zone “includes the entire area of a block that is directly adjacent to the park” to be confusing because it unnecessarily brings into the equation an entirely different unit of measurement, “the entire area of a block.” Moreover, the majority potentially answers or presumes to answer a broader question than we are asked to address today. Under the majority‘s holding, the total area within the square blocks that lie to the northwest, northeast, southeast, and southwest of Gabrych Park are “directly adjacent” to the Park and therefore under its definition must be included within the park zone. Whether all or part of those square blocks are in the park zone is not a question before us. Here, I take issue with the majority‘s characterization of the concurrence as being an advisory opinion because it answers more than the question before us. The concurrence does
While I agree with Carufel that the words “one city block” as used in
Even though Carufel‘s house faces Adams Street, it is within a park zone because it is located within the area ascertained by measuring the length of one city block outward from the boundary of Gabrych Park. (See attached diagram). Houses and other points on the western side of Adams Street are within one city block of the edge of the park and are therefore within the park zone; but houses across the street on the eastern side of Adams Street lie beyond the park zone because they are not within one city block of the park. Under my interpretation, Carufel‘s second-degree controlled substance convictions are sustained because his house lies within the area created by measuring the distance of one city block from the park boundary.
Finally, if one were to conclude that
To conclude, I would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Carufel‘s second-degree controlled substance convictions. But, I would do so under an interpretation of the statute that holds one city block as used in the statute is a linear measure of distance and that this distance is equal to a segment of a street bounded by consecutive cross streets, a segment which begins and ends at the middle point of each cross street.