177 N.E.2d 799 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1960
The defendant, appellant herein, Charles Carney, appeals from his conviction of violating Section
The first assignment of error is that the affidavit and warrant are inconsistent with each other. The warrant, which appears on the back of the affidavit, described the charge as "laboring on Sunday." Upon application of the prosecutor, leave was granted to amend the warrant to conform to the affidavit. Such leave was appropriately granted, and the defendant has failed to show that he was in any way prejudiced in this connection.
The former Section
Also, former Section
Present Section
The report of the Criminal Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association contains this comment upon Section
"This proposal should solve the main portion of the problem raised in present [Section]
The first assignment of error is not well made.
The second assignment of error is that the affidavit fails to charge an offense. The first ground of this assignment is that the affidavit fails to charge knowledge or intent.
Section
The law is well settled that where the basic statute is silent on the question of intent, averments of guilty knowledge, criminal intent, or scienter are not necessary. See State v.Huffman,
A second basis for the second assignment of error is the argument that it is necessary to a complete statement of such a charge that the exceptions contained in the statute should be negatived. Counsel argue that this is always necessary in charging an offense which is malum prohibitum rather than malum in se. We are not aware of such a rule. It is our understanding that the determinative question is whether the negative averments are a necessary part of the description of the offense. It is so stated, in the process of considering a different statute, in the case of Hirn v. State,
The exceptions in our present statute are not a part of the description of the offense; they constitute affirmative defenses which a defendant is required to establish by the greater weight of the evidence. State v. Haase,
The second assignment of error is not well founded.
The third assignment of error is that the wrong person was charged. The contention is that the business was owned by a corporation and that therefore an individual ought not to be charged.
We find this argument untenable. Criminal liability is personal.
The statute creating these offenses forbids their commission by a "person, firm, or corporation." If a corporation offends, it is necessary that it do so through the action of an individual; if an individual offends, either on his own account or on behalf of a corporation, either he or both are criminally responsible. One may be the principal offender while the other aids, abets or procures the commission of the offense. Section
For his fourth and last assignment of error appellant asserts that the statute is unconstitutional. His forceful arguments on this point have been effectively presented. We recognize that the subject is controversial and that those seeking enforcement may be moved by a variety of motives.
If the question were one of first impression, we would be prompted to serious discussion of some of the arguments advanced. But the Supreme Court has determined that these questions are proper matters for the consideration of the Legislature and not the courts. In the case of State v. Kidd,
Since that decision was rendered, the statute has been amended by adding to the list of permissible activities and by broadening them to include the providing of services and commodities incident to the activities exempted. Careful examination of the language of the Supreme Court in the Kiddcase *284 convinces us that the decision is equally applicable to the statute in its present form. Bound as we are to follow the law as declared by the Supreme Court, we find that the fourth assignment of error is not well made.
The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
WISEMAN, P. J., and KERNS, J., concur.