207 Conn. 619 | Conn. | 1988
Lead Opinion
The defendant, Mélico Butler, was charged with the crimes of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2),
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in admitting into evidence, for purposes of impeaching the credibility of a defense witness, a typewritten but unsigned out-of-court statement made by the witness, (2) in charging the jury on its use of the statement, (3) in lowering the state’s burden of proof on an element of the crime, by virtue of its charge to the jury on the statement, (4) in failing to instruct the jury on the degree of certitude necessary to arrive at a verdict of guilty, and (5) in instructing the jury on the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We find no error.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On February 18,1986, at approximately 8 p.m., two men committed a robbery at the Brewster Pharmacy in Waterbury. One of the men was wearing a brown, three quarter length coat and a green ski mask, and he was carrying a rifle. The other man was Anthony Nichols. After they had collected the money from the cash registers, the robbers fled the scene. A witness who saw the men running from the pharmacy flagged down a police cruiser and told the police officer the direction in which they had gone. The police officer followed the trail of the suspects to the backyard at 101 Division Street in Waterbury where he was
I
The defendant’s first three claims pertain to the admission into evidence of a statement allegedly made by Nichols to a police detective that directly contradicted Nichols’ trial testimony. Against the advice of defense counsel and at the defendant’s insistence, Nichols was called as a defense witness. He testified that, on the afternoon of February 18,1986, he had borrowed the defendant’s rifle, telling the defendant that he needed it to protect himself from some persons with whom he had had some problems. He stated that, on the evening in question, he and an accomplice committed the robbery; that the accomplice was not the defendant but another person known to Nichols only by his nickname, J.D.L.; and that, following the robbery, he and J.D.L. ran through a number of yards, eventually arriving at a yard where they found the defendant working on his car. Nichols further testified that J.D.L. threw off his coat and continued to run, but Nichols stayed behind, waiting for the defendant to give him a ride. He said the police then arrived and arrested him and the defendant. Nichols asserted that he had not given any statement to the police.
On cross-examination, Nichols admitted that he had spoken to Detective John Maia on the night of the robbery and had told him that he had committed the robbery, but had not named his accomplice. The state then
When cross-examination of Nichols resumed, the state again showed him the statement which he maintained he had never seen until that day. He adhered to his testimony that J.D.L., not the defendant, had been his accomplice in the Brewster Pharmacy robbery. He also asserted that Maia had wanted him to implicate the defendant in the robbery but that he had not done so. He repeated that although he had recounted the robbery to Maia, Maia had not, in his presence, typed any statement, nor had he asked Nichols to read a typed statement.
Subsequently, the state called Maia. He testified that, sometime after 3 a.m. of the day following the robbery, after he had advised Nichols of his constitutional rights, he had interviewed him in the cell block at the police department. He said that Nichols had admitted to having committed the robbery, at which point, Maia had brought him to the detective bureau where a typewriter
The state then offered the statement as a full exhibit and defense counsel objected on the ground that it was hearsay. The state responded that it offered the statement as a prior inconsistent statement. The court ruled that a prior inconsistent statement, although hearsay, is admissible for the sole purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, and advised counsel that it would instruct the jury that use of the statement was limited to impeachment purposes and it could not be used for the substantive purpose of determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The defendant excepted to the ruling. Maia, thereupon, was permitted to read the statement aloud. The statement described, allegedly in Nichols’ own words, how Nichols and the defendant had planned and executed the robbery, directly contradicting Nichols’ trial testimony. Immediately thereafter, the court formally charged the jury as promised. Maia testified that Nichols had named only the defendant as his accomplice and had never mentioned anyone called J.D.L. He stated further that, had Nichols mentioned J.D.L., it would have appeared in the statement.
In its charge to the jury at the close of the evidence, the court again cautioned the jury that the statement could be used only to test Nichols’ credibility and added
A
The defendant concedes that a prior inconsistent statement of a witness, whether oral or written, is admissible to impeach the credibility of the witness. He principally objects to the form in which the statement was admitted, contending that, because it was neither signed nor adopted by Nichols, it was hearsay, admitted to prove the substantive fact that the statement was made. The state counters that the statement, having been offered for the sole purpose of impeachment, was properly admitted, and the scope of its use was adequately conveyed to the jury by the trial court. We agree with the state.
