[¶ 1] Jоel A. Byzewski appeals from two judgments entered on conditional pleas of guilty to the charges of violating a domestic violence protection order and driving while under susрension, reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and motion to suppress evidence. We affirm both judgments.
I
[¶ 2] In February 2007, the trial court entered a domestic viоlence protection order against Byzewski effective until further court order. The order prohibited Byzewski from coming within one hundred yards of the victim’s place of employment: 3315 University Drive, Bismarck, N.D. 58504, which is the address for the campus of United Tribes Technical College. By-zewski testified he was on the campus on February 11, 2009, with his girlfriend to pick up her children. He testified that his girlfriend drove onto the campus. After his girlfriend exited the vehicle to pick up one of her children, Byzewski began driving the vehicle. After Byzewski picked up both his girlfriend and her child, he drove apрroximately a half a block where he was stopped by campus security. Byzewski was detained until Burleigh County law enforcement arrived. The officers arrested him for violating the protection order and driving while under suspension.
[¶ 3] Byzewski moved to dismiss the domestic violence protection order violation and moved to suppress evidence of the driving while under susрension violation. The trial court held a hearing on the motions, and Byzewski testified. He also submitted an affidavit of a United Tribes College Vice President that described the campus as 233 acres. The trial court denied both motions. Byzewski offered conditional guilty pleas to both the domestic violence protection order violation and driving while under suspension, preserving his right to appeal the denial of the motions. Byzewski appeals.
II
[¶ 4] Our standard of review on preliminary motions is well-established:
We will not reverse a trial court’s findings of fact in рreliminary criminal pro *553 ceedings if, after the conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of affir-mance, there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capablе of supporting the findings and if the trial court’s decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
State v. Bethke,
[¶ 5] The trial court accepted Byzew-ski’s conditional guilty pleas to the charges of violating a domestic violence protection order and driving while under suspension. In his plea, Byzewski preserved his right to appeal by stating he was appealing, “(1) the Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss ... because the protection order imрer-missibly infringes upon Mr. Byzewski’s fundamental right to intrastate travel; and (2) the Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence ... when said evidence was obtained pursuant to an illegal seizure.” Undеr N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), “a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.” Therefore, Byzewski’s motions are properly before this Court.
See State v. Bornhoeft,
[¶ 6] We note Byzewski raises his constitutional challenges to the protection order two years after it was entered. The State, however, has not raised an issue concerning Byzewski’s ability to challenge the protection order at this late time. We, therefore, proceed to address the merits of Byzewski’s constitutional challenge.
Ill
[¶ 7] Byzewski argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the domestic violence protection order unconstitutionally restricted his right to intrastate travel. Section 14-07.1-02, N.D.C.C., governs domestic violence protection orders. The Court construes the statute “liberally, with a view to effecting its objects and to promoting justice.”
Frisk v. Frisk,
*554 [¶ 8] We conclude the domestic violence protection order does not unconstitutionally restrict Byzewski’s right to travel. Under N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(a), the court may order relief that includes “[rjestrаining any party from threatening, molesting, injuring, harassing, or having contact with any other person.” The victim had a valid protection order that prohibited Byzewski from engaging in any domestic violence, having any direct or indirect contact with the victim specifically threatening, molesting, injuring, harassing, calling, writing, visiting, taking or damaging any of the victim’s property, having any physical contаct with the victim, and following or stalking the victim. In addition, the order provided Byzewski could not come within one hundred yards of the victim’s home, her place of employment, her day carе, an elementary school, and wherever the petitioner may be or reside.
[¶ 9] By engaging in behavior that led to a domestic violence protection order, Byzewski forfeitеd his right to travel where the victim works. Therefore, By-zewski engaged in activity that was not constitutionally protected when he traveled to the victim’s place of employment in violation of her domestic violence protection order. Other courts have concluded similar restrictions do not violate the right to travel.
Spence v. Kaminski,
rv
[¶ 10] Byzewski argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained following law enforcement’s alleged illegal seizure оf Byzewski. According to Byzewski, the evidence should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. “Any evidence obtained as a result of illegally acquired evidencе must also be suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ”
State v. Torkelsen,
[¶ 11] Here, law enforcement was advised by United Tribes’ campus security that Byzewski was on the United Tribes’ campus in violаtion of a protection order. Byzewski was driving on the campus when he was stopped by campus security and held for arrest by law enforcement. We have concluded therе was a valid protec *555 tion order prohibiting Byzewski from going on the United Tribes’ campus. The protection order and Byzewski’s presence on the campus provided the law enfоrcement officers with reasonable and articula-ble suspicion to stop his vehicle. We therefore conclude the evidence obtained from Byzewski’s seizure is admissible.
V
[¶ 12] We have considered the remaining arguments raised by Byzewski and determine them to be unnecessary to our decision or without merit. “We have said a party waives an issue by not providing supporting argument and, without supportive reasoning or citations to relevant authorities, an argument is without merit.”
Riemers v. O’Halloran,
[¶ 13] We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Byzewski’s motion to dismiss and motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments entered on conditional pleas of guilty to the charges of violating a domestic violence protection order and driving while under suspension.