*1 JERSEY, STATE NEW OF AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT CROSS-APPELLANT, CALIGUIRI, v. ANTHONY DEFEN- AND DANT-APPELLANT CROSS-RESPONDENT. Argued February April 1999 Decided 1999. *4 Defender, Urban, argued the Deputy Public Cecelia Assistant (Ivelisse Torres, cross-respondent Public appellant for and cause Defender, attorney). General, Danielson, argued the Deputy Attorney K.
Linda (Peter Vemiero, Attor- cross-appellant respondent for cause Jersey, attorney). ney of New General delivered opinion of the Court was GARIBALDI, J. may prosecutor if a appeal, the must determine
In this Court (PTI) to a Pretrial Intervention refuse to admit a defendant marijua possession with of Program solely because he is property. within 1000 feet of school na intent to distribute 2C:35-7, crime is a offense Under N.J.S.A. 3:28, imprisonment. R. carrying mandatory term of Neither New Operation Pretrial Intervention in Guidelines of for 3:28, Rules, Pressler, R. comments on Jersey, Current N.J. Court (“CDRA”) (1999), Drug provide Reform Act Comprehensive or the ineligible categorically should be 2C:35-7 offenders underlying and the policies both the Guidelines for PTI. The however, essentially treating as warrant N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 CDRA presump second-degree offense for which equivalent to a tively Because the this case considered unavailable. application categorically ineligible, we remand the the offender remand, offender must prosecutor for reconsideration. On also “compelling reasons” to obtain admission to PTI. We show part of the Appellate Division’s decision to invalidate affirm Prosecuting Attorney Supplemental Directive Cases General’s Drug (“Attorney Comprehensive Act General’s Under Reform ”), 6, 1997. January issued Directive
I. 1996, defendant, Anthony morning April Early Caliguiri parked in a lot in front of a Krauser’s convenience store River, Jersey. New The lot is located within 1000 feet South approached Caliguiri because his car stereo was a school. Police encounter, police playing loudly. During the course of that too marijuana Caliguiri’s car. officer spotted on the front seat One *5 searched the of ear interior the and uncovered an additional Meanwhile, quantity drug Ziploc bags. of the and a of box questioned Caliguiri, guided another officer who to officers large Ziploc bag marijuana another concealed in the trunk. Caliguiri police headquarters. was taken to questioned, When bag marijuana he admitted that the contained 1.5 ounces of purchased Caliguiri he had also name of volunteered the $150. the seller and location of police the sale. told that he had He himself, marijuana intended to use most of the but that he would given Caliguiri intending have some to his close friends. denied counts, drugs. -grand jury Caliguiri sell the A on indicted three including third-degree possession with the intent to distribute property, within 1000feet of school a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. Caliguiri applied County for admission to the Middlesex Pre- Program. absolutely trial Intervention He had an unblemished record, job, good family support. prosecutor As the ac- knowledged, Caliguiri applicable satisfied all of the criteria of the exception statute and Guidelines with the of the nature of the Nevertheless, application rejected by offense. his was the crimi- manager. In evaluating application, nal division criminal manager division noted that “the seriousness the offense is weighed heavily,” Caliguiri’s and that [was] “offense seri- [sic] pre- ous too be considered for PTI. This offense carries a [sic] decision, sumption of incarceration.” The trial court reversed the subject by County to review the Middlesex Prosecutor’s Office. Caliguiri
The Prosecutor’s Office denied PTI. In a letter dated 10,1996, prosecutor October wrote: making This office was to review the an of his requested application analysis for rehabilitation, to correction and the nature of the offense potential amenability based the information in our involved, file and the upon already present report program____ the PTI In the all course of this and favorable analysis, positive factors have been taken into account. rejecting Caliguiri’s application, relied on a purported legislative drug belief that offenses near a school were “deserving punishment” of enhanced and “too serious for Pre- Trial Intervention.” to PTI over the Caliguiri’s admission court ordered
The trial *6 argued that all relevant objection. prosecutor The prosecutor’s considered, out- mitigating no factors and that had been factors court, by the questioned of the offense. When weighed the nature support to identify any additional factors not prosecutor the did prosecu- that the deny court determined to PTI. The the decision commit- solely because defendant Caliguiri’s application tor denied Legislature designated offense. Because ted a school zone crime, the court held that a 2C:35-7 N.J.S.A. solely nature of the rejection on the could not base his prosecutor rehabilitation, to Caliguiri otherwise amenable Finding offense. rejection represented prosecutor’s that the the court concluded judgment. in clear error presump Division held PTI appealed. Appellate The
The State 2C:35-7. under N.J.S.A. tively unavailable to defendants ”). (1997) However, 9, (“Caliguiri I 920 N.J.Super. 701 A.2d 305 categorically ineligible Caliguiri prosecutor considered because the Caliguiri the a remand to allow the court ordered presumption against admission. opportunity to rebut the 186, certification, 152 petition for N.J. granted the State’s We (1997), summarily remanded the case to the 704 A.2d light of the of Section 8 Appellate Division for reconsideration part, provides, relevant Attorney Directive. Section 8 General’s object” any applications by PTI county prosecutors “shall prosecutor “unless the persons charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 not sustain a proofs available for trial would determines that the Attorney charge.” General’s Directive conviction of that Ibid. ruling appeal any adverse on those required also applications. remand, again ordered reconsidera Appellate Division
On
214,
N.J.Super.