“It is fundamental that for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of his testimony, a witness may be cross-examined as to statements made out of court or in other proceedings which contradict those made upon direct examination.” State v. Saia, 172 Conn. 37, 45, 372 A.2d 144 (1976); C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed.) § 7.24.3 (a); see also
Usually, the foundation for introducing a prior inconsistent statement is laid by asking the witness on cross-examination whether he made the statement and alerting him to the time and place at which it was made. Adams v. Herald Publishing Co., 82 Conn. 448, 452-53, 74 A. 755 (1909); Bradley v. Gorham, 77 Conn. 211, 213, 58 A. 698 (1904). Where the witness denies having made the statement or is unable to recall having done so, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show it was made. State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 534-35, 529 A.2d 653 (1987); G & R Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 61; State v. Saia, supra.
The defendant argues, however, that the typewritten, unsigned statement was hearsay, relying principally on Judge Levin’s dissenting opinion in People v. Rodgers, 36 Mich. App. 211, 220-31, 193 N.W.2d 412 (1971), which was adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court when it reversed the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals. People v. Rodgers, 388 Mich. 513, 201 N.W.2d 621 (1972). In Rodgers, a police detective, over the objection of the defendant, read a memorandum containing a statement allegedly taken from a defense witness who never signed it. The trial court had admitted the statement under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule. The Court of Appeals held that it was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement, that a proper foundation had been laid, that it was a question of fact for the finder to determine whether the writing was a verbatim transcription of the witness’ statement or the conclusion of the detective, and that the jury had been instructed that its use was limited to impeachment of the witness’ credibility. People v. Rodgers, 36 Mich. App. 211, 217-20, 193 N.W.2d 412 (1971).
As to the status of the statement as a prior inconsistent statement, the dissent asserted that, while the statement itself was admissible to impeach the witness’ credibility, the manner of proving that it had been made resulted in the admission of hearsay. Id., 221. The writing in question opened with the following sentence: “ ‘This is the statement of Samuel King taken by Detec
We are unable to discern any appreciable difference between an evidentiary showing to prove a prior inconsistent oral statement, and that made through Maia’s testimony and the admission of the statement, with the exception of the fact that the typed statement itself was admitted. Proof that a prior inconsistent oral statement was made involves testimony that the statement was made and a recitation of its content. Indeed, the defendant concedes that Maia could have testified with respect to prior inconsistent oral statements for the purpose of impeaching Nichols. Whether Maia testified from memory as to the content of the statement or the content of the statement was introduced in an unsigned,
B
The defendant’s second claim challenges the trial court’s instructions to the jury on its use of the prior inconsistent statement on the ground that the instructions were predicated on the erroneous assumption that the statement was admissible and not hearsay. We have resolved the issue of its admissibility in part IA of this opinion and, accordingly, need not address this argument.
The defendant also contends that the trial court’s instructions on how the jury was to determine whether it was Nichols’ statement were erroneous and misleading. The state points out that the defendant did not file a request to charge on this issue, nor did he take an exception to this part of the charge or request a supplemental instruction, and that, accordingly, the alleged error is not reviewable. The defendant, nonetheless, urges us to grant review under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973), which permits review of an unpreserved claim where the record adequately supports a claim that the defendant has been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial. He argues that since the evidence does not support the court’s characterization of Maia’s testimony as stating that Nichols acknowledged the statement, the jury might have construed the court’s comments as telling them how to resolve a disputed issue of fact.
We disagree with the defendant that review of this claim under Evans is warranted. The court was careful to explain to the jury that, while the court might comment on the evidence, the jury was in no way bound
C
The defendant’s remaining claims with respect to the charge on the statement are similarly unmeritorious. The defendant asserts that the jury should have been charged that they could believe Maia and still find that Nichols did not adopt the statement because Maia’s testimony was insufficient to prove that fact. The defendant made no such request to charge nor did he except to the charge as given or ask for a supplemental charge. We shall, therefore, not consider this claim.
