Dеfendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). ORS 813.010. He assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence and to the triаl court’s denial of his petition for DUII diversion. We affirm without discussion the trial court’s denial of his diversion petition and write only to address his motion to suppress. We review for errors of law, ORS 138.220, and affirm.
The facts are not in dispute. At about 1:40 a.m. on April 13,1993, the Corvallis police department received a call from an employee of a convenience store. The caller said:
“[I] wanted to report a drunken driver. [I’m] working down here at Ninth Street 7-11. He came in just a minute ago. He’s driving a blue, looked like a MG, an older little sports car convertible rag top.”
The caller then stated that the vehicle’s license number was “RYG 126” and said that the car was “heading south on Ninth.” Before hanging up, the caller gаve his name and telephone number to the dispatcher.
A few minutes later, Officer Claxton of the Corvallis Police Department received a call from the poliсe dispatcher conveying the above information. Claxton drove north on Ninth Street and saw a small blue convertible Triumph heading south on the same street. He observed nо unusual driving pattern of the car and stopped it solely because of the report he had received from the dispatcher. He reported by radio that the cоrrect license plate number was “RYC 126.” Claxton arrested defendant for DUII.
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the stop on the ground that thе officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted following a stipulated facts trial.
On aрpeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. His first contention is that Claxton lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, because the informant was not sufficiently reliable. ORS 131.615(1) provides:
*495 “A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed a crime may stop the person and, after informing the person that the peace officer is a peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry.”
Reasonable suspicion requires a belief that is “reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts.” ORS 131.605(4).
When reasonable susрicion is based solely on a citizen informant’s report, that report must contain some indicia of reliability.
State v. Shumway,
“it [is] apparent that the informant had not been fabricating [the] report out of whole cloth * * * [and] the report [is] of the sort which in common experiеnce may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable way * * Spinelli v. United States,393 US 410 , 417-18,89 S Ct 584 ,21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969).
State v. Shumway, supra,
In this case, the store clerk gave his name, location and telephone number to the police. He thereby exposed himself to possible criminal and civil liability if his rеport was false. His report indicated that he personally saw defendant *496 (“he came in just a minute ago”), saw him driving (“he’s driving”) and saw him drive in a particular direction (“he was heading south on Ninth”).
Claxton’s observations also corroborated the information reported by the store clerk. He saw a small blue convertible sports car, in the precise аrea where it had been reported to be going. 1 Defendant’s car was the only car that Claxton observed traveling south on Ninth street after receiving the report over his police radio.
We conclude that the informant’s report had sufficient indicia of reliability to support the stop of defendant’s vehicle under ORS 131.615(1). Under the totality of the circumstances, a police officer could reasonably have concluded that defendant was driving while intoxicated. The stop was therefore lawful, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Defendant also argues that it was error to deny the motion to suppress, because the report of a “drunken driver” is a conclusion or opinion that “prevents] a reviewing judge from determining facts creating reasonable suspicion.”
In
State v. Rand,
In
Brown v. Bryant,
Taken together, Rand and Bryant stand for the proposition that whether a person is under the influence of alcоhol isa matter of common knowledge about which a lay witness is competent to render an opinion. Those cases involved testimony by witnesses who were subject to cross-examination and impeachment. Here, we are presented with a police officer relying on an informant’s statement that the suspect is a “drunken driver.”
In
State v. Lichty,
We hold that, because members of the general public have a common knowledge about whether a person is under the influence of alcohol, а statement from a named informant, based on his own personal observations, that a person is a “drunken driver” conveys sufficient information to allow a reviewing judge to detеrmine that the facts created reasonable suspicion.
Affirmed.
Notes
There were only minor differences between the information provided by the store clerk and what the officer observed. The store clerk reported the license plate number as “RYG 126” and the officer reported it as “RYC 126.” The store clerk thought the car was an MG, while defendant’s car was a Triumph. However, defendant’s car was a small, blue convertible sports car with a rag top, as described by the clerk.