93 N.J.L. 268 | N.J. | 1919
The opinion of the court was' delivered by
The plaintiff in error was indicted for the murder of his mistress, one Florence Hicks. He was convicted on the trial of the indictment and the jury
The supplement to the Crimes act pissed in 1916 (Pamph: Ij., p. 576) provides that in the case of the convi el ion of a person for murder in the first degree the jury may “recommend imprisonment at hard labor for life, in which case this and no greater punishment shall be imposed.” In speaking of this statutory provision, in the charge to the jury, the trial court used the following language: “One of the elements to be considered by you in determining the punishment is that if you shall, by your verdict, impose life imprisonment, it can be disregarded and set at naught by the Court of Pardons, as well as by the provision of the statute, to the effect that every convicted prisoner confined in state’s prison for the term of his natural life, whose record of conduct shows that he has observed the rules of the institution, and who lias served not loss than fifteen years, may be released on parole.” The validity of this instruction is challenged by the first assignment of error) for the reason that the only purpose of the trial court, in referring to the fact that Carrigan might lie paroled or pardoned, was to improperly influence (lie jury against a recommendation to life imprisonment-. But, assuming that the instruction had a tendency to influence the jury in deiermining whether or not to recommend life imprisonment, Hie question is whether it was erroneous on that account, and that, we think, has been settled against the contention of the plaintiff in error by the decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals in State v. Rombolo, 89 N. J. L. 565, in which that court, speaking of the supplement of 1916, says:. “Naturally, one of the elements to he considered by them (the jury) in determining the punishment is whether, if they shall by their verdict impose life imprisonment, it can he disregarded and set at naught by the Court of Pardons. We see no reason why they should not be informed” * * * with relation to the power of supervision possessed by the pardoning tribunal.
Conceiving that there is nothing in the Martin case which negatives the right of the jury in determining the question of punishment to consider the evidence which has been adduced at the trial, we see no reason why the trial court may not instruct them that they may supplement their verdict by a recommendation of imprisonment at hard labor for life, if they conclude lhat by reason of the circumstances of the case, or because of any other reason, such action will be justified.
It is further said that the last sentence of the extract from the charge, viz., “the responsibility is, on yon to determine by your verdict whether the facts and circumstances developed in this case are of such a character as to justify you in bringing in such a recommendation,” requires the jury to determine the question of recommendation ved non entirely from the facts and circumstances which were proved in the case, and it is said that this is clearly within the condemnation of
Counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge that: “If the jury findthat there existed in the defendant’s mind an irresistible impulse to take the life of the deceased, and the shooting took place under the influence of such an impulse, the defendant cannot be convicted of murder in the first degree,” and the refusal of this request is also assigned as a ground for reversing this conviction. The fundamental proposition embodied in the request is that an act done under an irresistible impulse cannot, as a matter of law,, be willful, deliberate and premeditated within the meaning of our statute defining murder in the first degree. The proposition is untenable. Conceding for the moment that the law recognizes the existence of an impulse which is irresistible as an element to be considered in determining the grade of a criminal homicide, the question in every case where that element exists is whether the act was willful, deliberate and premeditated, notwithstanding that its perpetration was the result of such impulse; and that question is clearly one of fact, to be settled by the jury, for it involves the mental operations of the defendant, and they are not to be resolved by the arbitrary application of legal rules but by a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case which throw light thereon.
We think also that the request was properly refused upon a broader ground. We consider to be unsound the suggestion that the law recognizes a form of insanity In which the faculties are so affected that the person suffering from it, although he perceives and appreciates the moral qualit}'' of his acts, is unable to control them and is urged by some mysterious pressure, which he cannot resist, to their commission. It may* be that such a mental condition is recognized by medical or scien
Only those reasons for reversing the conviction which have been discussed by us were argued by counsel for the defendant. Finding no legal merit in them, we conclude that there must be an affirmance.