State v. CarrState v. Carr
Lead Opinion
Defendant, John Carr, was charged by bill of information with one count of third offense driving while intoxicated, a violation of
FACTS
The facts surrounding defendant’s arrest were revealed at a motion for preliminary examination and bond reduction hearing. Zachary Police Department Officer John Steele testified that he encountered defendant at approximately 6:30 a.m. on April 3, 1998. Officer Steele had been dispatched to investigate a reрort of a
\,MOTION TO QUASH
In its sole assignment of error, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to quash for failure to state a chargeable offense. The State argues that a bicycle is an “other means of conveyance” within the meaning of La .R.S. 14:98(A).
A. (1) The crime of operating a vеhicle while intoxicated is the operating of any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, vessel, or other means of conveyance when:
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The term “other means of conveyance” is defined neither in La.R .S. 14:98, nor in the definitional section of the criminal code. See
It is well established that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. Courts are not empowered to extend by аnalogy the terms of a criminal provision to cover conduct not included within the definition of a crime. Any doubt as to the extent of the coverage of a criminal statute must be decided in favor of the accused and against the State. See State v. Smith, 97-0782, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/20/98);
However,
The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.
The trial court expressed concern that the State’s argument, that a bicycle is an “other means of conveyance” within the meaning of
The trial court’s concerns stemmed from the fact that
The trial court’s concerns regarding fair warning also failed to provide a basis for excluding bicycles from the scope of
Defendant аrgues that if the legislature intended “other means of conveyance” to include a non-motor powered vehicle such as a bicycle, it would not have listed “motor vehicle” in
When the legislature chose to expand the scope of the article in 1942, it did so by adding to the existing class “motor vehicle,” which had been in the artiсle since its inception in 1922, rather than by redrafting the entire vehicle scope clause anew. See 1922 La .Acts No. 132, § 1 & 1924 La.Acts No. 78, § 1 (“any form of motor vehicle, whatsoever”); 1936 La.Acts No. 188 (“motor vehicle of any nature whatsoever”); 1938 La.Acts No. 320, § 1 (“motor vehicle, of any nature whatsoever!)]”) A genuine construction of the added language, taken in context, reveals that the legislаture’s intent was to expand
Further, bicycle driving while intoxicated had been specifically criminalized prior to 1942. The 1942 version of
In regard to the trial court’s concerns over whether or not the public would be aware that a criminal penalty attached to operating a bicycle while intoxicated, even if the operation wаs in one’s own back yard, we note that the instant offense did not occur in defendant’s back yard, but rather on Highway 64. The issue of whether or not
The State argued before the trial court that the legislature must have had a reason to add the phrase “or other means of conveyance!,]” to the classes of vehicles listed in the DWI statute. However, the trial court rejected the argument, reasoning the DWI statute also listed particular classes of vehicles before stating “or other means of conveyance!,]” and |7that as a matter of statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words must be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. See State v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
Ejusdem generis, the rule of statutory construction relied upon by the trial court, did not provide a basis for excluding bicycles from the scope of
By the rule of construction known as ‘ejusdem generis,’ where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons оr things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. The particular words are presumed to describe certain species and the general words to be used for the purpose of including other species of the same genus. The rule is based on the obvious reason that, if the Legislature had intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, they wоuld have made no mention of the particular classes. The words ‘other’ or ‘any other’ following an enumeration of particular classes are therefore to read as ‘other such like,’ and to include only others of like character. The doctrine of ejusdem generis, however, is only a rule of construction to be applied as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, and does not control where it clearly appears from the statute as a whole that no such limitation was intended. Nor does the doctrine apply where the specific words of a statute signify subjects greatly different from one another, nor where the specific words embrace all objects of their class, so that the general words must bear a different meaning frоm the specific words, or be meaningless.
Pabst Brewing Co.,
The trial court’s application of ejusdem generis to
The trial court also relied upon State v. Guidry,
In Guidry,
Williams reached its conclusion citing State v. Hightower,
Williams also relied upon the history of
The State argues on appeal, that the legislаture’s intent to include non-motor
This Subsection shall be cited as the “Child Endangerment Law”. When the state proves in addition to the elements of the crime as set forth in Subsection A of this Section that a minor child twelve years of age or younger was a passenger in the motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, vessel, or other means of conveyance at the time of the commission of the offense, of the sentence imposed by the сourt, the execution of the minimum mandatory sentence provided by Subsection B, C, or D of this Section, as appropriate, shall not be suspended. For the fourth conviction, at least two years of the sentence shall be imposed without benefit of suspension of sentence.
The State’s argument is convincing. As
For the foregoing reasons, the State’s assignment of error has merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s granting of defendants motion to quash is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WEIMER, J., concurs with reasons.
Notes
. Webster's II New College Dictionary 715 (1995) defines a "motor vehicle” as "[a] self-propellеd wheeled conveyance not running on rails.”
. See footnote 4, infra.
. Williams erred in staling that the “other means of conveyance” language was first utilized in 1956. See Williams,
. “It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in а subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.” Cohens v. Virginia,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I agree with the rationale of the majority and concur to add the following.
Those operating bicycles on the roadway while intoxicated can pose a serious danger to themselves and others. This is the precise behavior
Persuasive to a finding that a bicycle is an “other means of conveyance” is the title of
1.any dеvice or contrivance for carrying or conveying persons or objects, including land conveyances, vessels, aircraft, and spacecraft: sometimes specif, restricted to land conveyances on wheels, runners, treads, etc.
Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1574 (2nd ed.1984). Based on this definition, it is not necessary for a vehicle to be motorized to nevertheless be considered a vehicle. Although thе body of the statute requires a vehicle to be motorized, it is not necessary for a conveyance to be motorized to fit within the purview of
|2I also note that as a general rule, a bicycle rider is subject to the same traffic laws as a driver of a motor vehicle. See
Lastly, I agree with the dissent of Judge Domegeaux in State v. Guidry,
. One cannot help but note the irony in the fact that a Mr. Carr chose a bicycle as his means of conveyance.
. I note the defendant indicated to the arresting officer that he was proceeding to work to operate a forklift.
.It is the words of the statute, as opposed to the words of the title, which must be evaluated. However, the words of the title can aid in determining the meaning and scope of the statute. See State v. Madere,