THE STATE v. REGINALD CALDWELL, Appellant.
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
December 22, 1925
311 Mo. 534
Division Two
Where an indictment describes a statutory crime in the language of the statute, it is sufficient if the statute sets forth every element of the crime. Under the statute in this case the quantity of the liquor sold is not an essential element of the crime, provided it is sufficient to be the subject of a sale. The further allegation in the information regarding the liquor sold, “being potable and fit for beverage purposes,” is a statement that the quantity must have been enough for that purpose, and therefore it comes within the terms of the statute.
Other errors are assigned in the motion for new trial but they are not of sufficient importance to deserve consideration.
The judgment is affirmed. All concur.
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE: Evidence of Subsequent Acts. Evidence for the State that defendant, fourteen years of age, had one act of sexual intercourse with prosecutrix before she was sixteen years of age requires that the case, under the statute relating to carnal knowledge with a female child under sixteen years of age (Sec. 3247, R. S. 1919, as amended, Laws 1921, p. 284a), be submitted to the jury; but evidence of subsequent acts of sexual intercourse is
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References: Rape, 33 Cyc., p., 1483, n. 97.
Appeal from Stoddard Circuit Court.—Hon. W. S. C. Walker, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
J. S. Miller and Wammack & Welborn for appellant.
(1) The evidence in this case is not sufficient to support a verdict of guilty against the defendant. State v. Tevis, 234 Mo. 284; State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 282; State v. Hughes, 258 Mo. 272; State v. Manuel, 263 Mo. 675; State v. Seay, 282 Mo. 679. (2) The prosecutrix having become sixteen years of age on April 27, 1922, and the one point in the case being whether or not defendant had intercourse with her before that date, it was error for the court to admit into evidence letters written by defendant to prosecutrix the last of May, 1922, the Christmas card and ring given by defendant to prosecutrix at Christmas, 1922, and evidence of the child born in July, 1923, and that defendant was the father thereof. State v. Harris, 283 Mo. 111; State v. Cason, 252 S. W. 690; People v. Freeman, 25 N. Y. App. Div. 583.
Robert W. Otto, Attorney-General, and Harry L. Thomas, Special Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.
(1) Appellant‘s demurrer at the close of the whole case was properly overruled, there being sufficient evidence to support a conviction. The act of intercourse was not in question. The element of force was not an
HIGBEE, C.—The defendant was charged with the crime of rape in that he did, on the —— day of July, 1922, assault and carnally know one Mary Bradham, a female child under the age of sixteen years. [
At the trial the prosecutrix testified that she was sixteen years of age on April 27, 1922, and that on the first or second Sunday before Easter, 1922, which fell on April 9, the defendant (who was then fourteen years old) took her on a drive in an automobile to Taylor schoolhouse and there had sexual intercourse with her. On April 27th the defendant and many young people of her acquaintance attended her birthday party. Over the objection of the defendant the prosecuting witness
The case was very close. The evidence for the State was that the defendant had one act of sexual intercourse with prosecutrix before she was of the age of sixteen years. Evidence of the subsequent acts of intercourse was clearly inadmissible under the ruling in State v. Guye, 299 Mo. 348, 252 S. W. 955, and should have been excluded. [See also State v. Harris, 283 Mo. 99, 222 S. W. 420, and State v. Cason, 252 S. W. 688.]
Other questions raised need not be considered. The judgment is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded. Railey, C., concurs.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion of Higbee, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur.