705 A.2d
Caliguiri’s application.
tion
II”).
(1998)
statement
(“Caliguiri
Relying on this Court’s
(1997),
court
We for certification of and the (1998). 155 N.J. State.
II.
A.
discretionary program diverting
Pretrial intervention is
crimi
2C:43-12a(1);
prosecution.
nal defendants from formal
1(a).
3:28, Pressler, supra,
R.
Guidelines
PTI formalized the
employed by prosecutors
discretion often
and law enforcement
Note,
selecting charges against
specific
officials in
offender.
*7
Programs-An
Intervention
Innovative
Criminal Justice-Pretrial
System,
Rutgers
the
28
L.Rev.
Criminal Justice
Reform of
(1975).
1205-06
(1976)
Leonardis,
85, 92-96,
In State v.
71 N.J.
Any charged with defendant statute, Pressler, and the supra, 2. The Guidelines Guidelines manager however, criminal division prosecutor and provide the reviewing application. a PTI apply in specific criteria to Pressler, 2C:43-12e(1)-(17); supra, Includ Guidelines 3. N.J.S.A. offense, the circum the nature of the in those criteria are ed defendant, crime, and age of the the motivation stances of society. 2C:43- victim and needs and interests 12e(1)-(3),(7); 3. Guidelines appropriate prosecutor may, a
This has held that Court circumstances, solely of the nature of reject applicant an because 360, 382, Leonardis, v. 73 N.J. the offense. State ”). (1977)(“Leonardis recognize this limita II The PTI Guidelines If tion. a crime is (2) (1) continuing organized of a criminal business criminal or activity; part part (3) committed with violence or threat violence or or deliberately enterprise; (4) against to a a of the trust where admission another or breach public person; program crime, of defendant’s the defen- would the seriousness depreciate rejected. generally A with a first be defendant dant’s should application drugs dispensing degree II of Schedule I or narcotic or second offense or sale or program. for enrollment in a PTI ... should not be considered ordinarily 3(i)J Guidelines [Pressler, supra, appropriate that it is
Applying language, this we have concluded reject the nature of the offense when application a PTI because of Baynes, supra, presumption against PTI. express the Guidelines 445-47, express the Guidelines 690A.2d 594. Where ineligibility, “compelling must show presumption of defendant *8 Pressler, 3(i); supra, PTI. reasons” to be admitted to Guidelines 252-53, Nwobu, supra, 652A.2d 1209. v. State prosecutor application If refuses an for then Pressler, supra, provided. statement of reasons must be written judi A of reasons fosters effective 8. clear statement Guidelines meaningful opportunity to and the offender a cial review allows 249, Nwobu, rejection. supra, at 652 A .2d challenge the 139 N.J.
