State v. . Caldwell

Nov 24, 1937

Versions:212 N.C. 484

193 S.E. 716

1937 N.C. LEXIS 345

ClaRicsoN, J.

At the close of the State’s evidence the defendant made a motion in the court below for judgment as in case of nonsuit. N. C. Code 1935 (Michie), sec. 4643'. The court below overruled the motion, and in this we can see no error. The evidence was plenary to have been submitted to the jury.

The charge of the court below is not in the record; the presumption is to the effect that the court charged the law applicable to the facts. We think the evidence objected to competent.

The defendant contends that the prosecuting witness made no outcry, which is a circumstance affecting her credibility to be considered in favor of the accused. S. v. Dill, 184 N. C., 645. It is presumed that the court below in the charge covered this aspect, if the evidence supported it. The testimony of the prosecuting witness was “He came after me and I hollered. He caught me by the arm and dragged me back into the house. He pulled me into the house and into the bedroom where he pushed me across the bed and held the broken blade of a knife to my throat. He stated that if I made any outcry he would kill me. He then accomplished his purpose.”

The alleged confession of defendant to the sheriff while in jail, in the presence of other officers, we think was voluntarily made. On the voir dire the court below examined the sheriff and gave defendant an opportunity to “put up any evidence on this particular point” and held “upon no evidence being produced by the defendant, the court holds the statement made by the defendant was voluntarily made.” S. v. *489 Whitener, 191 N. C., 659; S. v. Blake, 198 N. C., 547. Tbis finding is not reviewable if there is any competent evidence to support same. S. v. Moore, 210 N. C., 686 (692-3).

In S. v. Myers, 202 N. C., 351 (353), it is said: “The confession in evidence was not made under the impulsion of hope or fear. The suggestion that the accused had better tell who the ‘other men’ were or that he ‘had better go on and tell the truth’ has no element of unlawful inducement. As said in S. v. Harrison, 115 N. C., 706, ‘The rule which is generally approved is, that where the prisoner is advised to tell nothing but the truth, or even when what is said to him has no tendency to induce him to make an untrue statement, his confession in either case is admissible.’ No promise was made to induce the confession; no threat was used to extort it. S. v. Bohanon, 142 N. C., 695.”

. In 8. v. Jones, 203 N. CL, 374 (376), is the following: “ ‘We are not aware' of any decision which holds a confession, otherwise voluntary, inadmissible because of the number of officers present at the time it was made. Nor has the diligence of counsel discovered any. 8. v. Gray, 192 N. C., 594.”

In S. v. Grier, 203 N. C., 586 (588), it is written: “A confession voluntarily made by a person under arrest is competent. S. v. Ellis, 97 N. C., 447; S. v. Rodman, 188 N. C., 720; and all confessions are to be taken as voluntary unless the person making them shows facts authorizing a legal inference to the contrary. S. v. Sanders, 84 N. C., 728; S. v. Christy, 170 N. C., 772. But every confession must be voluntary. The test is whether it was made under circumstances that would reasonably lead the person charged to believe that it would be better to confess himself guilty of a crime he had not committed. It is expressed in various ways. The confession is inadmissible if ‘the defendant was influenced by any threat or promise,’ or if it is ‘induced by hope or extorted by fear,’ or if ‘fear is excited by a direct charge or hope is suggested by assurance,’ or if extorted by ‘threats, promises, or any undue influence,’ or if ‘wrung from the mind by the flattery of hope or the torture of despair,’ or by ‘actual force,’ or the ‘hope of escape,’ or the statement, ‘It will be lighter on you.’ S. v. Roberts, supra (12 N. C., 259); S. v. Howard, supra (92 N. C., 772); S. v. Whitfield, 70 N. C., 356; S. v. Myers, 202 N. C., 351; S. v. Livingston, ibid., 809.” S. v. Fox, 197 N. C., 478; S. v. Gosnell, 208 N. C., 401.

In S. v. Stefanoff, 206 N. C., 443 (444): “Where there is no duress, threat or inducement, and the court found there was none here, the fact that the defendants were under arrest at the time the confessions were made, does not ipso facto render them incompetent. S. v. Newsome, 195 N. C., 552; S. v. Drakeford, 162 N. C., 667. ‘We are not aware of any decision which holds a confession, otherwise voluntary, *490 inadmissible because of the number of officers present at the time it was made. Nor has the diligence of counsel discovered any.’ S. v. Gray, 192 N. C., 594.” S. v. Tate, 210 N. C., 613 (617).

No threat or promise of any immunity or reward was made defendant. The confession was voluntary, made neither under the influence of hope nor fear. “I told him we would like to know the truth.” This was no inducement. From the competent evidence we think the confession voluntary, and it was so found by the court below.

On the record we see no prejudicial or reversible error.

No error.