He also contends that the charge diluted the state’s burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt the defense’s evidence of the absence of the defendant at the scene of the crime. Throughout his brief, the defendant characterizes Nichols’ testimony as “reverse” or “insider’s” alibi evidence and claims that he was entitled to have the jury charged that Maia’s testimony, together with other evidence in the case, must be
A defendant asserting an alibi and relying upon it as a defense is entitled to have the jury charged that the evidence offered by him on that subject is to be considered by them in connection with all the rest of the evidence in ascertaining whether he was present, and that if a reasonable doubt on that point exists, it is the jury’s duty to acquit him. State v. McKnight, 191 Conn. 564, 584, 469 A.2d 397 (1983). We need not decide, however, whether the defendant was entitled to this charge since he failed to request it at trial. “[A] trial court has no duty to instruct upon alibi in the absence of a request, and . . . the failure to instruct in such an instance will not ordinarily constitute reversible error, even though substantial alibi evidence may have been introduced by the defense.” State v. Parham, 174 Conn. 500, 510, 391 A.2d 148 (1978). The defendant asserts that the omission of an alibi instruction is reviewable under Evans. The court instructed the jury that its deliberations must cease if it found that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the scene of the robbery. The defendant does not claim error in this aspect of the charge. Under such circumstances, the defendant was not deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial. Id., 510-11.
II
The defendant argues that the court impermissibly diluted the state’s burden of proving him guilty beyond
A
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that if a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt exists, he must be acquitted. The defendant had requested that the jury be charged as follows: “What the law does require, however, is that after hearing all the evidence, if there is something in that evidence or lack of evidence which leaves in the minds of the jury, as reasonable men and women, a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused, the accused must be given the benefit of that doubt and acquitted. If there is not reasonable doubt, then the accused must be found guilty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof which precludes every reasonable hypothesis except [guilt], is consistent with guilt, and is inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. If you can, in reason, reconcile all of the facts proved
The defendant cites as erroneous the following language from the jury charge: “The demonstration of guilt need be only beyond a reasonable doubt, one that a reasonable person reasonably entertains after a fair evaluation of all the evidence in the case.” He argues that the charge connects reasonableness to the demonstration of guilt, not to the presumption of innocence. We disagree.
A jury instruction is to be examined in its entirety and its correctness tested by whether the charge as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will be done. State v. Lytell, 206 Conn. 657, 664, 539 A.2d 133 (1988); State v. Simms, supra, 416. “ ‘A charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding them to a correct verdict in the case.’ Amato v. Desenti, 117 Conn. 612, 617, 169 A. 611 [1933]; State v. Harris, 172 Conn. 223, 226, 374 A.2d 203 [1977].” State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 304-305, 386 A.2d 243 (1978). Therefore, we must examine the challenged language in the context of the entire charge.
The court clearly related the presumption of innocence to reasonable doubt. It charged the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that, if an item of evidence is capable of two reasonable constructions, one of which is consistent with innocence, it is to be construed in favor of innocence; that the presumption of innocence applies to every element of the crime charged; and that the state bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of innocence by establishing proof of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then
The court also apprised the jury that, if it found that the state had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been the person who robbed the Brewster Pharmacy, it must find-him not guilty. Furthermore, after charging the jury on the elements of robbery, the court instructed the jury that, if they did not find that all the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then it must find the defendant not guilty. At several other points in the charge, the court referred to the state’s burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Viewing the charge as a whole, we are satisfied that it adequately and fairly apprised the jury of the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The portion pertaining to the character of reasonable doubt is substantially similar to charges we heretofore have found acceptable. See, e.g., State v. Simms, supra; State v. Moss, 189 Conn. 364, 368, 456 A.2d 274 (1983); State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 170-71, 434 A.2d 356, cert.
B
Finally, the defendant argues that the court’s charge on reasonable doubt failed to convey the degree of certitude necessary to convict him because it did not apprise the jury that it must have been convinced of his guilt to a “moral certainty,” or by “utmost certainty,” or to “near certainty.” We have previously considered whether a trial court’s charge on reasonable doubt requires the use of such language and have resolved this issue against the defendant. State v. Simms, supra, 419; State v. Ryerson, 201 Conn. 333, 341-42, 514 A.2d 337 (1986).