37 therefore, rejection, may 1209. The written simply “parrot” not Sutton, languáge 110, of relevant statutes. v. State 80 N.J. (1979). 117, 402 A .2d230
The decision to
prosecution
divert an offender from
analogous
prosecutor’s charging
to the
function and involves the
therefore,
implicit
judicial
judicial
power;
exercise of
review is
Nwobu,
245,
permitted.
supra,
B. Caliguiri 2C:35-7, violating was which possession criminalizes with the intent to distribute within a 1000 feet of a school. This Compre crime was created Drug hensive Reform Act. designed was strategy CDRA to create a coordinated Edwards, illegal drug Jersey. Cary
combat use in New W. An Comprehensive Drug Overview the Act Reform (1989)(“CDRA ”). Legis. Seton Hall J. Overview The CDRA policy, expresses contains a statement of which desire for punishment uniform drug and stern offenders convicted of 2C:35-1.1a,c. operating near schools. N.J.S.A. The CDRA effec tively “safety creates a zone” of 1000 feet around schools and property. Legislative Commentary, reprinted school Cannel, Annotated, Jersey New Criminal Code comment 1 to policies, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. Because of those offenders convicted *9 subject mandatory period are to a violating 2C:35-7 N.J.S.A. ineligibility. parole incarceration pro- the CDRA favoring punishment, stern Despite policy drug for sentencing possibilities of alternative vides a number rehabilita- the court to order 2C:35-14 allows offenders. N.J.S.A. any convicted of drug-dependent offenders tive treatment for offense, degree. 2C:35- except of the first N.J.S.A. crimes CDRA 2C:35-7 and program, N.J.S.A. 14a. Under the rehabilitative to a residential treatment second-degree offenders are committed The CDRA N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14c. program for at least six months. prosecu- discharge that allows a conditional statute also contains charges against some first offenders. tors to dismiss 2C:36A-1. drug offend- increasing penalties for serious
In addition schools, “safety the CDRA incor- creating zones” around ers and sentencing structure of the drug laws into the porated the new Overview, supra, 13 Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. CDRA New incorporation, 11. a result of this Legis. Hall J. at As Seton degree, designated drug a crime of a certain specified offense will be as every invoking sentencing In in the code---- all the found penal thereby provisions drug assigning degree of the Act offenses, the provisions classifications specific use realities of current distribution and were tailored to reflect carefully seriousness of each offense. as well as modern notions of the relative patterns, [Id. 12.] is a crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7
III. A. 2C:35-7, characteriz Baynes, referred to N.J.S.A. this Court type offense similar to ing penalty [as] structure for this “[t]he admission to PTI is second-degree offenses for which that for Baynes, supra, 148 N.J. at presumptively unavailable.” presumptively if argues 594. The a defendant A.2d State committing PTI a crime that carries the second- ineligible for for incarceration, a defendant must be degree presumption of then crime, completely ineligible when the like N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 7, requires Furthermore, incarceration. the State contends that *10 implicitly repealed the CDRA portion of the PTI Guidelines allowing disagree. diversion for all defendants. We
The PTI Guidelines make diversion available to all defen
Pressler,
2;
Bender,
84,
supra,
dants.
Guidelines
State v.
80 N.J.
93,
(1979).
402
charged
A.2d 217
Even offenders
with violent or
first-degree
Pressler,
categorically ineligible.
offenses are not
3(i)
supra,
(stating
applications
Guidelines
that such
“should
generally
rejected”).
require
be
The
Guidelines
to
Poinsett,
application individually.
evaluate each
State v.
206
(Law Div.1984)
307, 313,
N.J.Super.
(stressing
The legislative State relies on the intent of the to CDRA particular, overcome the PTI Guidelines. In the State asserts that the punishment CDRA mandates severe and consistent for drug result, offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1c. As a the State punishments “fatally concludes that the stern of the CDRA are general eligibility inconsistent” with for PTI.
A
reading
precedent
careful
of the
and related
CDRA
demon
strates, however,
Legislature
preclude
that the
did not
to
intend
drug
legislative
offenders from PTI. The CDRA’s statement of
policy,
example, specifically
punishment
for
refers to severe
for
“convicted offenders.” N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1a. The CDRA intends
offenders,
punishment
severe
for
preclude
convicted
but does not
prior
which
a criminal trial.
diverts offenders
to
For exam
ple,
violating
defendants
ineli
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 are
Luna,
gible
youthful
sentencing.
offender
State v.
278 N.J.Su
433,
Luna,
per.
(App.Div.1995).
Similarly, in State v.
N.J.
under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7
held an offender convicted
this Court
Supervi
County Local Intensive Probation
ineligible for the Essex
(“ECLIPSE”).
cer
program
The ECLIPSE
allowed
sion Effort
subjected
highly
to a
prison
released from
and
tain offenders to be
Stewart, supra,
136 N.J.
regulated probationary term.
