The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CARTHON, Appellant.
No. 2011-CA-21
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Greene County.
Decided Jan. 20, 2012.
197 Ohio App.3d 677, 2012-Ohio-196
{¶ 37} Accordingly, I dissent and would overrule both assignments of error, affirming the trial court‘s judgment in its entirety.
Ronald Lewis, Xenia Law Director, for appellee.
McCulloch, Felger, Fite & Gutmann Co., L.P.A., and Frank J. Patrizio, for appellant.
{¶ 1} Timothy Carthon appeals from his conviction and sentence on misdemeanor charges of menacing and disorderly conduct.
{¶ 2} Carthon advances two assignments of error on appeal. First, he claims that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to seek dismissal of the menacing charge on statutory speedy-trial grounds. Second, he contends that the trial court violated
{¶ 3} Both of Carthon‘s convictions stemmed from a dispute he had with Central State University police officers in the early morning hours of October 18,
{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, Carthon alleges that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to seek dismissal of the menacing charge on speedy-trial grounds. Although Carthon waived speedy-trial time on the disorderly-conduct charge, he argues that this waiver did not apply to the menacing charge, which was added later. In response, the state asserts only that the time waiver applicable to the disorderly-conduct charge applied equally to the menacing charge.
{¶ 5} Upon review, we find Carthon‘s argument to be persuasive. The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “[w]hen an accused waives the right to a speedy trial as to an initial charge, this waiver is not applicable to additional charges arising from the same set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the execution of the waiver.” State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 538 N.E.2d 1025 (1989), syllabus. In the present case, the disorderly-conduct and menacing charges arose from the same dispute between Carthon and Central State University police officers. Therefore, Carthon‘s speedy-trial waiver on the disorderly-conduct charge did not apply to the menacing charge, which was filed after the waiver.
{¶ 6} The Ohio Supreme Court also has made clear that “‘[w]hen new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charge and the state knew of such facts at the time of the initial indictment, the time within which trial is to begin on the additional charge is subject to the same statutory limitations period that is applied to the original charge.‘” Id. at 68, quoting State v. Clay, 9 Ohio App.3d 216, 218, 459 N.E.2d 609 (1983). Here the
{¶ 7} In his second assignment of error, Carthon contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of fourth-degree-misdemeanor disorderly conduct. He argues that neither the complaint nor the guilty verdict stated the degree of his offense or included an additional element elevating it from a minor misdemeanor to a fourth-degree misdemeanor, as required by
{¶ 8}
(A) When the presence of one or more additional elements makes an offense one of more serious degree:
(1) The affidavit, complaint, indictment, or information either shall state the degree of the offense which the accused is alleged to have committed, or shall allege such additional element or elements. Otherwise such affidavit, complaint, indictment, or information is effective to charge only the least degree of the offense.
(2) A guilty verdict shall state either the degree of the offense of which the offender is found guilty, or that such additional element or elements are present. Otherwise, a guilty verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least degree of the offense charged.
{¶ 9} Here, neither the complaint nor the verdict form stated the degree of Carthon‘s disorderly-conduct offense or included an additional element elevating the offense from a minor misdemeanor to a fourth-degree misdemeanor.3 In
{¶ 10} The state‘s argument that the trial court instructed the jury on fourth-degree-misdemeanor disorderly conduct is correct but unavailing. The trial court instructed the jury that the state was required to prove that Carthon persisted in disorderly conduct after a reasonable warning to desist. Undoubtedly, the jury had to conclude that this element was proven before it could return a guilty verdict. In Pelfrey, however, the majority expressly rejected the notion that noncompliance with
{¶ 11} The Pelfrey analysis fails to recognize that the defendant can waive most purported defects in the charging instrument or in the verdict form. Here, the original charging instrument does not specify that disorderly conduct was charged as a fourth-degree misdemeanor. Nor does it contain language that the defendant persisted after warning. Nevertheless, the waiver of time the defendant signed classifies the offense as an “M-4.” Moreover, the defendant filed a jury demand and had a jury trial on the disorderly-conduct offense. He was not entitled to a jury trial if the offense was only a minor misdemeanor. Furthermore, as previously stated, the jury was instructed that part of the offense was that the defendant persisted after reasonable warning. The jury was instructed that it must return a verdict of not guilty if the prosecution failed to prove every essential element. Finally, before submission of the case, the trial court specifi
{¶ 12} The failure to recognize the proceedings in the previous paragraph as a waiver results in the ironic anomaly that the defendant is better off because of his counsel‘s failure to object. If counsel had raised the inadequacy of either the charging instrument or the verdict form, leave likely would have been granted to amend the complaint, and the verdict form would have been corrected. If the trial court did not permit amendment or correction, then the defendant could have been convicted only of the lesser charge. But, because counsel did not raise the inadequacy of the complaint or the verdict form, Pelfrey dictates that the defendant could be convicted only of a minor misdemeanor even when he undoubtedly knew that he was charged with a fourth-degree misdemeanor, had a jury trial on a fourth-degree misdemeanor, and had a jury determine that he committed each of the elements of a fourth-degree misdemeanor.
{¶ 13} Having sustained both assignments of error, we hereby vacate Carthon‘s menacing conviction and reverse his fourth-degree-misdemeanor, disorderly-conduct conviction, and we remand the cause for the trial court to enter a judgment convicting him of minor-misdemeanor disorderly conduct and sentencing him accordingly.
Judgment reversed in part and vacated in part, and cause remanded.
GRADY, P.J., concurs separately.
FROELICH, J., concurs separately.
GRADY, Presiding Judge, concurring.
{¶ 14} Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees all persons a “remedy by due course of law.” The provision is the equivalent of the due-process requirements of the federal constitution. Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 539, 9 N.E. 672 (1887); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504 (1994). Unlike the due-process clause, however, Section 16, Article I is not an independent source of self-executing provisions. “Rather, it is a statement of fundamental ideals upon which a limited government is created. But it requires other provisions of the Ohio Constitution or legislative definition to give it practical effect.” State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 523, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000).
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16}
FROELICH, Judge, concurring.
{¶ 17} I concur only to emphasize that a defendant cannot be convicted of something he or she is not charged with, regardless of proof at trial. Appellant was charged with only the minor misdemeanor of disorderly conduct, irrespective of what the court, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, or appellant thought the charge was.
{¶ 18} If a request to amend the complaint had been made, the court would then have had to consider, for example, questions related to