Nor do we find error in the court’s admonition to the jury to disregard defense counsel’s use of the term “moral certainty” in his discussion of reasonable doubt. Defense counsel had stated to the jury: “You promised me that you understood and believed in the presumption of innocence, that the accused in a criminal trial is innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You promised me that you understood and believed that someone accused of a crime does not have to prove his own innocence. The burden of proof, ladies and gentlemen, is not with the accused, but with the state. This is the United States, this is not Moscow or Nicaragua. The state has a heavy burden. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not absolute certainty, certainly not, but moral certainty.”
Following its explanation of reasonable doubt, the court stated: “It is my recollection, ladies and gentle
A trial court is required to give jury instructions that are accurate in law, adapted to the issues and adequate to guide the jury in reaching a correct verdict. State v. McDermott, 190 Conn. 20, 25, 458 A.2d 689 (1983); State v. Williams, 182 Conn. 262, 269, 438 A.2d 80 (1980). A criminal defendant is entitled to a clear and unequivocal charge that his guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DelVecchio, 191 Conn. 412, 420, 464 A.2d 813 (1983). We have recognized that “ ‘[attempts to explain the term “reasonable doubt” do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.’ Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312, 26 L. Ed. 481 (1881).” Id. We have further noted that “ ‘[jjudicial attempts to clarify the meaning of the phrase “reasonable doubt” by explanation, elaboration or illustration . . . more often than not tend to confuse or mislead.’ United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1976).” Id.; see also State v. Ryerson, supra, 342. Likewise, we find no abuse of discretion in the court instructing the jury to disregard argument by counsel tending to cloud the meaning of so important a concept as reasonable doubt. In so doing, the trial court discharged its duty to give jury instructions that are accurate in law, adapted to
There is no error.
In this opinion Peters, C. J., Callahan and Covello, Js., concurred.
“[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-134. robbery in the first degree .... (a) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime ... (2) is armed with a deadly weapon.”
“[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-40. persistent offenders: definitions; defense; authorized sentences, (a) A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first or third degree, sexual assault in the first or third degree with a firearm, robbery in the first or second degree, or assault in the first degree; and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned, under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution for any of the following crimes: (A) The crimes enumerated in subdivision (1), the crime of murder, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes or murder; or (B) prior
According to the state, the defendant and Nichols were seated on a stairway leading to a porch at 101 Division Street and the clothes and rifle were behind the defendant. The defendant states that Nichols picked up the clothes and gun and placed them on the porch, and that the defendant was in the yard repairing his car.
The state also notes that the defendant failed to file a notice of intent to offer a defense of alibi as required by Practice Book § 763. In light of our disposition of this issue, we need not address the effect of this failure.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. Although I agree with the remainder of the majority opinion, I disagree with the portion of part IA holding that there was no error in the admission of the typewritten document prepared by Detective John Maia that purported to be the unsigned statement of a witness for the defense, Anthony Nichols. Nevertheless, I concur in the result because, apart from the admission of the document, Maia testified to the same critical fact contained in the unsigned statement, viz. that Nichols had named the defendant as his companion in the robbery. Such an evidentiary ruling has no constitutional implications, and, therefore, the defendant must demonstrate that the admission of the unsigned statement for the purpose of impeaching Nichols was probably harmful to him. State v. Artieri, 206 Conn. 81, 88, 536 A.2d 567 (1988). Not only is there other testimony of Maia concerning the gist of his conversation with Nichols, but it is apparent that, even if the document had been excluded from evidence, its entire substance could have been introduced through the oral testimony of Maia by using it to refresh his recollection. See C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed.) § 7.14.1. If Maia had no present memory of particular details capable of being refreshed by reference to the document, those portions of his typewritten account of what Nichols had told him would have been admissible as a past recollection recorded. Id., § 11.21.
Despite its harmlessness in this case, the admission of Maia’s written account of what Nichols told him concerning the robbery was a violation of the hearsay rule
The federal courts have now abandoned some restrictions upon the admissibility of prior statements, written or oral, made by a declarant-witness available for cross-examination. Fed. R. Evid. 801. Perhaps this court should follow that lead, since it would eliminate many troublesome evidentiary problems in the admission of such documentary evidence. The majority opinion, however, does not purport to take such a giant step in concluding that the admission of Maia’s written version of Nichols’ statement was not erroneous.
Accordingly, I disagree wih the implicit view of the majority that the admission of that document comports with our previous decisions concerning the introduction of documentary evidence.