2C:35-7,
pled guilty
violating
A.2d 942. Stewart
*11
Id.
days
years probation.
prison
to 364
in
and two
was sentenced
later,
court released
A.2d 942. Two months
the
at
642
Id.
at
A.2d 942.
program.
into the ECLIPSE
Stewart
improperly admitted
This
concluded that Stewart had been
Court
sentencing alternatives like ECLIPSE
program
to the
because
2C:35-12,
inconsistent with N.J.S.A.
requires a court
which
were
pre
prosecution
impose precisely
to
the sentence
a CDRA
Id. by
plea agreement.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14a added).] (emphasis Both Stewart and Luna already involved defendants who had pled guilty plea agreements. under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 The reha program applies bilitation of N.J.S.A. only 2C:35-14 after convic tion; therefore, likely it most was replace intended to intensive supervision post-conviction ECLIPSE, programs like and not PTI. legislative history supports by The expressly that conclusion ren dering complete defendants who fail to the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 program ineligible for other supervision programs. intensive Cannel, Legislative Commentary reprinted supra,, comment to sentencing N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14. Post-conviction alternatives not only CDRA, legislative underlying contradict the intent but utterly punishments also subvert imposed by statute. however, fact, prior intervenes to conviction. the Guidelines prohibit prosecutors conditioning program from access to the on Pressler, any Thus, guilt. supra, admission of Guidelines 4. rejection admissions are post-convic unaffected the CDRA’s sentencing tion alternatives.
Despite the impose punishment, overall intent severe preserves programs apply prior CDRA to conviction. Condi discharge tional “charged remains available to offenders with or any disorderly persons convicted of petty disorderly persons or However, offense.” 2C:36A-1. offenders specifically indictable offenses are excluded from the conditional discharge program. argues N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1a. The State legislative that exclusion evinces a supplant intent to both preclude prosecutions. PTI in legislative history CDRA suggests discharges sup otherwise. Conditional were meant plement, supplant rather than PTI. Legislative Commen *12 Cannel, tary reprinted supra, in comment 1 to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1 (stating Jersey’s drug consolidate “[t]o New laws into the code, penal discharge drug this act eliminates conditional for crimes, offenders provides accused of indictable and instead that proceedings the diversion of these criminal accomplished be through pretrial program.”). the intervention
42 sentencing alter-
Although
prohibits post-conviction
the CDRA
natives,
PTI,
to
prior
which
it
countenances
intervenes
expressly
finding pre-trial
prevents
from
diversion
trial.
us
That distinction
Nothing in
mandatory
“fatally inconsistent.”
incarceration
any
to
or
reveals
intent
either the PTI Guidelines
the CDRA
offenders from PTI.
categorically
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7
exclude
categorically
are
offenders
not
Although N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7
against
The
ineligible
presumption
is a
diversion.
for
there
solely
reject an
prosecutor
application
PTI
allow a
to
Guidelines
“appropriate
the
circumstances.”
based on the nature of
offense
594;
II,
445,
A.2d
Baynes, supra,
The demonstrates that CDRA Baynes, supra, a serious N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 is offense. 449, Baynes A.2d 594. The defendant was simple possession within 1000 feet of a school. Id. at program Baynes 594. for A.2d The director recommended rejected program. admission Ibid. policy application, prohibited applica his consent to PTI because 440, 690 tions from school zone offenders. Id. at A.2d 594. We justified prosecutor’s per could not be held se rule 3(i), “appropriate “ap circumstances” of Guideline clause because only in “of propriate circumstances” existed cases a more serious possession personal nature than of CDS for use.” Id. at possession specifically distinguished personal A.2d 594. We possession use from with the intent to distribute. Id. at policies underlying A.2d 594. observed that enforce the We CDRA, crime, Legislature created a new 2C:35- “the *13 7____ penalty type The structure for this of offense is similar to second-degree that for offenses for which admission to PTI is presumptively unavailable.” Ibid.
Although Legislature established N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 as crime, especially punishments its stern indicate Legislature light that the considered it a serious crime. of the Guidelines, general tenor of goals the CDRA and the of the PTI prosecutors may equivalent we hold that treat N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 as second-degree to a presumptively offense and consider PTI un available.
