MEMORANDUM DECISION
11 Dеfendant Jason Lyle Butler appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. After the district court denied his suppression motion, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, see generally State v. Sery,
T2 Defendant argues that his rights protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution were violated by
I. Defendant's Traffic Stop Based on an Agent's Observation that Defendant Committed a Minor Traffic Violation Was Constitutional.
Defendant Failed to Establish a Flaw in the Evidence on Which the Court Relied.
13 Defendant initially argues that the State produced insuffiсient evidence at the suppression hearing to justify the traffic stop based on Defendant's minor traffic violation. Although Defendant acknowledges in his brief that "both Agents [Brandon] Beck and [Kasey] Burell stated that Defendant failed to signal when he was exiting from the curb," Defendant suggests that this evidence was insufficient because it contradicted his own testimony that he had properly signaled. Despite listing supporting evidence, Defendant has not established the fatal flaw in the evidence on which the district court relied. See State v. Hodge,
¶4 Rather than pointing to a flaw in the evidence, Defendant essentially urges us to reweigh the credibility of the witnesses.
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We decline to do so. See generally State v. Hansen,
B. Based on the District Court's Findings, the Traffic Stop Was Constitutional.
¶5 an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a "seizurе" within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments." State v. Preece,
¶6 Defendant requests that we evaluate the reasonableness of the stop and the seope of the stop, including the subsequent arrest, based solely on the stop for a minor traffic violation. At oral argument, Defendant's counsel also urged us to consider the reason the agents initially gave for justifying the stop, i.e., the traffic violation. However, we "look to the totality of the cireumstances present at thе time of the stop to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity," see id., rather than considering only selective facts or the agents' subjective intent.
¶7 Here, "there was an objective basis for suspecting" that Defendant not only committed a traffic offense but was also committing a crime by possessing and transporting drugs "at the time of the stop." See id. Prior to stоpping Defendant, Agent Beck, who had been working at the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force for three years and had been a police officer for eight years, had received information from a confidential informant (the CI), who had previously provided Agent Beck and another officer with information that led to criminal prosecutions. The CI provided Agent Beck with a spеcific address to which Defendant would be traveling in his green Dodge truck. The CI advised the police that the Defendant's truck contained a hidden compartment in the driver's side door panel, which would be used to transport approximately ten grams of methamphetamine that evening. Agent Burrell went with Agent Beck to the address the CI identified; Agent Beck recognized the address as a suspected "drug house" and considered at least one person living at the address to be involved in narcotics distribution. Approximately thirty minutes after Agent Beck received the information from the CI, Agents Beck and Burrell saw Defendant arrive at that address in a green Dodge truck, enter the residence for approximately five to ten minutes, leave the residence, and pull away from the curb without properly signaling. The CI then called Agent Beck and told him that Defendant was leaving the residence and that he still had the drugs in the secret compartment in the driver's side door. Agent Beck believed, based on this information, that the CI had personal knowledge of the information.
¶8 "'Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessеd by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors-quantity and quality-are considered in the totality of the cireumstances....'" Humphrey,
III. Defendant's Arrest, Supported by Probable Cause, Was Constitutional.
¶9 The same facts that justify the stop of Defendant's vehicle also justify the seoрe of the stop, including Defendant's subsequent arrest. Once more, Defendant argues that his alleged failure to signal did not justify the stop and detention. However, we do not limit our review of the agents' and officer's (collectively, the agents) actions based on Defendant's failure to signal; instead, we view the seope of the stop and the arrest under the totality of the ciream-stances. See State v. Despain,
¶10 “[The [United States] Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense." " State v. Trane,
The United States Supreme Court defined probable cause justifying an arrest as "facts and cireumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense."
Id. 127 (quoting DeFillippo,
¶11 Because the facts and circumstances known to the agents support a reasonable belief that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity, i.e., possessing and transporting an illegal drug, they had probable cause to detain and arrest Defendant. Thus, we determine that the subsequent detention and arrest following the stop were constitutionally valid.
IV. The Search of Defendant's Truck Was Constitutional Based on the Automobile Exception.
¶12 Finally, Defendant argues that the search of his truck without a warrant also violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant argues that there were no exigent cireumstances to justify the search, that it was not permitted as a search incident to arrest, and that the inventory search exception, which is allowed when a vehicle is impounded, is inapplicable. Nevertheless, we determine that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies here to validate the search. Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a war-rantless search is allowed "'if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contrabаnd.'"
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Despain,
€ 13 Defendant has not challenged the district court's finding that Defendant's truck was "readily mobile," see id. 118, and we agree with the district court that the agents had probable cause to believe that Defendant's truck contained contraband. The CI gave Agent Beck specific information regarding the color and make of the truck, as well as where the drugs would be located within the truck. Agent Beck corroborated part of this information when the truck arrived at the address given by the CI, an address that Agent Beck knew had previously been associated with narcotics. Given these facts, the agents had probable cause to search the truck because the automobile exception requirements were met, ie., the truck was readily mobile and probable cause existed to believe that the truck contained contraband. See id. Thus, the search of Defendant's truck was constitutional.
{14 In conclusion, because the stop, arrest, and search were constitutionally valid, we affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
15 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge, and STEPHEN L. ROTH, Judge.
Notes
. We cite to the current version of the code for the reader's convenience because the subsequent amendments do not affect this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 amend. notes (Supp. 2010).
. Because Defendant does not make any separatе arguments under the Utah Constitution, we consider his appeal only under the protections afforded by the United States Constitution. See State v. Worwood,
. Defendant also argues that the traffic stop was a pretext. Although the district court may consider an officer's subjective intent when evaluating the credibility of the officer's stated reason for stopping a defendant, see State v. Lopez,
. Although Defendant acknowledges that both Agent Beck and Agent Burell stated that Defendant had not signaled, the district court's findings stated that "the agent observed that [Defendant] failed to use his signal." (Emphasis added.) However, for purposes of our analysis, so long as either agent observed Defendant's failure to signal and the district court believed that testimony over Defendant's testimony, the stop for Defendant's failure to signal was constitutional.
. The district court made a conclusion of law that stated,
The Court finds that because the vehicle was readily mobile at the time of the stop and because the Defendant was alerted to the police presence when he was arrested, there existed exigent circumstances sufficient to allow police to search the motor vehicle for the contraband without first obtaining a search warrant.