State v. CarltonState v. Carlton
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- Biles
Frederick W. Carlton seeks review of a divided Court of Appeals decision. The panel reversed the district court’s order suppressing drug evidence obtained during a vehicle search conducted incident to Carlton’s arrest following a traffic stop. The panel majority acknowledged the vehicle search was later invalidated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009), but held that the drug evidence should not be suppressed because at the time Carlton’s vehicle was searched, existing caselaw and
Factual and Procedural Background
On June 18, 2008, a police officer observed Carlton driving a pickup truck with expired tags. The officer stopped the vehicle and learned Carlton’s driving privileges were revoked. The officer arrested Carlton on that basis. Once Carlton was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car, the officer searched Carlton’s truck incident to the arrest and discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.
Carlton filed a motion to suppress, arguing the evidence found after the traffic stop was obtained from an illegal search. The district court denied the motion. But a little more than 2 months later, the United States Supreme Court decided Gant, which prohibited police from conducting warrantless vehicle searches incident to an occupant’s arrest unless “the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” 556 U.S. at 351. Following this decision, Carlton filed a second motion to suppress based on Gant.
The district court initially upheld its decision denying suppression based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule but reversed itself once Carlton sought reconsideration before trial. The State filed an interlocutory appeal on the district court’s final decision to suppress tire drug evidence. A divided Court of Appeals panel reversed the district court’s suppression ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Carlton, 2010 WL 2817048, at *2-3.
The panel members unanimously agreed the search was unconstitutional under Gant and State v. Henning, 289 Kan. 136, Syl. ¶ 6, 209 P.3d 711 (2009), which declared
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Henry Green argued the evidence should be suppressed. First, he noted that both Gant and Henning invoked the suppression remedy, so he believed Carlton also should be given that remedy based on the retroactivity rules set forth in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 325, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987). Second, he contended the caselaw regarding the validity of a vehicle search incident to arrest was not well settled. And third, he argued our decision in Henning declaring
Carlton petitioned this court for review, raising three challenges to the panel majority’s decision: (1) retroactivity rules required applying both the rule and the suppression remedy from Gant; (2) the panel majority’s reliance on Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987), was misplaced because that case dealt with administrative searches, not criminal searches; and (3) the panel majority should have applied the former version of
We granted review of Carlton’s petition in conjunction with two other Court of Appeals decisions considering the same issue but reaching differing outcomes and rationales: State v. Dennis, No. 101,052, 2011 WL 425987 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished decision) (denying application of good-faith exception), rev. granted May 31, 2011; State v. Karson, 44 Kan. App. 2d 306, 314, 235 P.3d 1260 (2010) (applying good-faith exception), rev. granted May 31, 2011. Our jurisdiction arises under
The Good-faith Exception Applies
Carlton seeks to suppress the evidence discovered during the search incident to his arrest under
Standard of Review
Our review of an evidence suppression issue is bifurcated. Without reweighing the evidence, the appellate court first examines the district court’s findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Sanchez-Loredo, 294 Kan. 50, 54, 272 P.3d 34 (2012). The district court’s legal conclusions are then reviewed de novo. If there are no disputed material facts, tire issue is a question of law over which the appellate court has unlimited review. 294 Kan. at 54. In Carlton’s case, the facts material to the legal issues on review are not in dispute. The only remaining inquiry is whether the appropriate remedy is to suppress the evidence seized. This is a question of law.
Discussion
Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable and invalid unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. One such exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See 294 Kan. at 55 (citing State v. Fitzgerald, 286 Kan. 1124, 1127, 192 P.3d 171 [2008]). In this case, the officer searched Carlton’s vehicle incident to his arrest pursuant to
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule, which was created by tire United States Supreme Court to deter police misconduct. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 251-52, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011). Kansas similarly recognizes the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings is an appropriate remedy for an unlawful search. See Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496. But neither the Fourth Amendment nor § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 Kan. at 496. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter violations by the State. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496. Accordingly, exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492.
In Daniel, this court considered whether to apply a good-faith exception for searches governed by
Carlton first argues that Gant and Henning require suppression based on the doctrine of retroactivity, citing United States v. Gonzales, 578 F.3d 1130 ( 9th Cir. 2009). But this argument is directly contrary to Davis, in which the United States Supreme Court made clear the good-faith exception is applicable to searches conducted incident to arrest, even if they were subsequently rendered illegal based on Gant. The Court reasoned that Gant impacted tire validity of the search but did not extend to the judicially created remedy of excluding invalidly obtained evidence. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-27. For purposes of the exclusionaiy rule remedy, the Court said it was necessary to look instead to binding federal court precedent in the jurisdiction in which the search occurred to determine whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied for Fourth Amendment purposes. 131 S. Ct. at 2428-30. Davis renders Carlton’s first argument meritless.
Next, Carlton argues the panel majority’s reliance on Krull is misplaced. But this argument was expressly rejected by this court in Daniel in which this court similarly relied on Krull as authority for applying the good-faith exception when the officer objectively relied on the subsequently invalidated
For similar reasons, Carlton’s claim that Henning revived the former version of
The panel majority correctly held that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to rely on
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded.