{1 Defendant-appellant Alexander Bybee ("Bybee") appeals a district court order denying a motion to suppress his confession. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I 2 In mid-August 1996, a six-year-old boy disappeared in Big Water, Kane County, Utah. The boy was last seen leaving the home of Bybee, who was then one week shy of his seventeenth birthday. On three separate occasions during the subsequent investigation, police unsuccessfully attempted to question Bybee about the boy. The first time, Bybee was playing a video game and would not stop long enough to focus his attention on the interview. The second time, Bybee would not leave his room, would not speak to the investigators, and yelled that he had already been interviewed enough. The third time, Bybee again refused to answer any questions and told investigators not to bother him unless they had a warrant.
T3 A short while after the young boy's disappearance, Bybee moved to Las Vegas to live with his father, While there, Bybee became severely depressed and attempted suicide. Subsequently, Bybee's father had him admitted to a youth mental health facility run by the Southern Nevada Child and Adolescent Services Treatment Division, ak.a, Children's Behavioral Services (°CBS"). At some point after Bybee was admitted, his father informed CBS personnel that Bybee had killed a young boy in Big Water, Utah. CBS called the Las Vegas police to report this information. That same day, the Las Vegas police relayed the information to Chief Deputy Alan Johnson of the Kane County Sheriff's Office.
T4 Shortly thereafter, Deputy Johnson traveled to Las Vegas. After gaining permission from the Nevada Attorney General's Office to speak with Bybee, Deputy Johnson met with a group of CBS personnel concerning his desire to interview Bybee. This group included Dr. Robert Behrens, the psychologist working with Bybee. No one present at this meeting discouraged Deputy Johnson from interviewing Bybee. Dr. Beh-rens told Deputy Johnson that although By-bee was severely depressed he was not suffering from mental instability.
15 Following the meeting, Deputy Johnson questioned Bybee in an unlocked office located in a different building than the one in which Bybee resided. The office was chosen because it provided a more comfortable environment than Bybee's room. At the outset, Bybee refused to allow Deputy Johnson to take notes of, or tape record, the interview. After reading Bybee his Miranda rights, Deputy Johnson asked him whether or not he understood them and wished to waive them to discuss the missing boy. Bybee nodded his head in the affirmative. Bybee never requested an attorney. He did ask if his father could be present. Deputy Johnson refused this request.
17 Immediately after the interview, Deputy Johnson met with Bybee's father, who was then on CBS property. Deputy Johnson had not consulted with him prior to the interview. Deputy Johnson told Bybee's father about the interview and asked if he would assist in bringing Bybee to Utah to locate the burial site if necessary. Bybee's father agreed to the request and proved to be helpful in that regard. He helped arrange for Bybee's temporary release from CBS and accompanied Bybee, Deputy Johnson, and others from Las Vegas to Page, Arizona, where Bybee's father remained while Bybee and others went on to Big Water. Once in Big Water, Bybee led officers to the burial spot.
[ 8 The State of Utah charged Bybee with murder, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999), and the case was set for jury trial in the Sixth District Court, Judge KL. Melff presiding. Prior to trial, Bybee moved to suppress his confession on the grounds that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and that Deputy Johnson violated rule 8(d) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The trial court concluded that Bybee's waiver of his Miranda rights was valid and denied his motion on that basis, The trial court did not address the rule 8(d) question. Bybee then entered a conditional plea agreement, pleading guilty to the murder charge while reserving the right to appeal the trial court's decision on the motion to suppress. On appeal, Bybee reasserts both the rule 8(d) and the Miranda claims.
ANALYSIS
I. UTAH RULE OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE 8(d)
19 Bybee argues his confession should be suppressed because Deputy Johnson violated Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8(d), which states as follows:
No person other than a probation officer or a staff member of a detention facility shall be permitted to interview a minor 14 years of age or older in a detention facility without the consent of the minor and the minor's parent, guardian or custodian after first advising said minor of constitutional rights as described in Rule 26 and such rights having been intelligently waived by the minor.
Utah R. Juv. P. 8(d). Bybee claims Deputy Johnson violated this rule by not obtaining the consent of his father prior to the interview. 1
1 10 "The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we review the trial court's decision for correctness." Ostler v. Buhler,
T11 Rule 8d) by its express terms applies only to interviews conducted in a "detention facility." The hospital in which Deputy Johnson interviewed Bybee clearly does not qualify as a "detention facility." First, neither the State of Utah nor its agents were in any sense detaining Bybee at CBS. Bybee's father had Bybee admitted to CBS and it was Bybee's father and CBS who controlled the conditions and duration of By-bee's stay. Indeed, Deputy Johnson had to obtain the permission of the Nevada Attorney General's office just to speak with By-bee.
T12 Second, CBS does not fit within the definition of a "detention facility" as contemplated by the Utah Code. Although neither
T13 Bybee argues that Deputy Johnson impliedly contracted with CBS to detain him. Nothing in the record supports this bare allegation, however,. The simple fact that CBS retained custody of Bybee after Deputy Johnson spoke with CBS personnel and heard Bybee's confession does not demonstrate that Deputy Johnson had anything to do with the terms and conditions of Bybee's stay at CBS, much less that these conversations created an implied contract.
{14 Based on the foregoing, we find that CBS was not a "detention facility" for purposes of Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8(d). Accordingly, rule 8(d) does not apply to Bybee's interview with Deputy Johnson and Bybee's first claim therefore fails.
II. VALIDITY OF THE MIRANDA WAIVER
T15 Bybee alleges he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before confessing to Deputy Johnson. He primarily bases his claim on the fact that his father was not present during the interview and the fact that he was being treated for severe depression at the time.
¶ 16 We review for correctness a trial court's ultimate ruling regarding the validity of a Miranda waiver, while "granting some degree of discretion to the trial court because of the wide variety of factual settings possible." State v. Dutchie,
117 In order to determine whether Miranda rights were validly waived, we examine the totality of the cireumstances surrounding the waiver. See Dutchie,
"[A] minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession, even of capital offenses, without the presence or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, and the admissibility of such a confession depends not on his age alone but on a combination 'of that factor with such other cireum-stances as his intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement."
State v. Hunt,
{ 18 The trial court determined that some of the above factors weighed against finding the waiver to be valid and others weighed in favor of such a finding. Specifically, the trial court determined that the following facts weighed against finding the waiver to be valid: Bybee's depressed mental state, his level of education, his degree of experience with police, and the absence of his father from the interview. On the other hand, the
119 We affirm the trial court's holding that Bybee knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In doing so, we accept all the trial court's factual findings regarding the relevant cireumstances surrounding the waiver. However, as discussed below, we disagree with the legal import the trial court gave to a few of its factual findings (he., whether a particular fact weighed for or against a finding of valid waiver).
120 First, as the trial court noted, Bybee was nearly seventeen and one-half years old at the time of the interview-less than seven months short of reaching his majority. Though not dispositive, a minor's age is an important factor. Indeed, based solely on his age, Bybee would be presumed capable of validly waiving his right to counsel under the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure. See Utah R. Juv. P. 26(e) ("A minor 14 years of age and older is presumed capable of intelligently comprehending and waiving the minor's right to counsel...."). On many oceasions, this court has found older juveniles' waivers of Miranda rights to be valid. See Dutchie,
T21 Second, although the trial court made no specific finding, the record indicates Bybee possessed sufficient intelligence to knowingly waive his rights. For example, Dr. Robert Behrens, Bybee's treating psychologist at CBS, testified at the suppression hearing that he thought Bybee "was of average intelligence." This supports the trial court's ruling that the waiver was valid.
