Defendant Caldwell was tried and convicted of second-degree murder for the death of Ellen Egan, his live-in girlfriend. Defendant’s three assignments of error separately challenging jury instructions were rejected by the court of аppeals. On *555 further review we agree and affirm the trial court.
Defendant and Ellen were out with friends at several Halloween parties in Iowa City. Throughout the evening they became more and more intoxicated. After a quarrel they separated. Defendant went home while Ellen went to another party where she reportedly became even more intoxicated. Ellen eventually decided to leave that party which was on the second floor of an apartment building. As she left she tripped and tumbled down the stairway but did not seem hurt in the fall. She then took a cab home.
When she arrived Ellen was confronted by defendant who wanted to know where she had been. Defendant testified he was alsо very intoxicated and that he became extremely jealous when he was drunk. He was angry because she had left him at the party and accused her of being with another man. Defendant then began shoving and slapping Ellеn. When she attempted to get away from him, defendant hit her head against the bathroom door four or five times.
Defendant testified he stopped striking Ellen when he noticed a drop of blood coming from her nose. Ellen then came up to defendant in their bedroom but he pushed her away. Ellen hit the wall and slid to the floor. Defendant then picked her up, laid her on the bed, and went to bed himself. When defendant awoke at 5 a.m. he found he cоuld not awaken Ellen and noticed fluid coming from her mouth. He called an ambulance but paramedics were unable to revive her. She was pronounced dead at 6:37 a.m.
Expert testimony indicated Ellen’s skull was not fractured, nor did she suffer any massive blows which alone would have been responsible for her death. Instead, according to medical experts, she died from a subdural hematoma and cerebral edema. The expеrts could not say for certain whether the trauma causing her injuries was the result of defendant’s actions or were instead the result of her fall down the stairs earlier in the evening. Testimony did reveal, however, that repeated blows, even minor ones, could have caused her death.
Defendant denied any intent to kill or harm her. A psychologist testified for defendant that, because he was intoxicated, he did not intend to kill or harm Ellen.
I. Defendant’s first assignment challenges the trial court’s jury instruction which explained the proximate cause element of the offense. 1 Defendant requested that foreseeability be included in the definition of proximate causе. The trial court refused the request and instead adopted the substance of I Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions (Civil) No. 2.6. The trial court’s instruction was as follows:
With regard to element no. 2 of instruction no. 10, the state is required to prove by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of the death of Ellen Anne Egan.
“Proximate cause” means that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the death of Ellen Anne Egan, and that if it had not been for such conduct, Ellen Anne Egan would not have died.
“Substantial” as used in this instruction means that defendant’s conduct had such an effect in bringing about the death of Ellen Anne Egan аs to lead a reasonable person to regard it as a cause of her death.
If you find that the defendant inflicted the injuries which proximately caused the death of Ellen Anne Egan, then his conduct resulted in the death оf Ellen Anne Egan within the meaning of these instructions. This is true even if the conduct of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of her death.
In State v. Marti we said:
*556 The element of proximate cause in criminal prosecutions serves as a requirement that there be a sufficient causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and a proscribed harm to hold him criminally responsible.
Notwithstаnding our approval of the civil proximate cause instruction in
Marti
Caldwell insists the challenged instruction was incomplete because it lacked the requirement of foreseeability. To support this contention hе seizes on language in
State v. McFadden,
The defendant’s reliance on the language just quoted is misplaced. Our holding in McFadden did not change thе definition of proximate cause for criminal cases; it did precisely the opposite. The civil definition we previously approved in Marti was once more upheld. A relationship between proximate сause and foreseeability was mentioned, not to change or expand our definition, but merely to justify it.
We still adhere to our definition of proximate cause as explained in Marti. The trial court was correct in rejecting defendant’s challenge to it.
II. The trial court submitted the lesser included offense of manslaughter for the jury’s consideration. An essential element of manslaughter is recklessness.
State v. Conner,
In
Conner
we said the legislature intended to preserve the common law requirements of recklessness for involuntary manslaughter.
The definition we approved in Kernes is embodied in the uniform instruction which we have already mentioned was the basis for the one challenged here. The assignment is without merit.
III. A third instruction drew defendant’s objection and precipitated another assignment of еrror. Under either the *557 State’s or the defendant’s version of the facts it was important to instruct the jury about the relationship between murder and intoxication. In doing so the trial court included the following:
You are instructed that no amount of voluntary use of intoxicants can excuse a murder and reduce a murder to manslaughter.
Defendant objects to this language. He contends he harmed Egan only because he was drunk, not because of any malice aforethought. He thinks the jury should have been told it should consider his intoxication in determining whether he acted with malice aforethought.
It has long been the general rule in Iowa that, although voluntary intoxication сannot constitute a defense to a crime, it may negate criminal intent if such intent is an element of the crime charged.
State v. Watts,
Under our holding in Hall the trial court was clearly correct in informing the jury that “no amount of voluntary use of intoxicants can reduce murder to manslaughter.” But defendant thinks Hall was overruled by the subsequent enactment of Iowa Code section 701.5. That statute provides:
The fact that a person is under the influence of intoxicants or drugs neither excuses the person’s act nor aggravates the person’s guilt, but may bе shown where it is relevant in proving the person’s specific intent or recklessness at the time of the person’s alleged criminal act or in proving any element of the public offense with which the person is charged.
(Emphasis added.)
In
State v. Collins
we said “section 701.5 is substantially a codification of prior law.”
Section 701.5 contains but a single sentence. The concluding phrase, the one on which defendant relies, must be read in context. It and the phrase which immediately precedes it modify thе introductory language which states that intoxication “neither excuses the person’s act nor aggravates the person’s guilt.” We do not think the exception allowed by the last phrase was intended to change our longstanding rule.
See Wilson v. Iowa City,
*558 DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.3 (1983). One of the elements which the State must prove is that the defendant’s act was the proximate cause of the death.
. Because the State does not raise the point we do not consider whether the instruction might have been too favorable to the defendant. Under some circumstances an act can be a proximate or legal cause although the injury would have occurred anyway. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(2) comment (d) (1965).