The defendant was convicted of concealing stolen property. His sole basis for appeal is that he not only concealed the property, he initially stole the same property. Therefore, he contends, being the original thief, he cannot be found guilty of concealing the same property.
The defendant and one other were indicted for re *297 ceiving and concealing eight parking meters. The defendant Carlton was tried by the court sitting without a jury. The trial court found Carlton guilty of concealing stolen property.
The state’s evidence was that Carlton and three others unscrewed or unbolted eight parking meters from various locations in Eugene. They put the meters in a ear, drove over the Willamette river to a deserted area and concealed the meters under some trees and stumps. The defense called only one witness. This witness was an accomplice of Carlton and testified Carlton stole as well as concealed the meters.
The keystone of the defense’s contention is the proposition that a thief cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property when the property received is the selfsame property which he stole. The state concedes this proposition. It is without contradiction. 2 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson), §576. This proposition is based upon the logical reason that one cannot receive something from one’s self. Here, however, the court convicted Carlton of concealing stolen property. The court stated it was not necessary to decide whether or not the defendant was also guilty of receiving stolen property.
Once this distinction is comprehended, that defendant was convicted of concealing, not receiving, stolen property, it is apparent that the logical barrier, one cannot receive from one’s self, has no materiality. This then becomes a commonplace situation. The defendant engaged in a criminal transaction, or course of conduct. He stole meters; he carried them off; and he concealed them. The state selected one part of this transaction which constituted the crime of concealing stolen property and the defendant was convicted of such crime. The defendant is contending that *298 lie cannot be convicted of concealing the stolen property because the state could have convicted him of a different crime involving the first part of the transaction, i.e., stealing or larceny. The fact that one transaction embodies facts constituting two crimes and the state chooses to prosecute for one rather than the other cannot avail defendant, unless the existence of one crime precludes the other. Proving larceny precludes establishment of receiving, but not concealing.
There are a considerable number of decisions in this general field. They involve, however, the question of whether or not a defendant can be convicted of two different crimes committed in the same transaction; not can a defendant be convicted of any one particular crime of several committed in the transaction. In these cases of conviction of two crimes, the question of double jeopardy arises and the doctrine of “carving” is examined. For example, in
State v. Nodine, 121
Or 567,
In
State v. Pomeroy,
“* * * He [defendant] may have been guilty at the same time of aiding in the escape of John Pomeroy and John Holcomb, thus rendering himself amenable as an accessory to the crime of larceny, but if he has done those things which are essential to the crime charged, there seems to be no good reason why one should bar a prosecution for the other. The doctrine of carving can have no application here, as that can only be made available under a plea of former conviction or acquittal * *
Defendant relied primarily upon the decisions of
Milanovich v. United States,
The judgment is affirmed.