122 Third, Bybee's education level does not indicate his waiver was invalid. The trial court found that Bybee dropped out of school in the tenth grade and made the legal conclusion that this fact weighed against finding a valid waiver. We disagree with that legal conclusion. Dropping out of school in the tenth grade does not suggest the type of substantially deficient education that would be of concern in the assessment of the validity of a waiver. Most seventeen-year-olds would not have significantly more education than did Bybee at the time of the interview. Indeed, other seventeen-year-olds would only be in the eleventh or twelfth grade. Furthermore, we have found valid waivers by juveniles with far less education than Bybee possessed. Seq, eg., Dutchie,
123 Fourth, Bybee's prior experience with the police supports finding a valid waiver. The trial court found "no indication that [Bybeel ... had any prior substantial exposure to law enforcement" and made the legal conclusion that this fact weighed against finding a valid waiver. We disagree with that legal conclusion. Though perhaps lacking "substantial exposure to law enforcement," as the trial court found, the record indicates Bybee had at least some prior experience with police and exhibited a noteworthy degree of sophistication with respect to law enforcement officers. For instance, during the early investigation of the murder, Bybee twice refused to talk to police and once told them to leave him alone unless they had a warrant. Also, at the start of the CBS interview, Bybee refused to allow Deputy Johnson to take notes of, or tape record, the discussion. These incidents demonstrate that By-
{24 Fifth, we consider Bybee's ability to comprehend the meaning of the Miranda rights and the effect of their waiver. The Miranda rights include the suspect's right to remain silent, to know any statement he makes can be used against him in a court of law (e., the effect of waiving the rights), to have an attorney, and to have an attorney appointed if he cannot afford one. See Miranda v. Arizona,
125 The trial court found that By-bee understood his rights. The court appears to have based this conclusion primarily on the fact that there was no evidence of adolescent "fright" or "fantasy" on Bybee's part. The court did determine that Bybee showed some signs of "despair" but found that he did not confess for that reason. 2
€26 Beyond the trial court's express findings, the record contains facts illustrating Bybee's ability to comprehend his Miranda rights. Most significantly, Bybee himself testified at the suppression hearing that he knew nothing "adverse" would result if he refused to talk to Deputy Johnson. This is clear evidence that Bybee comprehended his right to remain silent. In addition, Bybee's refusal to let Deputy Johnson take notes of, or tape record, the interview is strong/evidence that Bybee was coherent ard capable of understanding and asserting his rights.
T 27 To be sure, Bybee was not completely mentally healthy at the time of the interview. He had attempted suicide one month before, was being treated for depression, and, according to Dr. Behreng' testimony, was not thinking as clearly as he could have been.
3
However, we emphasize that our inquiry is not whether Bybee was in an optimal mental state, but whether he was able to understand his important, yet relatively simple Miranda rights. Such an understanding did not require that Bybee be completely mentally healthy. For example, in Dutchie we found that a fifteen-year-old with significant mental problems competently waived his Miranda rights. See Dutchie,
T29 Finally, we consider the fact that Bybee did not have a parent, adult friend, or attorney present during the interview. The trial court found that Bybee asked for his father early in the interview, prior to confessing, but Deputy Johnson refused the request. It is impossible to know what effect on Bybee, if any, his father would have had if present. Given that it was he who had originally informed CBS that his son had killed a young boy, it is arguable whether Bybee's father would have altered the interview's course. Bybee's father did not appear to object to the interview or its results when he spoke with Deputy Johnson immediately thereafter. In fact, Bybee's father was helpful in arranging for Bybee's temporary release from CBS in order to locate the child's burial site and even accompanied the search party from Las Vegas to Page, Arizona. Regardless of such speculation, the fact remains that Bybee's father was not present. That fact does not render By-bee's waiver invalid, however. As we stated in Dutchie, "while the presence of a parent or an attorney is a factor that should be considered by the court, it is not determinative, and the lack thereof does not make the waiver invalid per se." Dutchie,
1 30 We conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in holding that Bybee knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. At the time of his confession he was almost seventeen and one-half years old, of average intelligence, possessed of a ninth grade edu
CONCLUSION
131 We hold that Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8(d) does not apply to the instant case because CBS is not a "detention facility" as contemplated by the Utah Code. Further, under the totality of the cireumstances test, the trial court correctly held that Bybee knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to confessing. We affirm the trial court's refusal to suppress Bybee's confession.
Notes
. The State contends that the Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not apply at all in this case. Because we conclude that Bybee's interview clearly did not take place in a "detention facility," we need not reach the question of the general applicability of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure.
. In assessing Bybee's ability to comprehend his Miranda rights, the trial court employed language from In re Gault,
. Nonetheless, Dr. Behrens also testified that at the time of the interview, Bybee's condition had substantially improved since his admittance to CBS. For instance, Dr. Behrens concluded that Bybee's judgment had improved from a 2 to a 5 or 6, (on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being normal), and that Bybee's depression had improved from being in the top 25% of depressed people, in terms of severity, to being in the 50% range. Dr. Behrens further observed that Bybee was showing a greater interest in life and wanted to leave the CBS facility.
. So long as no coercion exists, a discussion of Bybee's actual motivation for waiving his rights and confessing is not required. "[The Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned 'with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'" Colorado v. Connelly,