B. Appellate prosecutor The Division concluded that the had cate- gorically rejected Caliguiri’s application, Caliguiri and that was only presumptively ineligible for PTI. The court remanded the Caliguiri opportunity case to allow that show denial of his application injustice.” would result in a “serious may
A
application
prosecu
court
remand a PTI
to the
tor if
purpose
the remand will serve a useful
and the decision to
irrational,
reject
application
arbitrary,
is
or an abuse of
Dalglish, supra,
discretion.
c. Finally, Appellate Attorney Division invalidated the Gener Directive, reject required prosecutors al’s which then to the PTI applications of offenders. The N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 State relies on Brimage, our recent decision in v. State N.J.
(1998),
Brimage,
defend the Directive.
this Court invalidat
permitting
county
develop
ed Directives
each
its own standard
14-15,
plea
policies.
ized CDRA
offers and
Id. at
In
we
a Directive
consenting
from
to PTI for CDRA offenders unless the defendant
specific community
requirements
met
paid
service
and
a fine.
Baynes, supra,
distinguished
[Ibid.] case, Attorney In this is not General’s Directive consistent Instead, PTI. requirements with the established for this Directive PTI, inappropriately alters the criteria for admission to which are jointly governed by statute and court rule. judgment Appellate of the Division is affirmed and modified
in opinion. accordance with this
STEIN, J., concurring part dissenting part. and Defendant, gainfully employed twenty-five-year-old no with convictions, prior third-degree possession was indicted for marijuana within 1000 feet of school with intent to distribute to distribution was based on property. The indictment’s reference that, he would share the 1.5 ounces defendant’s admission friends, marijuana not on the basis of an intent to sell with some drugs. Caliguiri applied for admission to the Middlesex After (PTI) program, ac- County Pretrial Intervention offense, that, Caliguiri knowledged apart from the nature of the program. admission to that He had an satisfied all the criteria for record, job, good family support, appeared unblemished addition, Caliguiri cooperat- to rehabilitation. had be amenable by volunteering of the seller and the police ed with the the name Nonetheless, opposed the State defendant’s location of the sale. ground third-degree that admission to on the school-zone ineligible drug categorically offenders for PTI. were disposition hope offers defendant some of admission The Court’s rejects properly to PTI the Court the State’s contention because third-degree drug categorically that school-zone offenders are ineligible promise for PTI. But the faint of PTI the Court extends substantially other its with one hand it retracts offenders, just holding third-degree like school-zone second- offenders, degree presumptively ineligible must be considered presumption strong only by that it can overcome so be consisting “something “compelling reasons” of evidence of extraor unusual, dinary something ‘idiosyncratic,’ in defendant’s] or [the Nwobu, 236, 252, background.” State v. 139 N.J. A.2d (1995) Jabbour, 1, 7, (quoting State v. 118 N.J. (1990)). join disposition rejects I it the Court’s to the extent that position the State’s school-zone offenders are categorically ineligible join holding I for PTI. But cannot its *16 presumptively ineligible third-degree that offenders are for PTI.
I majority’s I concur with the conclusion that defendants categorically ineligi- third-degree school-zone offenses are not notes, majority correctly “[djespite ble for PTI. As the the overall impose punishment, preserves intent to pro- severe the CDRA 41, grams apply prior Supra to conviction.” at 726 A.2d at Thus, possibility PTI 919. admission as an alternative to prosecution by rejection formal remains “unaffected the CDRA’s ibid., alternatives,” where, post-conviction sentencing even as here, subject an mandatory imprisonment offender is to a term of upon conviction. clear, majority’s specific
As the
decision makes
whether a
presumption against
offense
carries
PTI admission is unrelated
severity
post-conviction sentencing
to the
of the
alternatives.
Presumptive ineligibility
only
express
arises
“when the Guidelines
presumption against
particular
PTI” for that
Supra
offense.
at
3(i)
36-37, 726
(noting
A.2d at 916-917
that PTI
states
Guideline
applications
generally
rejected”
that PTI
“should
be
when under-
lying
continuing
enterprise, organized
offense involves
criminal
trust,
activity,
criminal
public
breach of
violence or threat of
violence,
offense).
second-degree
or first- or
“The enumerated
”
presumptively
“rep-
circumstances
for which PTI is
unavailable
legislative
prevent
resent
decision to
serious offenders from
avoiding prosecution
ordinary
Supra
circumstances.”
at
added).
offenses,
(emphasis
Third-degree
A.2d at 919
school-zone
concedes,
majority
among
singled
by
as the
are not
the crimes
out
presumptive
ineligibility.
