152 Ga. 871 | Ga. | 1922
Lead Opinion
The act of 1918 (Georgia Laws 1918, p. 232), approved July 31, 1918, is in part as follows: “ That when the owner of property has omitted to return the same for taxation at the time and for the years the return should have been made, or, having returned his property or part of the
It follows that we concur in the judgment' affirming the judgment of the lower court, sustaining the demurrer of the defendants to the supplementary petition in this case. We do so because the complainants have an adequate, full, and complete remedy at law. The arbitration proceedings were null and void under the act of August 17, 1918 (Georgia Laws 1918, p. 234 et seq). Under this act there is now no provision of law for arbitrating an assessment made by a receiver of property of a delinquent taxpayer, claimed by the latter to be excessive. In the case of such delinquent taxpayer any objection to the assessments by the receiver, on the ground that they are excessive, must be 'raised by petition in equity, addressed to the superior 'court of the county where such property is assessed, under section 5 of this act. This being so, the complainants have a full and complete remedy at law. This void award did not stand in the way. The tax-collector can issue his executions based upon the assessments' made by the receiver, and proceed to collect the taxes thereunder. If the executor of the delinquent taxpayer is dissatisfied with these assessments, on the ground that they are excessive, he has his remedy under this act. We concur in the judgment of affirmance, solely on the ground that the award was void, and equity will hot undertake to set aside a void proceeding which does not stand in the way of the enforcement of the payment of taxes, based upon these assessments by executions, levies, and sales.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment of affirmance in this case; though I doubt whether the provision in the act of 1918, declaring when the alleged delinquent taxpayer may resort to equity, is applicable under the facts of the record. The petition in the present case is supplementary to the former original petition in
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. Construing tbn petition most strongly against the pleader, the sole ground of attack upon the award was that the valuation placed upon the property was so grossly inadequate as to show fraud upon the part of the arbitrators. The assignments of error in the bill of exceptions are limited to that question. Under the act by virtue of which the arbitration was had, Political Code, § 1116(d), the arbitrators had jurisdiction, and their power was limited to the question of valuation of the property, and their decision was final. Valuation of property was necessarily a matter of opinion. It would require actual fraud or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, to set aside the award. In this view the allegations of the petition were insufficient to show fraud, and the court properly dismissed the petition on demurrer. In view of the record in the trial court and the assignments of error in the bill of exceptions, it is unnecessary to make a ruling as to the applicability or effect of the act of 1918.