State v. Byrd, 07ca29 (7-21-2008)State v. Byrd, 07ca29 (7-21-2008)
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, LaTroy Byrd, appeals the decision of the Athens County Court of Common Pleas to accept his guilty plea for robbery and Alford plea for burglary. Appellant alleges the trial court erred in: 1) accepting his pleas without complying with the safeguards of
I. Facts
{¶ 2} Appellant was indicted on one count of burglary and one count of robbery. As a result of a plea agreement with the State, Appellant entered an Alford plea to the burglary count and a guilty plea to the robbery count. At the plea hearing, the parties presented a joint recommendation of a three year sentence for each count, to be served concurrently. Another recommendation of the plea agreement was for the trial court to order a pre-sentence investigation and conduct sentencing at a later date. After addressing Appellant pursuant to
{¶ 3} Appellant did not appear at his scheduled sentencing hearing and, several months later, was arrested on a warrant for failure to appear. As a result of his failure to appear and intervening criminal activity, the trial court sentenced Appellant to three years on count one and five years on
II. Assignments of Error
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE DEFENDANT‘S ALFORD AND GUILTY PLEAS DUE TO ITS FAILURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF OHIO RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11.
2. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED BYRD‘S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS PURSUANT TO AMENDMENT FOURTEEN OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION
III. Standard of Review
{¶ 4} Initially we note that the decision to accept or refuse a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Bronaka, 11th Dist. No. 2007-L-095, 2008-Ohio-1334, at ¶ 20; Cleveland v. Curtis, 8th Dist. No. 89843, 2007-Ohio-5961, at ¶ 6. As such, we will not overrule a trial court‘s judgment absent an abuse of discretion.
IV. First Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred by not complying with the dictates of
{¶ 6} Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must determine that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered the plea. State v. Taylor, 4th Dist. No. 07CA29, 2008-Ohio-484, at ¶ 27. “In considering whether a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, we must review the record to ensure that the trial court complied with the constitutional and procedural safeguards contained within Crim. R. 11.” State v. Young, 4th Dist. No. 06CA10, 2007-Ohio-5232, at ¶ 6.
{¶ 7} Under
{¶ 8} Though strict compliance with
{¶ 9} In the case sub judice, Appellant first asserts the trial court failed to inform him of the maximum possible sentences. Initially, we note
Court: So my first question is do you think you understand what count one and count two both charge in terms of criminal conduct and what the possibilities for sentence could be in those two cases? In other words, what the potential maximum could be?
Appellant: (Inaudible) years. I understand that.
Court: That would be correct. Okay.
{¶ 10} Appellant seems to argue that because his above response was inaudible to the court reporter, there is no indication he was aware of the maximum penalties. On the contrary, the trial court‘s confirmation of the Appellant‘s inaudible statement clearly indicates the number of years stated was correct and that Appellant was fully aware of his potential maximum sentence.
{¶ 11} Appellant also argues that he was prejudiced because the trial court failed to inform him that it could immediately proceed to sentencing
{¶ 12} Appellant further argues the trial court failed to inform him of the nature of the charges. Again, the record shows otherwise. At the outset of the hearing, the court stated Appellant was being charged with robbery and burglary, both second degree felonies. The State also briefly recounted the conduct and circumstances which gave rise to the offenses. Later, the court directly addressed Appellant and told him he was being charged with robbery and burglary. Further, the court asked Appellant if he understood what each count charged in terms of criminal conduct and he stated that he did. This was sufficient to inform him of the nature of the charges. In Ohio, courts are not required to inform defendants of the individual elements of each offense. State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. No. 07 MA 8, 2008-Ohio-1065, at ¶ 14.
{¶ 13} Appellant also contends the trial court failed to inform him that his pleas constituted a complete admission of guilt. However, during its colloquy with Appellant, the court explained that his guilty plea meant that he was admitting to the conduct underlying the charge and that his Alford
{¶ 14} In light of the forgoing, we find the trial court substantially complied with the dictates of
V. Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 15} Appellant‘s second assignment of error more specifically addresses his Alford plea. He contends the trial court accepted it without properly addressing Appellant‘s motive for entering the plea.
{¶ 16} North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, provides a method by which a defendant is able to maintain his factual innocence yet enter a plea of guilty. “A defendant who believes himself to be innocent of the charges against him may rationally conclude that the
{¶ 17} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, in the context of an Alford plea, the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made “[w]here the record affirmatively discloses that: (1) defendant‘s guilty plea was not the result of coercion, deception or intimidation; (2) counsel was present at the time of the plea; (3) counsel‘s advice was competent in light of the circumstances surrounding the indictment; (4) the plea was made with the understanding of the nature of the charges; and, (5) defendant was motivated either by a desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or both * * * .” State v. Piacella (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 56 O.O.2d 52, 271 N.E.2d 852, at the syllabus.
{¶ 18} Here, in its colloquy with Appellant, the court explained that, in entering an Alford plea, Appellant was pleading guilty but not admitting the underlying conduct. Appellant stated he understood the effect of the
{¶ 19} Finally, the record also shows he was motivated both by a fear of the result of a jury trial and by a desire to seek an accommodation with the State. During the plea hearing, Appellant‘s counsel stated the following: “He denies the burglary. We think at trial it would come down to a swearing match between he and the sole witness against him, who we think is probably the person who did commit the burglary. But, in consideration for the resolution of both charges he is entering an Alford guilty plea and is pleading guilty to count two.”
{¶ 20} Appellant correctly states that before accepting an Alford plea, a trial court must determine that the defendant has made a rational calculation to plead guilty notwithstanding the assertion of factual innocence and that this requires an inquiry into the reasons for the plea. Appellant further states that, in his case, the trial court failed to do so. However,
{¶ 21} Though admittedly brief, Appellant‘s counsel’ s explanation that the burglary charge would come down to a “swearing match” between Appellant and a witness to the burglary provides a factual basis and rationale for the plea. Further, the court was made aware that Appellant was entering an Alford plea as an accommodation with the State in order to resolve both charges against him. This was sufficient information for the trial court to determine Appellant was making a rational calculation to plead guilty though maintaining factual innocence.
{¶ 22} Under these circumstances, we find Appellant‘s Alford plea was made voluntarily and intelligently and the trial court did not abuse it‘s discretion in accepting it. Appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
VI. Conclusion
{¶ 23} After reviewing the record, we find that neither of Appellant‘s assignments of error are merited and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting the pleas. In our view, the trial court substantially complied with the procedural safeguards of
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the Appellee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Abele, P.J. and Harsha, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.