the Guidelines for
Despite
recognition
severity
post-convic
its
that neither the
sentencing
tion
nor the PTI
alternatives
Guidelines create a
offenders,
presumption against
third-degree
PTI admission for
majority
concludes that
school-zone offenders are
presumptively ineligible
Supra
for PTI.
at
punishments”
penalty structure
“[t]he
that because
920. The Court reasons
at
second-degree
for
is similar' to that
type
this
of offense
for
unavailable,”
presumptively
PTI
admission to
is
offenses for which
ibid,
434, 449,
Baynes,
I majority’s holding that school-zone offend- distinction between contention ineligible for and the State’s presumptively ers are categorically ineligible program. for that Both they are sentencing rely unpersuasively on the majority and the State support presumptive or after trial and conviction to alternatives PTI. categorical ineligibility pre-trial diversion into Moreover, ineligibility that PTI is a function of the to the extent crime, very designation of Legislature’s “seriousness” of the degree of the third demonstrates school-zone offenses as crimes equivalent legislative that such offenses are not the determination “seriousness” of the second-degree crimes terms of the of 38, 917; supra at see also W. underlying conduct. See A.2d Edwards, Comprehensive Drug Cary An Overview the of Reform (1989) (noting Legis. Hall J. Act 13 Seton of designated every drug as “crime of a certain Legislature offense ... of current distribution specified degree to reflect the realities as notions of the relative patterns, and use as well modern offense”). seriousness each underlying premise “penalty that the struc-
Even the Court’s
second-degree
school-zone and
offenses are
tures” for
scrutiny. As
noted in State v.
“similar” fails to withstand close
we
8-9,
(1998),
Brimage,
the “nondiscretion-
153 N.J.
(Section 7)
subject
reality
ary” parole
2C:35-7
bar N.J.S.A.
part
discretion of the
as
to waiver
the broad
(Sec-
plea
post-conviction agreement. See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12
or
12).
definition,
sentences,
mandatory
foreclose
Because
tion
discretion,
judicial
prosecutorial
or
we have observed that
sentencing
truly mandatory
scheme under Sections 7 and
is not
hybrid, combining
must
“a
mandatory
but
be characterized as
*18
discretionary
delegating sentencing authority
features and
to both
8-9,
prosecutors.” Brimage, supra,
the courts and the
That the chose to afford mandatory broad discretion to waive the term in the case of offenders, third-degree entirely foreclosing convicted almost while offenders, second-degree in discretion the case of demon- penalty strates that the structures for the two classes of offenses very Accordingly, any superficial in fact are different. “similari- schemes, believe, sentencing justify I ties” between the two do not majority’s upgrading third-degree of school-zone offenses for purpose withholding possibility of PTI from an sole of entire class of lower-level offenders. majority’s treating
The harshness of the these degree purposes for PTI is at offenses as crimes of the second not tempered by Caliguiri “only” all that on remand need holding its technically compelling show reasons for admission. The Court is injustice” applies in that “serious standard to second- correct degree seeking presumption of incar- offenders to overcome the ceration, “compelling applicable is while the reasons” standard overcoming presumption against a PTI admission. Howev- when Nwobu, er, supra, in in to sufficient as we held order show presumption against PTI “compelling reasons” to overcome a admission, something “a defendant must demonstrate extraordi- unusual, nary ‘idiosyncratic,’ in something or his or her back- ground” presumption against to overcome a admission order Nwobu, 252, supra, (quoting into PTI. at N.J. 391). Jabbour, 7, supra, 118 N.J. at 570A.2d That is the identical required second-degree attempting to showing offender over incarceration, presumption recently recog a standard come Soricelli, 532-34, supra, this nized Court being practical purposes A all .2d as insurmountable majority vague vast of cases. The Court’s concession that “the weight presumption against of the evidence to rebut the PTI need great if not be as as the defendant had been with a offense,” second-degree supra likely 726 A.2d at is provide Caliguiri similarly comfort small situated defen dants. establishment Court’s of new class lower-level offend presumptively inevitably
ers for whom
unavailable will
lead
many
to the unwarranted incarceration of
defendants who would
*19
appear
otherwise
to be the most suitable for
into PTI.
diversion
majority’s
underlying
decision thus undermines the dual
purposes
appropriate
of PTI to afford rehabilitative services to
already
jus
candidates and to relieve the
overburdened criminal
offenses,
system by avoiding
prosecution
tice
of “victimless”
freeing
prosecutors
pursue
the courts and
more serious criminal
Nwobu,
supra,
matters. See