{¶ 2} In the early hours of February 20, 2004, Miami University Police Officer Sharon Crouthers was traveling eastbound on Spring Street on the campus of Miami University while appellant was traveling westbound on Spring Street. Appellant went left of center, causing the officer to swerve to avoid being hit. The officer pulled appellant over. After failing field sobriety tests and exhibiting intoxication symptoms, appellant was arrested. He was charged with two counts of DUI in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} Appellant moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the officer did not have territorial jurisdiction to stop and arrest him on Spring Street because while Spring Street transverses the university campus, it is owned by the city of Oxford and not by Miami University. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court overruled appellant's motion to dismiss. Appellant subsequently pled no contest and was found guilty as charged and sentenced accordingly. This appeal follows.
{¶ 4} In a single assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. Appellant argues that (1) because Spring Street is a street owned by the city of Oxford and not by Miami University, it is therefore not "within the limits of the university" for purposes of R.C.
{¶ 5} Appellant first argues that the officer did not have statutory territorial jurisdiction to arrest him because Spring Street, a street owned by the city of Oxford and not by Miami University, is not "within the limits of the university" for purposes of R.C.
{¶ 6} Miami University is a public university authorized to appoint university law enforcement officers under R.C.
{¶ 7} R.C.
{¶ 8} R.C.
{¶ 9} R.C. Chapter 2935 does not define the phrase "within the limits" of a university. Appellant claims that the "limits of the university" are solely limited to the grounds, buildings, equipment, and facilities which the university board of trustees is authorized to regulate and control under R.C.
{¶ 10} Because the phrase "within the limits of the university" is not defined in the statute, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp. v. Twin ValleyLocal School Dist. Bd. Of Edn. (1983),
{¶ 11} Giving the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning and in light of the foregoing definitions, we find that "within the limits of the university" refers to the geographical territory of the university, that is, everything within the boundaries of the university, including roads and streets that transverse the university campus. See Free Ent. CanoeRenters Assoc. of Missouri v. Watt (C.A.8, 1983),
{¶ 12} Because Officer Crouthers stopped and arrested appellant on Spring Street on the campus of Miami University, therefore within the limits of the university pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 13} Next, appellant argues that the officer arrested him in violation of a Law Enforcement Assistance Agreement (the "Agreement") entered between the city of Oxford and Miami University. In denying appellant's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that Officer Crouthers had authority under the Agreement (and a memorandum of understanding) to stop appellant.
{¶ 14} The Agreement was entered between the city and the university in 1996. Then, in 1998, in accordance with the Agreement, the city and the university entered into a written memorandum of understanding (the "Memorandum") setting forth general operating provisions.
{¶ 15} Paragraph 1 of the Agreement provides that "the parties' police department will assist each other in law enforcement activities, following the procedures set forth in this Agreement and in any Memorandum of Understanding[.] Assistance shall be provided in two ways; by response to requests for assistance; and by direct response to incidents involving bodily injuries or substantial property damage." Paragraph 3 of the Agreement, in turn, provides in part that "[i]f any officer of either jurisdiction observes any incident in the other jurisdiction involving bodily injuries or substantial property damage, then such officer shall be authorized to respond to such incident with the full authority of an officer of the other jurisdiction including the authority to make arrests." The Agreement does not define or list incidents involving bodily injuries or substantial property damage.
{¶ 16} Paragraph B of the Memorandum provides that: "[p]otentially life-threatening and/or substantial property damage traffic violations, within the City of Oxford and properties of Miami University, shall be the responsibility of both the Oxford Police and the Miami University Police. An officer witnessing potentially life-threatening or substantial property damage traffic violations outside the officer's jurisdiction is empowered to stop the violator. The witnessing officer will then notify the on-duty supervisor of the responsible department and advise of the nature of the incident, its location and the witnessing officer's unit number."
{¶ 17} Paragraph C of the Memorandum, in turn,2 provides that "[a] University officer witnessing a potentially life-threatening or substantial property damage traffic violation is empowered to stop the violator and take appropriate action if the violations occur on any street defined in Paragraph H." Paragraph C lists DUI offenses in violation of R.C.
{¶ 18} Upon reviewing the Agreement and the Memorandum, we find that they grant a university police officer the authority to stop and arrest a violator whenever the officer witnesses a life-threatening or substantial property damage traffic violation, such as a DUI offense. In the case at bar, because the officer observed a life-threatening or substantial property damage traffic violation, the officer had the authority to stop and arrest appellant after she observed his impaired driving and after he failed the field sobriety tests.
{¶ 19} Finally, appellant argues that the state's interest in making a "full custodial" extraterritorial arrest was "outweighed by the serious intrusion upon the liberty and privacy [arising] out of the arrest." Appellant cites State v. Fitzpatrick,
{¶ 20} In Fitzpatrick, the defendant appealed his DUI conviction on the ground that the officer's extraterritorial stop of his vehicle and the defendant's subsequent arrest violated the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Appellate District agreed, stating: "The facts in the instant case are distinguishable from [State v.Weideman,
{¶ 21} "In the instant case, Officer Snow merely observed [Fitzpatrick]'s vehicle `moving kind of slow.' There is no testimony suggesting that [Fitzpatrick's] manner of driving presented a danger to other motorists. * * * [T]here is no evidence that [Fitzpatrick's] possession of illegal plates, a fourth-degree-misdemeanor violation, presented an imminent safety danger to other motorists. Given the lack of urgency, we see no reason why Officer Snow could not have alerted Toledo police to the general location of [Fitzpatrick's] vehicle and allowed officers with jurisdictional authority to stop [Fitzpatrick].
{¶ 22} "We conclude that the government's interest in making an extraterritorial stop and arrest for a fourth-degree-misdemeanor violation is minimal and outweighed by the serious intrusion upon a person's liberty and privacy that necessarily arises out of a stop and arrest. Therefore, Officer Snow's action in making an extraterritorial stop of [Fitzpatrick's] vehicle violates the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at ¶ 12, 14-15.
{¶ 23} In the case at bar, appellant drove left of center, causing Officer Crouthers to swerve to avoid being hit. Clearly, appellant was an immediate danger to other motorists. See Weideman,
{¶ 24} In light of all of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to dismiss. Appellant's assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
{¶ 25} Judgment affirmed.
{¶ 26} Walsh, P.J., and Bressler, J., concur.